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Einführung: Drei Fälle von Organisationskrisen 
Krisen sind in gewisser Hinsicht ein paradoxes Phänomen. Auf einer gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
– oder gar globalen – Betrachtungsebene ist beinahe alltäglich von Organisationen zu hören 
oder zu lesen, die herausgefordert sind, auf kritische Situationen zu reagieren. Dies ist nicht 
zuletzt auf die Entwicklung immer komplexerer Technologien zurückzuführen (Perrow 
1984a), welche zugleich immer höheren Anforderungen bezüglich ihrer Verlässlichkeit unter-
liegen (Roberts 1990; Weick/Sutcliffe/Obstfeld 1999). Insgesamt scheinen Organisationskri-
sen nahezu unvermeidlich (Smart/Vertinsky 1977) und gerade deshalb eine intensivere Be-
trachtung wert zu sein (Hermann 1963). Auf der Ebene der individuellen Organisation ist eine 
Krise ein sehr selten auftretendes, aber wirkungsvolles Ereignis, dessen Ursachen schwer zu 
bestimmen sind (Hermann, 1963; Pearson and Clair, 1998). Diese Eigenschaften haben eine 
Vielzahl von Fallstudien über verschiedenste Organisationskrisen ermöglicht (bspw. Shri-
vastava 1992; Vaughan 1990; Weick 1990, 1993). Als Ausgangspunkt dieser Arbeit sowie zur 
Veranschaulichung des Themengebiets sollen drei exemplarische Fälle von Organisationskri-
sen dienen, welche im Folgenden kurz beschrieben werden. 
Am 24. März 1989 lief der Öltanker Exxon Valdez vor der Küste des US-Bundesstaats Alaska 
auf Grund. Infolge der Havarie traten etwa 40 Millionen Liter Rohöl aus und richteten schwe-
re Umweltschäden an, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Wildtierbestände. Der Vorfall gilt bis 
heute als eines der schwersten – und vermutlich bekanntesten – Tankerunglücke aller Zeiten 
(McLane/Bratic/Berstin 1999). Die Firma Exxon, damals das weltgrößte Unternehmen der 
Energiebranche, verhielt sich zunächst sehr zurückhaltend. So verging eine volle Woche, bis 
sich der Chief Executive Officer (CEO) des Unternehmens zu dem Unfall äußerte. Zudem 
wurde eine Zeitungsannonce geschaltet, die zwar eine Entschuldigung, aber kein Schuldein-
geständnis enthielt (McLane et al. 1999). Vielmehr versuchte Exxon die Schuld an der
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Havarie abzuwälzen, indem der Kapitän des Schiffs sowie die zuständigen Behörden in Alas-
ka als Verantwortliche dargestellt wurden (Pfarrer/DeCelles/Smith/Taylor 2008). Darüber 
hinaus war Exxon bestrebt, die durch die Ölpest entstehenden Schäden systematisch herunter-
zuspielen (Benoit 1995). Die Folgen für das Unternehmen waren erheblich. Abgesehen von 
hohen Geldstrafen und Schadenersatzzahlungen wurde die Reaktion auf das Unglück als völ-
lig unangemessen und hilflos eingestuft. Tausende Kunden gaben aus Protest ihre Kreditkar-
ten zurück. Mehrere Aktivistengruppen bereiteten Boykottkampagnen vor. Der CEO war an-
lässlich der Hauptversammlung scharfer Kritik vonseiten enttäuschter Aktionäre augesetzt 
(Benoit 1995). Im Unternehmensranking der Zeitschrift Fortune fiel Exxon innerhalb eines 
Jahres von Rang sechs auf Rang 110. Zudem wurde Exxon zu einem populären Ziel der Ver-
höhnung im US-amerikanischen Fernsehen (McLane et al. 1999). Obwohl die Krise in finan-
zieller Hinsicht gut bewältigt werden konnte, ist die Reaktion Exxons aus Sicht der Organisa-
tionsforschung als Fehlschlag zu bezeichnen (Pearson/Clair 1998). 
Eine ähnliche Bilanz lässt sich für den Fall Firestone ziehen. Am 9. August 2000 gab das Un-
ternehmen einen Produktrückruf von insgesamt sechseinhalb Millionen Autoreifen bekannt. 
Bereits seit dem Jahr 1992 gab es Hinweise darauf, dass sich die Reifen der betroffenen Ty-
pen bei hohen Temperaturen auflösen könnten. Als sich die Informationen über Produktsi-
cherheitsprobleme immer weiter verdichteten, wurden offizielle Ermittlungen eingeleitet, auf 
welche Firestone mit der Rückrufaktion reagierte. Die Ermittlungen ergaben, dass eine große 
Zahl von Verkehrsunfällen mit insgesamt 271 Todesopfern auf fehlerhafte Reifen zurückzu-
führen war. Wie sich zeigte, hatte das Unternehmen in den Jahren zuvor versucht, die beste-
henden Probleme zu verschleiern. Auch nach Bekanntwerden der Sicherheitsmängel wurde 
deren Existenz geleugnet. Zudem wurde versucht die Schuld der Firma Ford, deren Fahrzeuge 
in die meisten Unfälle verwickelt waren, zuzuweisen – trotz einer beinahe hundertjährigen 
Geschäftsbeziehung. Verstärkt wurde die hierdurch ausgelöste öffentliche Empörung durch 
die Tatsache, dass die Rückrufaktion zunächst in mehreren anderen Ländern und erst mit Ver-
zögerung in den USA umgesetzt wurde. Zwar wurden auch Maßnahmen zur zukünftigen 
Vermeidung solcher Probleme getroffen, etwa durch Einrichtung neuer Qualitätskontrollen, 
jedoch hatte die Mehrheit der US-amerikanischen Bevölkerung noch Monate später ein nega-
tives Bild vom Gebaren Firestones (Blaney/Benoit/Brazeal 2002). 
Eine wesentlich effektivere Krisenbewältigung zeigt der Fall Texaco. Im November 1996 
wurde bekannt, dass ein Gerichtsverfahren wegen Diskriminierung gegen Texaco anhängig 
war. Es waren geheime Tonbandaufzeichnungen aufgetaucht, auf denen sich hochrangige 
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Führungskräfte beleidigend über dunkelhäutige Angestellte des Unternehmens äußerten. Die 
resultierende Medienberichterstattung war ausgiebig und überwiegend negativ geprägt (Brin-
son/Benoit 1999). Zahlreiche Kunden kündigten an, keine Produkte des Unternehmens mehr 
zu kaufen oder beteiligten sich an Demonstrationen vor Texaco-Tankstellen. Auch Investoren 
übten scharfe Kritik; der Kurs der Texaco-Aktie verlor deutlich an Wert. Die Reaktion der 
Unternehmensführung auf diese Krise unterschied sich jedoch deutlich von den oben be-
schriebenen Fällen. Der CEO von Texaco hörte sich persönlich das Tonband an und veröf-
fentlichte sofort eine Entschuldigung, beurlaubte zwei der beteiligten Führungskräfte und 
kürzte die Sozialleistungen zweier weiterer. Zudem bereisten hochrangige Manager alle 
Standorte des Unternehmens und entschuldigten sich dort für die Vorkommnisse. Darüber 
hinaus wurden Förderprogramme für die Integration von Minderheiten, etwa durch mehr Be-
förderungen oder bevorzugte Auftragsvergabe, aufgelegt. Im Rahmen des gerichtlichen Ver-
gleichs wurden den dunkelhäutigen Mitarbeitern außerdem Lohn- und Gehaltserhöhungen 
sowie Entschädigungen in Millionenhöhe zuteil. Die Reaktion Texacos wurde in der Öffent-
lichkeit als zügig und entschieden wahrgenommen und die Berichterstattung über den Vorfall 
verebbte rasch. Auch aus Sicht der Organisationsforschung wird die Vorgehensweise als Er-
folg gewertet (Brinson/Benoit 1999; McLane et al. 1999; Coombs/Schmitt 2000; Pfarrer et al. 
2008). 
Problemstellung 
Die drei skizzierten Fälle zeigen zum Einen das breite Spektrum an möglichen Reaktionen auf 
Organisationskrisen. So finden sich beispielsweise Schweigen, Verschleierung, Leugnung, 
Schuldabwälzung, Entschuldigung, Entschädigung, Trennung und Restrukturierung. Neben 
diesen qualitativ unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen war auch das „Timing“ der Reaktionen sehr 
verschieden. Während vor allem bei Firestone sehr zögerliche Reaktionen zu beobachten wa-
ren, reagierte Texaco eher schnell. Zu Anderen unterscheiden sich die Fälle stark bezüglich 
des Erfolges in der Krisenbewältigung. Während Exxon und Firestone sich nur schwer von 
der mit den jeweiligen Vorfällen verbundenen Rufschädigung erholen konnten, gelang es Te-
xaco relativ schnell die Krise hinter sich zu lassen und ungeschadet zum Alltagsgeschäft 
überzugehen. Diese Unterschiede bilden den Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Arbeit sowie 
den Ansatzpunkt für deren Zielsetzung. Die leitende Forschungsfrage ist dabei, inwiefern sich 
systematische Zusammenhänge identifizieren lassen, welche erklären, ob bestimmte Reaktio-
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nen auf Krisen effektiver sind als andere und worauf dies zurückzuführen ist. Es bietet sich 
an, zur Beantwortung zunächst die Literatur zu Organisationskrisen zu betrachten. 
Die bisherige Forschung zu Organisationskrisen lässt sich grob in zwei Strömungen gliedern. 
Die eine widmet sich vor allem der Ursachenforschung und wird methodisch durch Fallstu-
dien dominiert. Dabei werden ausführlich die Entstehung und der Verlauf von Krisen – zu-
meist Unfällen – analysiert, wobei üblicherweise die Aspekte Wahrnehmung (Weick 1988, 
1993), Informationsverarbeitung (Rudolph/Repenning 2002) oder soziale Kontrolle (Vaughan 
1990) im Vordergrund stehen. Beispiele sind die Studien des Flugzeugunglücks von Teneriffa 
(Weick 1990), des Industrieunfalls von Bhopal (Shrivastava 1992), der Explosion des Space-
shuttles Challenger (Vaughan 1990) oder des Störfalls im Atomkraftwerk Three Mile Island 
(Perrow 1984b). Die zweite Strömung ist eher präskriptiv ausgerichtet und fokussiert Mög-
lichkeiten der Vermeidung solcher Vorfälle. Es werden Empfehlungen zur Gestaltung von 
organisationalen Strukturen und Prozessen abgegeben, welche die eskalierenden Faktoren der 
Krisenentstehung eindämmen sollen (bspw. Hedberg/Nystrom/Starbuck 1976; Turner 1976; 
Smart/Vertinsky 1977). Einige Autoren konzentrieren sich dabei auf Branchen, welche auf-
grund der dort eingesetzten riskanten Technologien und eng gekoppelten Systemen als beson-
ders anfällig für Krisen identifiziert wurden (bspw. Perrow 1984a; 
Mitroff/Pauchant/Finney/Pearson 1989; Pauchant/Mitroff 1988, 1992). Deutlich weniger Be-
achtung findet die Frage wie Organisationen mit Krisen umgehen können, wenn sie trotz aller 
Prävention dennoch auftreten, mit Ausnahme einiger weniger Arbeiten (bspw. Pearson/Clair 
1998; Pfarrer et al. 2008). Ein anderer Aspekt, welcher wesentlich stärkere Berücksichtigung 
verdient, ist die soziale Dimension der Krisenbewältigung. 
Organisationskrisen aus Legitimitätsperspektive 
Organisationen existieren und handeln nicht völlig unabhängig, sondern sind in ein soziales 
System eingebettet. Eine wichtige Rolle spielen dabei verschiedene Anspruchsgruppen – oder 
Stakeholder – die mit der jeweiligen Organisation in Austausch stehen oder anderweitig in-
volviert sind (Freeman 1984; Donaldson/Preston 1995; Frooman 1999). Beispiele hierfür sind 
Kunden, Mitarbeiter, Lieferanten, Kapitalgeber, aber auch Behörden oder Nichtregierungsor-
ganisationen. Diese Gruppen sind oft Betroffene von Organisationskrisen, wobei in einigen 
Fällen die Gruppe erst durch die Krise entsteht, etwa Opfer von Industrieunfällen (Shrivasta-
va/Mitroff/Miller/Miglani 1988; Marcus/Goodman 1991). In wiederum anderen Fällen kön-
nen Krisen durch unzufriedene Anspruchgruppen, z.B. Kunden, Aktivisten oder Regulie-
rungsbehörden ausgelöst werden (Meyer 1982; Milburn/Schuler/Watman 1983). Darüber hin-
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aus kann die Wahrnehmung der Krise durch Stakeholder die Ausbreitung von Krisen auf an-
dere Organisationen beeinflussen und somit ganze Branchen verändern (Yu/Sengul/Lester 
2008). 
In diesem Zusammenhang ist von großer Bedeutung, dass Stakeholder die jeweilige Organisa-
tion bezüglich ihrer Eigenschaften und Handlungen evaluieren und dementsprechend Ent-
scheidungen treffen: Mitarbeiter passen ihre Loyalität an, Investoren verteilen finanzielle Res-
sourcen und andere Anspruchsgruppen entscheiden über Transaktionen mit der Organisation 
(Carroll/Hannan 2000; Yu et al. 2008). In Abhängigkeit von ihrer Stellung gegenüber der Or-
ganisation greifen Stakeholder dabei auf Berichterstattung in den Medien zurück (Pol-
lock/Rindova 2003; Pfarrer et al. 2008), wobei Krisen in der Regel mit einer gesteigerten Auf-
merksamkeit verbunden sind (James/Wooten 2006). Überdies stellen Krisen eine Bedrohung 
für die positive Evaluation durch Stakeholder dar, indem sie mit einem Verlust gemeinsamer 
Werte und geteilter Annahmen einhergehen und dadurch die Organisation und ihre Leitung 
einer genaueren Überprüfung aussetzten (Turner 1976; Ginzel/Kramer/Sutton 1993; Pear-
son/Clair 1998). Hinzu kommt, dass Akteure in organisationalen Feldern soziale Normen nut-
zen um Unsicherheit zu reduzieren. Stakeholder können Krisen als einen Bruch solcher Nor-
men auffassen (Milburn/Schuler/Watman 1983; Carroll/Hannan 2000; Yu/Sengul/Lester 
2008), welcher durch die Beendigung von Transaktionen, Arbeitsverhältnissen oder finanziel-
ler Unterstützung bestraft wird (Yu/Sengul/Lester 2008). In der Folge einer Krise wird des-
halb die Angemessenheit der Reaktion einer Organisation durch Interaktion in Form von 
Handlungen der Organisation und Feedback der Stakeholder bestimmt (Pfarrer et al. 2008). 
Dieses Wechselspiel ist essentiell für die Wiederherstellung normaler Beziehungen und die 
Rückkehr zu einem geregelten Austausch, durch welchen letztlich der Bestand der Organisa-
tion gesichert wird (Shrivastava et al. 1988; Pearson/Clair 1998; Yu et al. 2008). 
Diese Zusammenhänge lassen sich gut durch das Konstrukt der organisationalen Legitimität 
(bspw. Dowling/Pfeffer 1975; Meyer/Scott 1983; Ashforth/Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995) ab-
bilden. Gemäß der wohl meistzitierten Definition von Suchman (1995) wird eine Organisation 
als legitim angesehen, wenn ihre Handlungen als wünschenswert, richtig oder angemessen 
bezüglich eines sozial konstruierten Systems von Normen, Werten, Vorstellungen und Defini-
tionen sind. Diese Abgrenzung ist kongruent mit der obigen Charakterisierung von Organisa-
tionskrisen, welche eine plötzliche Bedrohung der Legitimität darstellen, indem sie mit einem 
Bruch sozialer Normen einhergehen. Mit anderen Worten: Krisen zeichnen sich durch einen 
unerwarteten Verlust von Legitimität aus. Gewissermaßen stellt eine negative Evaluation 
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durch Stakeholder sogar den Kern organisationaler Krisen dar. Andere mit Krisen verbundene 
Probleme, wie zum Beispiel finanzielle Engpässe, sind lediglich Folgen dieser Evaluation. 
Ausnahmen hiervon bilden etwa Verluste von Menschenleben oder Vermögensgegenständen, 
die mit dem Krisenauslösenden Ereignis, beispielsweise einem Unfall, verbunden sind. Dabei 
kann sich die Einschätzung solcher Verluste durch verschiedene Stakeholder durchaus unter-
scheiden (Billings/Milburn/Schaalman 1980). Welche Rolle organisationale Legitimität im 
Krisenkontext konkret einnehmen könnte, soll im Folgenden erläutert werden. 
Vorgehensweise 
Bezogen auf die Frage, ob bestimmte Krisenreaktionen effektiver sind als andere, wird im 
Rahmen dieser Arbeit organisationale Legitimität als zentrale Variable zur Erklärung heran-
gezogen. Dies soll in Abbildung 1 grafisch verdeutlicht werden. Bislang wurde – wenn der 
Frage überhaupt nachgegangen wurde – unterstellt, dass bestimmte Reaktionen für bestimmte 
Krisenarten zu einer größeren Akzeptanz unter Stakeholdern führen (Marcus/Goodman 1991). 
Dies ist in Abbildung 1 durch gestrichelte Pfeile gekennzeichnet. Bei Vorliegen einer solchen 
Passung leistet die Reaktion einen Beitrag zur Bewältigung der Krise (gepunkteter Pfeil). Im 
Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird nun vorgeschlagen, dass dieser Zusammenhang über das Kon-
strukt der Legitimität zustande kommt. Eine Krisenreaktion wird dann akzeptiert, wenn sie 
zur Wiederherstellung der durch die Krise verringerten Legitimität geeignet ist (durchgezoge-
ne Pfeile). Die Rückgewinnung von Legitimität geht einher mit der Bewältigung der Krise.  
Um dieses Konzept umzusetzen, kann auf die eingangs geschilderten Krisenfälle zurückge-
griffen werden. Wie erwähnt fallen dabei zwei Ansatzpunkte für eine weitergehende Untersu-
chung auf. Zum Einen könnte – im Einklang mit der vorgeschlagenen Legitimitätsperspektive 
– die wahrgenommene Angemessenheit der Reaktion seitens des Unternehmens eine Rolle 
spielen. Bei Exxon und Firestone war eine große Enttäuschung verschiedener Anspruchs-
gruppen mit der Handhabung der Vorfälle zu beobachten. Bei Texaco hingegen zeigten sich 
etwa Bürgerrechtsorganisationen zufrieden mit der Reaktion auf den Rassismusskandal. Zum 
Anderen bestehen Hinweise auf eine gewisse Bedeutung des Timings von Krisenreaktionen. 
Das anfängliche Schweigen seitens Exxon sowie die langjährige Vertuschung und die schlep-
pend verlaufenden Rückrufaktionen bei Firestone waren deutlich weniger erfolgreich als die 
sofortige Reaktion bei Texaco. Eine genauere Beleuchtung dieser ersten Anhaltspunkte wurde 
im Rahmen der drei Fachartikel, welche den Hauptteil dieser Arbeit bilden, vorgenommen. Im 
Folgenden werden diese zusammengefasst. 
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Abbildung 1: Legitimität als zentrales Konstrukt in Organisationskrisen 
Zusammenfassung der drei Fachartikel 
Die drei Fachartikel, hier in chronologischer Reihenfolge dargestellt, bauen aufeinander auf 
und verfolgen gleichzeitig unterschiedliche Vorgehensweisen, so dass sowohl eine stetige 
Vertiefung und Ausdifferenzierung des Wissensstandes als auch eine gewisse Stützung der 
gewonnenen Erkenntnisse erzielt werden konnte. Im ersten Fachartikel werden die beiden aus 
Fallstudien identifizierten Ansatzpunkte Angemessenheit und Timing von Krisenreaktionen 
näher untersucht. Dazu wurde ein Simulationsmodell konstruiert und angewendet. Die wich-
tigste Limitation der Simulationsstudie war Ausgangspunkt des zweiten Fachartikels. Darin 
wird eine umfassende konzeptionelle Grundlage für die Untersuchung von Krisenreaktionen 
aus Legitimitätsperspektive geschaffen. Um die dort deduktiv hergeleiteten Aussagen durch 
empirische Erkenntnisse zu ergänzen, wurde außerdem eine empirische Doppelstudie durch-
geführt, welche im dritten Fachartikel dokumentiert ist. Darin wurden unter Einsatz qualitati-
ver Methoden multiple Fallstudien zu Effekten von Krisen auf organisationale Legitimität 
bzw. zur Wirksamkeit verschiedener Krisenreaktionen durchgeführt. In den folgenden Zu-
sammenfassungen werden jeweils Ziel, Vorgehensweise und Ergebnisse vorgestellt sowie 
ggf. zum nächsten – darauf aufbauenden – Artikel übergeleitet. 
Erster Fachartikel: „Exploring Organizational Crises from a Legitimation 
Perspective – Results from a Computer Simulation and Illustrative Cases” 
(Breitsohl 2008) 
Zur Untersuchung der identifizierten Ansatzpunkte Angemessenheit und Timing wurde eine 
explorative Vorgehensweise mithilfe von Computersimulation gewählt. Ziel war es, einen 
Erklärungsansatz für die in den drei Fällen beobachteten Unterschiede zu finden. Grundlage 
Legitimität Krise Reaktion 
Akzeptanz durch 
Stakeholder Bewältigung 
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hierfür waren die Möglichkeiten, welche Simulationsmethoden im Rahmen der Theoriebil-
dung bieten (Davis/Eisenhardt/Bingham 2007; Harrison/Lin/Carroll/Carley 2007). Beispiel-
haft sind hier die Steigerung interner Validität und Vertiefung des Verständnisses im Zuge der 
Modellformulierung sowie der Einsatz von Simulationsmodellen als „virtuelles Labor“ zu 
nennen. Der Gang der Untersuchung erfolgte anhand des Schemas von Davis et al. (2007). 
Als Simulationsverfahren wurde System Dynamics (Forrester 1961; Sterman 2000) gewählt. 
Dieser Ansatz ist besonders für die Abbildung von komplexen Kausalbeziehungen – und da-
mit von sozialen Systemen – geeignet. In diesem Fall wurden aus der Literatur zur Legitima-
tionsforschung, teilweise ergänzt durch angrenzende Forschungsströmungen, die essentiellen 
Zusammenhänge bezüglich der Zuschreibung von Legitimität isoliert und zu einem System 
Dynamics-Modell zusammengesetzt. Diese Zusammenhänge sind schematisch vereinfacht in 
Abbildung 2 wiedergegeben und werden im Folgenden kurz beschrieben.  
Zunächst lässt sich das Modell in drei Bereiche unterteilen, nämlich die Reaktion der Organi-
sation auf die Krise (obere Hälfte), die Wahrnehmung der Stakeholder hinsichtlich der Kri-
senreaktion sowie der Organisation im Allgemeinen (untere Hälfte) und schließlich der Be-
reich außerhalb des eigentlichen Modells, dem die als exogen angenommene Krise entspringt. 
Die Krise verringert plötzlich die bestehende, anfänglich hoch ausgeprägte Legitimität der 
Organisation. Darauf reagiert die Organisation mit einer gewissen Verzögerung aufgrund be-
grenzter Informationsverarbeitungskapazität und fehlender passender Routinen. Die Reaktion 
selbst wird im Modell durch ihre Heftigkeit operationalisiert, welche sowohl mit dem akuten 
Verlust an Legitimität (Verlust-Effekt) als auch mit deren zuvor bestehender Knappheit (Ni-
veau-Effekt) zunimmt. Die Stakeholder stehen dieser Reaktion umso skeptischer gegenüber, 
je weniger legitim die Organisation wahrgenommen wird, was die Wirkung der Reaktion mo-
deriert. Zusätzlich wird die Krisenreaktion von den Stakeholdern in ihrer Angemessenheit 
beurteilt, was bei einer als unangemessen wahrgenommenen Reaktion zu einem weiteren Ver-
lust an Legitimität führen kann. 
Im Rahmen der mit dem Modell durchgeführten Simulationsläufe wurden die Schwere der 
Krise sowie die Verzögerung der Reaktion variiert. Dabei zeigte sich, dass bezüglich der Kri-
senschwere eine kritische Schwelle („tipping point“) besteht. Unterhalb dieser Schwelle liegt 
ein nichtlinearer Effekt auf die benötigte Zeit zur Rückgewinnung von Legitimität vor: je 
schwerer die Krise, desto überproportional länger dauert die Wiederherstellung des früheren 
Status der Organisation. Oberhalb der kritischen Schwelle gewinnt die Angemessenheit der 
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Abbildung 2: Simulationsmodell in vereinfachter schematischer Darstellung 
Krisenreaktion stark an Bedeutung. Wird bei einer schweren Krise die Reaktion als unange-
messen – also Überreaktion – wahrgenommen, so „bestrafen“ die Stakeholder die Organisati-
on mit weiterem Legitimitätsentzug und werden zusätzlich misstrauischer. Dies führt seitens 
der Organisation zu noch stärkeren Rettungsversuchen, wodurch ein Teufelskreis aus Überre-
aktion, Skepsis und wahrgenommener Unangemessenheit ausgelöst wird. Dieser verhindert 
nicht nur eine Wiederherstellung, sondern bewirkt einen völligen Verlust an Legitimität. Auch 
hinsichtlich des Timings der Reaktion zeigte sich ein nichtlinearer Effekt. Je später die Reak-
tion auf die Krise erfolgt, desto überproportional länger dauert insgesamt die Wiederherstel-
lung von Legitimität. Hinzu kommt, dass die verbliebene Legitimität weiter verfällt, je länger 
eine Reaktion ausbleibt, was eine Rückgewinnung weiter erschwert. 
Insgesamt liefern die Ergebnisse dieser explorativen Studie wertvolle Hinweise auf die Kau-
salzusammenhänge hinter den sehr unterschiedlichen Krisenverläufen, welche in empirischen 
Fallstudien dokumentiert sind und als Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung dienten. Sowohl die 
Angemessenheit als auch das Timing der Krisenreaktion könnten eine bedeutende Rolle bei 
der Bewältigung spielen. Insbesondere die gefundenen Hinweise auf nichtlineare Effekte und 
die damit zusammenhängende kritische Schwelle können die Forschung zur Krisenwahrneh-
mung bereichern. Unter Rückbezug auf die drei eingangs vorgestellten Fälle lässt sich fest-
stellen, dass im Fall Texaco eine wesentlich schnellere Reaktion vorlag als bei Exxon und 
Firestone, so dass kaum weitere Legitimitätsverluste durch Verzögerung auftreten konnten. 
Zudem wurde die Reaktion als wesentlich angemessener eingestuft, was eine Bewältigung der 
Reaktion 
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Krise weiter vereinfachte, so dass Texaco den Skandal weitestgehend unbeschadet überstehen 
konnte. 
Gleichzeitig ist festzuhalten, dass die Simulationsstudie gewissen Limitationen unterliegt. 
Dies betrifft primär die Eindimensionalität der Variablen des Modells. So wurde im Modell 
von einer einzigen Art von Legitimität ausgegangen, wohingegen die Literatur zwischen meh-
reren Dimensionen des Konstrukts unterscheidet. Die Krise wurde, ebenfalls der Sparsamkeit 
halber, als eindimensional abgebildet, während sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch ver-
schiedene Arten von Organisationskrisen diskutiert werden. Auch bei der Krisenreaktion 
wurde lediglich die Stärke modelliert. In der Realität könnten jedoch qualitative Unterschiede 
von Bedeutung sein. In einem nächsten Schritt sollte deshalb diese Eindimensionalität über-
wunden werden. Dies bildet den Gegenstand des zweiten Fachartikels. 
Zweiter Fachartikel: „Linking Organizational Crises and Reactive Strate-
gies via Dimensions of Legitimacy” (Breitsohl 2009a) 
Um der Differenziertheit der zentralen Aspekte von Organisationskrisen, aufbauend auf einer 
vorläufigen Bestätigung der Legitimitätsperspektive durch die Simulationsstudie, besser 
Rechnung zu tragen, bestand die Zielsetzung nun in der „Auffächerung“ der Hauptbestandtei-
le des Grundkonzepts der Arbeit. Dies ist schematisch in Abbildung 3 dargestellt. Es sollte 
nun jeweils zwischen verschiedenen Arten von Krisen, Legitimität und Reaktionen unter-
schieden werden. Der Erklärungsansatz wurde also dahingehend modifiziert, dass sowohl 
unterschiedliche Krisentypen als auch Reaktionsklassen auf verschiedene Legitimitätsdimen-
sionen wirken. Dieses Zusammenspiel über die Dimensionen des Legitimitätskonstrukts soll 
die Effektivität von Reaktionen im Kontext von verschiedenen Krisen erklären. Um eine sol-
che Erklärung zu fundieren, musste zu jeder der drei Komponenten die relevante Literatur 
gesichtet, kondensiert und systematisiert werden, wobei anzumerken ist, dass sich die jeweili-
gen Wissensbestände nur teilweise überschneiden. Ergebnis der Literaturarbeit sind drei Ty-
pologien, die zwischen vier Legitimitätsdimensionen, drei Krisentypen und vier Reaktions-
klassen unterscheiden. Im Rahmen des Fachartikels werden diese ausführlich hergeleitet und 
vorgestellt. Hier sollen sie nun kurz zusammengefasst werden. 
Die Literatur zur organisationalen Legitimität enthält mehrere Klassifikationen, die sich so-
wohl in ihrem Differenzierungsgrad als auch in ihrer inhaltlichen Abgrenzung unterscheiden. 
Aldrich und Fiol (1994) unterscheiden zwischen zwei Dimensionen, welche später auf drei 
ausdifferenziert wurden (Aldrich/Ruef 2006). Bei Scott (1995) finden sich drei ähnlich
 Organisationale Reaktionen auf Krisen aus Legitimitätsperspektive 
  11 
Abbildung 3: „Auffächern“ der Hauptelemente der Arbeit 
abgegrenzte Dimensionen. Suchman (1995) wiederum präsentiert ein dreigliedriges Modell, 
das jedoch in der Aufteilung von den anderen beiden abweicht. Insgesamt konnten dennoch 
vier relevante Aspekte von Legitimität isoliert werden, welche mit den Attributen regulativ, 
pragmatisch, moralisch/normativ und kognitiv bezeichnet werden. Dabei entspricht regulative 
Legitimität der Wahrnehmung, dass die fokale Organisation sich an geltende Gesetze und 
kodifizierte Normen (bspw. DIN) hält. Pragmatische Legitimität wird zugeschrieben, wenn 
die Organisation als guter Austausch- und Kooperationspartner wahrgenommen wird. Morali-
sche oder normative Legitimität ist mit der Einhaltung gesellschaftlicher Wertvorstellungen 
verknüpft, während kognitive Legitimität die Verständlichkeit und Selbstverständlichkeit des 
Zwecks und Handelns der Organisation umfasst. 
Hinsichtlich der Literatur zu Organisationskrisen ist eine nicht geringere Vielfalt an Systema-
tisierungsansätzen zu finden. Einige Autoren haben dabei Auflistungen von Krisen präsentiert 
(bspw. Pauchant/Mitroff 1992; Pearson/Clair 1998). Die wenigen vorhandenen Typologien 
(Marcus/Goodman 1991; Milburn et al. 1983; Pauchant/Mitroff 1992; Shrivastava et al. 1988) 
unterscheiden sich deutlich in Bezug auf ihre Abgrenzung, Dimensionalität, Detaillierungs-
grad und Fokus. Deshalb wurde eine neue Typologie entwickelt, die Elemente der genannten 
Modelle kombiniert und so eine umfassende Klassifizierung von Organisationstypen unter 
Berücksichtung der Stakeholderperspektive erlaubt. Unterschieden wird zwischen drei Klas-
sen von Krisen, nämlich Unfällen, Skandalen sowie Produktsicherheits- und Gesundheitsvor-
fällen. Diese werden anhand zweier Dimensionen, nämlich der Beeinflussbarkeit durch die 
Organisation (groß vs. gering) und der primären Ursache (technisch vs. human/sozial), cha-
rakterisiert. Skandale sind aufgrund ihres Ursprungs im Kreis der Organisationsmitglieder 
eher leicht zu beeinflussen und haben humane und soziale Ursachen. Unfälle entstehen häufig 
Legitimität Krise Reaktion 
Akzeptanz durch 
Stakeholder Bewältigung 
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aus technologischer Komplexität und sind, nicht zuletzt deshalb, eher schwer zu beeinflussen. 
Produktsicherheits- und Gesundheitsvorfälle liegen jeweils zwischen diesen beiden Polen. Sie 
unterliegen sowohl technischen als auch humanen und sozialen Einflüssen. Gleichzeitig sind 
sie weniger leicht vermeidbar als Skandale, aber nicht so unvorhersehbar wie Unfälle. 
Der vielfältigste und umfangreichste Literaturbestand fand sich zur dritten Komponente des in 
dieser Arbeit verwendeten Ansatzes – den Krisenreaktionen. So existieren zahlreiche Typolo-
gien, die sich jedoch in Breite, Tiefe und Abgrenzung der Typen unterscheiden und teilweise 
widersprechen. Deshalb wurde auch hier eine neue Typologie entwickelt, welche praktisch 
alle bekannten Reaktionstypen abdeckt und nach eindeutigen Kriterien klassifiziert. Diese 
Kriterien wurden dem Aufsatz von Marcus und Goodman (1991) entlehnt und grenzen ab, ob 
eine betroffene Organisation erstens die Existenz eines Problems anerkennt, zweitens die 
Verantwortung für das Problem übernimmt und drittens aktiv zu seiner Lösung beiträgt. Hier-
durch ergeben sich vier Klassen von Reaktionen, welche mit den Bezeichnungen ausweichend 
(z.B. Verschleierung), abwehrend (z.B. Ausreden), anerkennend (z.B. Entschuldigung) bzw. 
entgegenkommend (z.B. Entschädigung) überschrieben sind. Weitere Beispiele werden im 
Fachartikel erläutert. 
Basierend auf diesen drei Typologien und der dahinter stehenden Literatur wurden insgesamt 
sieben Propositionen hergeleitet, welche die in Abbildung 3 dargestellten Zusammenhänge 
widerspiegeln. Zur Veranschaulichung sollen hier beispielhaft nur zwei davon aufgeführt 
werden. So besagt Proposition 1 dass Skandale eher auf regulative und moralisch/normative 
Legitimität wirken als auf pragmatische oder kognitive Legitimität. Dies ist darauf zurückzu-
führen, dass Skandale häufig mit Wirtschaftskriminalität in Verbindung stehen und zudem oft 
durch individuelle Bereicherung auf Kosten der Stakeholder motiviert sind. Die Kernaufgaben 
der Organisation als Austauschpartner und Produkt- oder Dienstleistungsanbieter rücken da-
bei eher in den Hintergrund. Proposition 7 besagt, dass regulative Legitimität primär von 
ausweichenden und eher ausgeprägten abwehrenden und entgegenkommenden Reaktionen 
beeinflusst wird. Dies lässt sich dadurch erklären, dass abwehrende Taktiken sowie Distanzie-
rung den Eindruck erwecken sollen, die Organisation halte sich weiterhin an geltende Rege-
lungen. Entgegenkommende Reaktionen wiederum signalisieren eine Abkehr von problemati-
schen Praktiken – oder Personen – und Neuorientierung hin zu stärkerer Konformität mit den 
Erwartungen der Stakeholder.  
Empirisch untersucht wurden diese Zusammenhänge bislang kaum. Die wenigen verfügbaren 
Studien stützen die deduktiv aufgestellten Propositionen teilweise. Insgesamt leistet der Fach-
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artikel dennoch einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis von Organisationskrisen und mögli-
chen Reaktionen. Dies wird durch eine umfassende Analyse und Integration dreier relativ 
unabhängiger Literaturströmungen erreicht. Das Ergebnis ist nicht nur ein kompakter Über-
blick über diese Wissensbestände, sondern neue umfassende Typologien, die eine klarere 
Diskussion ermöglichen. Allgemeiner betrachtet bietet die Legitimitätsperspektive einen viel-
versprechenden Ansatz zum Verständnis des Verlaufs organisationaler Krisen. Um die zuvor 
explorativ bzw. deduktiv gewonnenen Erkenntnisse mit zusätzlichen empirischen Daten zu 
ergänzen, wurde eine Doppelstudie multipler Fälle von Krisen durchgeführt, welche die 
Grundlage des dritten Fachartikels bildet. 
Dritter Fachartikel: “Organizational Crises and Reactions from a Legiti-
macy Perspective – Results from Two Multiple-case Studies” (Breitsohl 
2009b) 
Ausgangspunkt des dritten Fachartikels war die Frage, inwiefern sich die zuvor hergeleiteten 
Zusammenhänge in tatsächlichen Krisen wiederfinden. Um diesbezüglich Hinweise zu erhal-
ten, wurden zwei Studien durchgeführt, wobei auf das in der Krisenmanagementforschung 
übliche Design der Fallstudie (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt/Graebner 2007) zurückgegriffen 
wurde. Eine größerzahlige quantitative Untersuchung wäre aufgrund der Seltenheit von Kri-
sen sowie des Aufwandes der Datenanalyse nur sehr schwer durchführbar gewesen. Wie die 
Ergebnisse der beiden Studien sowie deren Limitationen zeigten, war dies die richtige Ent-
scheidung. Die Studien unterschieden sich teilweise in der Vorgehensweise bei der Fallaus-
wahl, wie noch zu erläutern sein wird.  
Gemeinsam war den beiden Studien, dass Medienberichte über Organisationskrisen die jewei-
lige Datengrundlage bildeten. Diese wurde einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse unterzogen, wo-
bei relevante Fundstellen bestimmten theoretisch fundierten Kategorien zugeordnet wurden 
(Miles/Huberman 1994). Ähnliche Ansätze wurden im Rahmen anderer Forschungsfragen 
bereits erfolgreich verfolgt (bspw. Deephouse 1996; Hybels et al. 1994). So können Medien-
berichte als Indikator für Legitimität angesehen werden (Deephouse/Suchman 2008), da Sta-
keholder bei ihren Entscheidungen auf sie zurückgreifen (Fombrun/Shanley 1990; Pol-
lock/Rindova 2003). Auch für den Verlauf von Krisen spielen Medienberichte eine Rolle, 
indem sie als Filter für die öffentlich verfügbaren Informationen über eine Krise wirken (Nel-
kin 1988). Insofern erschien dieser Ansatz als gut geeignet. 
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Studie 1: Krisenarten und Legitimitätsdimensionen 
Für Studie 1 stand die Frage im Vordergrund, inwiefern verschiedene Arten von Krisen unter-
schiedlich im Hinblick auf organisationale Legitimität wahrgenommen werden. Es galt also, 
sich dem Gegenstand der Propositionen 1 bis 4 aus dem oben vorgestellten zweiten Facharti-
kel (Breitsohl 2009a) empirisch zu nähern. Genauer sollten robuste Hinweise auf Zusammen-
hänge zwischen Krisenarten – Unfällen, Skandalen und Produktsicherheitsvorfällen – einer-
seits und Legitimitätsdimensionen – moralisch, kognitiv, regulativ und pragmatisch – ande-
rerseits gefunden werden. Zu diesem Zweck wurden komparative Fallstudien durchgeführt, 
die dem “most different systems”-Prinzip (Przeworski/Teune 1970) folgten. Demgemäß sind 
Eigenschaften, anhand derer sich Fälle unterscheiden, irrelevant, wenn die zu erklärende Va-
riable, hier die betroffene(n) Legitimitätsdimension(en), für alle Fälle gleich ausgeprägt ist. 
Deshalb wurden für jede Krisenart drei Fälle ausgewählt, welche sich in ihren Eigenschaften 
möglichst stark unterschieden, etwa hinsichtlich der betroffenen Branche. Zu jedem dieser 
neun Fälle wurden Medienberichte in Bezug auf Aussagen über die Legitimität des jeweiligen 
Unternehmens ausgewertet. 
Die untersuchten Fälle werden im Fachartikel ausführlicher beschrieben, weshalb sie hier 
lediglich aufgezählt werden sollen, wobei jeweils das involvierte Unternehmen angegeben ist. 
So umfassten die Unfälle das Zugunglück von Eschede (Deutsche Bahn), die Explosion einer 
Feuerwerksfabrik im niederländischen Enschede (S.E. Fireworks) sowie den Untergang des 
Öltankers Prestige vor der spanischen Küste (Mare Shipping). Die analysierten Skandale wa-
ren die Affäre um die Bespitzelung von Angestellten und Kunden beim Einzelhandelskonzern 
Lidl, die Unterschlagungen, welche zur Insolvenz des Geldtransportunternehmens Heros führ-
ten sowie der sogenannte „Lustreisen“-Skandal bei Volkswagen. Die betrachteten Produktsi-
cherheits- und Gesundheitsvorfälle betrafen bleiverseuchtes Spielzeug der Firma Mattel, 
schädliche Säuglingsnahrung von Humana sowie das Medikament Lipobay von Bayer. 
Die Ergebnisse von Studie 1 brachten deutliche Hinweise darauf, dass Krisen mit einem Ver-
lust an Legitimität einhergehen. Insgesamt waren kognitive und regulative Legitimität am 
häufigsten betroffen, moralische Legitimität immerhin noch in über der Hälfte der Fälle. Kein 
Fall war ohne Legitimitätsverlust, wobei nur sehr wenige Meldungen einen Rückschluss auf 
pragmatische Legitimität zuließen. Zudem bestehen Unterschiede hinsichtlich der betroffenen 
Legitimitätsdimensionen in Abhängigkeit von der jeweiligen Krisenart. Skandale zeigten, wie 
im zweiten Fachartikel hergeleitet, vor allem Verluste an moralischer und regulativer, teilwei-
se auch kognitiver Legitimität. Unfälle beeinflussten primär moralische Legitimität. Dieses 
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Ergebnis ist nicht deckungsgleich mit der vorangegangenen theoretischen Diskussion, könnte 
aber durch die Fallauswahl zu erklären sein. So zeigte sich, dass zwei der drei Unfälle auch 
Eigenschaften von Skandalen aufwiesen. Dies deutet auch auf die Schwierigkeit der Einord-
nung realer Fälle in Krisentypen sowie die Limitationen der dahinter stehenden konzeptionel-
len Abgrenzung hin. Für Produktsicherheits- und Gesundheitsvorfälle konnten keine eindeuti-
gen Zusammenhänge ermittelt werden. Dies stützt zumindest die Einordnung dieser Krisenart 
zwischen den beiden anderen. Außerdem zeigte sich anhand einiger weniger Medienberichte, 
dass Krisenreaktionen sowohl positive als auch negative Wirkungen auf organisationale Legi-
timität haben könnten. Dies motivierte zusätzlich die Durchführung von Studie 2, welche sich 
dezidiert mit diesem Aspekt befassen sollte. 
Studie 2: Wirksamkeit von Krisenreaktionen 
Im Unterschied zur obigen Studie sollten nun nicht Gemeinsamkeit zwischen unterschiedli-
chen Fällen identifiziert werden. Vielmehr hatte Studie 2 zum Ziel, Unterschiede in den Reak-
tionen verschiedener Unternehmen zu entdecken, welche mit ähnlichen Krisen konfrontiert 
waren. Dadurch sollten Aussagen hinsichtlich der Wirksamkeit von Reaktionsklassen in Ab-
hängigkeit von Krisenarten ermöglicht werden, wie sie im zweiten Fachartikel diskutiert wur-
den (Breitsohl 2009a). Diese Vorgehensweise entspricht dem “most similar systems”-Prinzip 
(Przeworski/Teune 1970). Demnach werden möglichst ähnliche Fälle verglichen, damit Un-
terschiede in der zu erklärenden Variable auf eine möglichst kleine Anzahl von Ursachen zu-
rückgeführt werden können. Deshalb wurde für jede Krisenart ein Fallpaar gesucht, welches 
sich in Bezug auf die genaue Krisenart, die Branche sowie die geografische Region möglichst 
wenig unterschied und gleichzeitig stark abweichende Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der Krisenbe-
wältigung aufwies. Dies schränkte die Anzahl der infrage kommenden – naturgemäß ohnehin 
seltenen – Krisen stark ein. Die gewählten Fälle wurden, analog zu Studie 1, einer qualitativen 
Inhaltsanalyse von Medienberichten unterzogen, wobei relevante Fundstellen den vier theore-
tisch hergeleiteten Reaktionsklassen zugeordnet wurden. Bei den Unfällen handelte es sich 
um je einen Flugzeugabsturz bei indonesischen Linienfluggesellschaften. Die Skandale betra-
fen die Bespitzelungsaffären bei Lidl und der Deutschen Telekom. Die Produktsicherheits- 
und Gesundheitsvorfälle hatten vergiftetes Milchpulver zweier großer chinesischer Hersteller 
zum Gegenstand. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigten teils große Unterschiede in den Krisenreaktionen der jeweiligen Un-
ternehmen. Dabei traten Reaktionsarten jeweils umso häufiger auf, je entgegenkommender sie 
waren, wobei in keinem Fall Hinweise auf ausweichendes Verhalten gefunden wurden. Bei 
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Betrachtung der einzelnen Krisenarten lässt sich sagen, dass sich kaum Unterschiede zwi-
schen den beiden Skandalen ausmachen ließen. Dies erschwerte zwar einen aussagekräftigen 
Vergleich, zumindest stützte aber die vorwiegende Verwendung anerkennender, entgegen-
kommender und einiger verteidigender Reaktionen die vorangegangene Diskussion (Breitsohl 
2009a). Zusätzliche Belege fanden sich bei den Produktsicherheitsvorfällen, wobei sich ge-
wisse Einschränkungen aus der Tatsache ergaben, dass beide Unternehmen von derselben 
Krise betroffen waren. Hinsichtlich der Unfälle erwiesen sich entgegenkommende Taktiken 
als erfolgreicher, was früheren Erkenntnissen entspricht (Marcus/Goodman 1991). Interessant 
waren auch zwei Muster, welche sich im zeitlichen Ablauf der Krisenreaktionen zeigten. So 
fanden die meisten Reaktionen unmittelbar nach Eintritt der Krisen sowie im Abstand von 
etwa einer Woche statt. Zwischen diesen Zeitpunkten sowie danach zeigten die Unternehmen 
deutlich weniger Aktivität. Dies kann als Beleg für Konzeptualisierung von Krisen als Inter-
aktion in Form von organisationaler Handlung und Feedback durch Stakeholder (Pfarrer et al. 
2008) angesehen werden. Zudem wurden die Reaktionen im Verlauf der Krisen immer entge-
genkommender, wobei vor allem die abwehrenden Taktiken sehr schnell verschwanden. In 
Anknüpfung an die Simulationsstudie (Breitsohl 2008) lässt sich darüber hinaus berichten, 
dass zügige Reaktionen erfolgreicher waren als langsame. 
Gesamtergebnis 
Insgesamt unterstreichen die Ergebnisse der Studien aus dem dritten Fachartikel die Bedeu-
tung, welche sowohl den zentralen Konstrukt Legitimität als auch der organisationalen Kri-
senreaktion zukommt. Studie 1 zeigte, dass drei von vier Legitimitätsdimensionen durch Kri-
sen negativ betroffen waren, wobei die vierte möglicherweise Verzerrungen unterlag. Außer-
dem fanden sich Belege für die vorgeschlagenen Zusammenhänge aus dem zweiten Facharti-
kel. Die Resultate von Studie 2 können im Großen und Ganzen ebenfalls als Belege für frühe-
re Arbeiten (Breitsohl 2008, 2009a) angesehen werden. So wurde nochmals die entscheidende 
Rolle des Timings von Krisenreaktionen aufgezeigt. Außerdem folgten Skandale und Pro-
duktsicherheitsvorfälle den vermuteten Zusammenhängen. 
Es zeigten sich aber auch gewisse Limitationen, welche vorwiegend der Verwendung von 
Medienberichten als Datenquelle sowie dem Design der komparativen Fallstudien zuzuordnen 
sind. So könnte zum Einen die geringe Anzahl an Fundstellen pragmatischer Legitimität dar-
auf zurückzuführen sein, dass solche Aspekte aus journalistischer Perspektive weniger rele-
vant sind als andere Legitimitätsdimensionen. Zum Anderen waren die Fälle trotz aufwändi-
ger Auswahl von zahlreichen Eigenarten geprägt, welche die Vergleiche erschwerten. Trotz 
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der wichtigen Beiträge, welche durch Fallstudien von Krisen (bspw. Vaughan 1990; Weick 
1990, 1993) geleistet wurden, scheint noch Raum für andere methodische Ansätze zu beste-
hen, wie bereits durch die Simulationsstudie gezeigt werden konnte. 
Schlussbetrachtung 
Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Arbeit war die Beobachtung, dass Unternehmen sich in ih-
ren Reaktionen auf Krisen stark unterscheiden, sowohl hinsichtlich qualitativer Eigenschaften 
der Reaktionen als auch in Bezug auf den Erfolg der getroffenen Maßnahmen. Anhand dreier 
in der Krisenmanagementforschung dokumentierter Fälle wurden das Timing sowie die wahr-
genommene Angemessenheit der Reaktion als Ansatzpunkte für eine Erklärung der unter-
schiedlichen Ergebnisse der Krisen identifiziert. Eine Sichtung der organisationswissenschaft-
lichen Literatur ergab, dass bislang vor allem die sozialen und technischen Ursachen von Un-
ternehmenskrisen sowie Möglichkeiten zur Krisenprävention diskutiert wurden. Nur einige 
wenige Studien haben sich bislang mit Krisenreaktionen befasst. Diese bieten zwar gewisse 
Hinweise auf die Wirksamkeit von Taktiken des Krisenmanagements, beleuchten jedoch nicht 
die Ursachen der Erfolgsunterschiede verschiedener Maßnahmen. Gleichzeitig war festzustel-
len, dass die Rolle des sozialen Systems, in welchem sich Organisationen befinden, bislang 
im Krisenkontext nur wenig Beachtung gefunden hat. 
Ausgehend von dieser Bestandsaufnahme wurde eine Betrachtung von Organisationskrisen 
aus Legitimitätsperspektive vorgeschlagen. Genauer ist die Grundannahme dieser Arbeit, dass 
Krisen durch einen Verlust an Legitimität der betroffenen Organisation in den Augen ihrer 
Stakeholder gekennzeichnet sind. Legitimität bildet das zentrale Konstrukt, welches die Ent-
wicklung und Bewältigung von Krisen prägt. So ist eine Krisenreaktion dann erfolgreich, 
wenn sie geeignet ist, die verringerte Legitimität der Organisation wiederherzustellen. Ziel der 
Arbeit war somit, durch Einführung und Ausarbeitung der Legitimitätsperspektive einen Bei-
trag zur Erklärung der Wirksamkeit von Krisenmanagementstrategien zu liefern. Dazu wur-
den insgesamt drei Fachartikel verfasst, welche sich dem Ziel auf unterschiedliche Weise nä-
hern. Gleichzeitig bauen diese Artikel aufeinander auf und ergänzen sich. 
Der erste Fachartikel (Breitsohl 2008) knüpft dabei direkt an die Ansatzpunkte Timing und 
Angemessenheit von Krisenreaktionen an und untersucht, wie sich die Kausalzusammenhän-
ge der Interaktion zwischen Organisation und Stakeholdern im Zeitablauf auswirken. Dabei 
konnte die Bedeutung von Timing und Angemessenheit insofern bestätigt werden, als dass für 
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beide Aspekte nichtlineare Effekte auf die Krisenbewältigung identifiziert wurden. Die Wir-
kungsweise dieser Effekte liefert außerdem einen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Interaktion 
zwischen Organisation und Stakeholdern sowie einen vielversprechenden Erklärungsansatz 
für die unterschiedlichen Verläufe der drei eingangs diskutierten Fallstudien. Der dritte Fach-
artikel (Breitsohl 2009b) konnte hier teilweise anknüpfen. So zeigte die dort präsentierte 
zweite Fallstudie, dass schnelle Reaktionen mit größerem Erfolg einhergingen als eine eher 
abwartende Haltung. 
Neben diesen Erkenntnissen zeigte die Simulationsstudie, dass eine eindimensionale Model-
lierung von Legitimität, Krisen und Reaktionen zwar wertvolle Einblicke ermöglicht, aber 
hinter der Komplexität der interaktiven Natur von Organisationskrisen zurückbleibt. Deshalb 
bestand die Notwendigkeit, eine stärker ausdifferenzierte theoretische Basis für die Betrach-
tung von Krisen aus Legitimitätsperspektive zu schaffen. Zu diesem Zweck wurde von einer 
formal modellierenden – und damit zwangsläufig reduzierenden – zu einer konzeptionellen 
Vorgehensweise übergegangen. Im zweiten Fachartikel (Breitsohl 2009a) wurden drei relativ 
unabhängige Forschungsströmungen – Krisenmanagement, Legitimation und „impression 
management“ – zusammengeführt. Die hierfür erforderliche intensive Literaturarbeit ergab 
für jedes der drei Teilgebiete einen umfassenden und detaillierten Überblick. Darauf basie-
rend wurde jeweils eine neue Typologie entwickelt, welche bereits bekannte Ansätze einbe-
zieht und einige bisherige Schwachpunkte beseitigt. So ermöglicht der Artikel ein tieferes 
Verständnis der wichtigsten Elemente einer Legitimitätsperspektive auf Krisen(-reaktionen). 
Darüber hinaus konnte diese Perspektive wesentlich weiterentwickelt werden, indem Proposi-
tionen über präzisere Zusammenhänge der Typen bzw. Dimensionen der enthaltenen Konzep-
te aufgestellt wurden. Erst durch diese Ausdifferenzierung wurde eine intensivere empirische 
Untersuchung möglich, wie sie anschließend erfolgte. 
Um dem deduktiv geprägten zweiten Fachartikel zusätzliche empirisch fundierte Erkenntnisse 
zur Seite zu stellen, wurden vor dem Hintergrund der verbesserten Theoriebasis zwei qualita-
tive Studien durchgeführt. Dabei wurde auf das in der Krisenmanagementforschung bewährte 
Fallstudiendesign zurückgegriffen, welches nicht zuletzt durch den Seltenheitscharakter von 
Krisen bedingt ist. Um Aussagen jenseits einer der Beschreibung eines Einzelereignisses zu 
ermöglichen, wurden strenge Maßstäbe an die Auswahl der zu analysierenden Fälle angelegt. 
Für die erste Studie wurde eine starke Generalisierbarkeit der Zusammenhänge zwischen Kri-
senarten und Legitimitätsdimensionen angestrebt, weshalb sehr unterschiedliche Fälle ausge-
wählt wurden. Anhand der ausgewerteten Medienberichte konnte gezeigt werden, dass Aus-
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sagen über organisationale Legitimität im Krisenkontext eine bedeutende Rolle spielen. Zu-
dem entsprachen die Ergebnisse teilweise den im zweiten Fachartikel hergeleiteten Propositi-
onen. Bei der zweiten Studie stand die Wirksamkeit von Krisenreaktionen im Zentrum der 
Betrachtung. Um diese – gegeben die Stärken und Schwächen qualitativer Forschung - mög-
lichst verlässlich beurteilen zu können, wurden im Unterschied zur ersten Studie möglichst 
ähnliche Fälle ausgewählt. Hier fand sich wieder teilweise Unterstützung der theoretischen 
Diskussion, wobei insbesondere durch die Bedeutung des Reaktionstimings an die Erkennt-
nisse aus der Simulationsstudie angeknüpft werden konnte. Es zeigten sich allerdings gewisse 
Limitationen qualitativer Fallstudienforschung. 
Insgesamt kann über die drei Fachartikel ein erheblicher Erkenntnisgewinn festgestellt wer-
den. So leistet im Allgemeinen die Legitimitätsperspektive einen wertvollen Beitrag zum Ver-
ständnis der sozialen Komponente von Organisationskrisen, welche bislang häufig zu wenig 
Beachtung fand. Auch die Bewältigung von Krisen, bzw. die Kausalzusammenhänge die ein 
erfolgreiches Krisenmanagement ermöglichen, können durch Einnehmen der Legitimitätsper-
spektive besser erklärt werden. Im Besonderen schafft die vorliegende Arbeit hierfür wichtige 
konzeptionelle Grundlagen und Systematiken, indem die relevanten Literaturbereiche geord-
net und zueinander in Beziehung gebracht werden. Auch bietet sie, insbesondere hinsichtlich 
der Rolle des Timings von Krisenreaktionen sowie des Zusammenspiels von Eigenschaften 
von Krisen und Reaktionen, konkretere Hinweise auf generalisierbare Zusammenhänge. Hier 
zeigen sich auch Ansatzpunkte für weitere Untersuchungen. 
Zukünftige Studien zum Management von Organisationskrisen unter Berücksichtigung der 
Legitimitätsperspektive könnten das Ziel verfolgen, eine noch stärkere Verallgemeinerung der 
hier vorgeschlagenen Zusammenhänge zu erreichen. Damit einhergehen würde eine Über-
windung der Restriktionen der traditionellen fallbasierten Krisenforschung, hin zu statistisch 
prüfenden Untersuchungsdesigns. Zur Erfassung der Zuschreibung von Legitimität könnte die 
Verwendung direkterer Maße ohne den „Umweg“ über Medienberichte sinnvoll sein. Diese 
Ansatzpunkte implizieren eine stärker psychologisch fundierte Untersuchung, wobei sich ein 
experimentelles Design (bspw. Shadish/Cook/Campbell 2002) anbieten würde. So könnten 
zukünftige Studien direkt erheben, wie unterschiedliche Krisen sowie verschiedene Reaktio-
nen durch (potentielle) Stakeholder beurteilt werden und wie sich organisationale Legitimität 
dadurch verändert. Dies würde nicht nur zur immer wieder geforderten stärkeren Mikrofun-
dierung der Organisationsforschung (Felin/Foss 2005; Gambardella/Zollo 2009) beitragen, 
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sondern auch das Verständnis sozialer Prozess im Krisenkontext wesentlich vertiefen und so 
letztlich eine effektivere Handhabung solch kritischer Ereignisse ermöglichen. 
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ABSTRACT 
Organizational crises are rare, yet they fundamentally influence the evolution of organiza-
tions. An aspect of crises deserving more attention is the interaction of organizations and their 
stakeholders during a crisis from a legitimation perspective. This paper presents a simulation 
model mapping causal relationships behind this interaction. Results suggest that the nature 
and timing of organizational response to crises has considerable effect on the success and du-
ration of attempts of regaining organizational legitimacy after a threatening event. Illustrative 
case studies demonstrate how several organizations have been (un-)successful in overcoming 
individual crises with respect to these influences. 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizational crises are a somewhat paradoxical phenomenon. From the perspective of the 
individual organization, they can bring about fundamental change, but occur relatively rarely, 
while the roots of those changes often remain unclear. More precisely, they are low-
probability, high-impact events that threaten the organization’s viability while being causally 
ambiguous (Hermann, 1963; Pearson and Clair, 1998). Thus, crises usually take organizations 
by surprise and leave a limited amount of time for the affected organization to react 
(Hermann, 1963; Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman, 1980; Meyer, 1982). From a societal per-
spective, the evolution of increasingly complex technologies (Perrow, 1984), and what has 
become known as high-reliability organizations (Roberts, 1990; Weick, Sutcliffe, and 
Obstfeld, 1999) have made organizational crises, such as accidents, scandals, or product 
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safety incidents (Marcus and Goodman, 1991) an almost daily phenomenon. Indeed, some 
scholars have argued that a world of discontinuities makes crises inevitable (Smart and 
Vertinsky, 1977). Such ubiquity, combined with the potential impact on the fate of an organi-
zation, makes organizational crises a topic not only allowing, but warranting scholarly inves-
tigation (Hermann, 1963). 
Research on organizational crises has tended to focus on two questions: How do organiza-
tional crises arise, and how can they be prevented in the future? There is a rich body of litera-
ture presenting case studies of crises and analyzing with great precision the development of 
catastrophic events. Examples are the Tenerife air disaster (Weick, 1990), the loss of the 
space shuttle Challenger (Vaughan, 1990), the industrial accident at Bhopal (Shrivastava, 
1992), or the Mann Gulch fire (Weick, 1993). The contributing factors to such events which 
are typically discussed in these studies include organizational sensemaking (Weick, 1988, 
1993), intraorganizational regulatory relationships and social control (Vaughan, 1990), and 
information processing (Rudolph and Repenning, 2002). The causes identified in these studies 
have prompted other authors to provide prescriptions for organizational design in order to 
prevent crises or minimize their effects (e.g., Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck, 1976; Turner, 
1976; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Some scholars have focused their research on industries 
identified as particularly ‘crisis prone’ due to their use of risky technologies and tightly cou-
pled systems (Perrow, 1984; Mitroff et al., 1989; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988, 1992). 
An aspect of organizational crises deserving more attention is the interaction between the af-
fected organization and its stakeholders. In the wake of a threatening event, the appropriate-
ness of the organization’s attempts of coping with the crisis is determined through discourse 
consisting of organizational action and stakeholder feedback (Pfarrer et al., 2008). This inter-
play is crucial in reestablishing a sense of normalcy and moving back to a more stable mode 
of operation since stakeholders are part of the environment the organization relies on in order 
to survive (Shrivastava et al., 1988; Pearson and Clair, 1998; Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 2008).  
Interestingly, research on organizational crises has produced numerous examples of how 
widely paths of crisis resolution between the actors involved can differ. For instance, after the 
Tylenol poisonings in 1982, Johnson & Johnson was able to quickly reestablish its stance as a 
reliable producer of pharmaceuticals, in spite of another death related to poisoned capsules a 
few years later (Shrivastava et al., 1988). In fact, the Tylenol case is considered exemplary in 
terms of how the organization reacted to a severe product safety incident (Pauchant and Mi-
troff, 1992). Conversely, one factor contributing to the demise of Pan American Airlines was 
  2 
SCHUMPETER DISCUSSION PAPERS 2008-005
the inappropriate withholding of information from passengers after the loss of Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, as perceived by the public (Sipika and Smith, 1993). Similarly, Bridgestone re-
quired a prolonged period of time to regain trust among American stakeholders after not dis-
closing the company’s problems related to a large-scale recall of faulty tires (Pfarrer et al., 
2008). These examples point to the importance of evaluation by stakeholders in an unfolding 
crisis. More specifically, it remains unclear why some organizations manage to overcome 
perceived inappropriateness associated with a crisis without significant difficulty, while others 
are unable to do so and, in some cases, exacerbate the situation and extend the crisis. 
This paper aims to shed some light on this issue by exploring extant theory on organizational 
crises. As will be outlined in the next section, it takes a legitimation perspective by viewing 
an organizational crisis as subject to interactive evaluation between the organization and its 
stakeholders. The paper analyzes the legitimation dynamics between these actors triggered by 
a threatening event. This is done by building a formal model based on causal relationships 
identified within the literature on organizational legitimation and crises, respectively. The 
model is then used to simulate the interaction between the organization and its stakeholders 
under varying conditions. A presentation of the simulation results is followed by a discussion 
of their implications, illustrated by several cases drawn from the literature. A consideration of 
limitations and avenues for future research concludes the paper. 
A LEGITIMATION PERSPECTIVE ON ORGANIZATIONAL CRISES 
Organizational crises do not occur independently of the social system which the organization 
is part of. A vital role in the development and outcome of crises is played by organizational 
stakeholders (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Frooman, 1999), as em-
ployees, shareholders, and customers are often affected directly by a crisis. Others, especially 
victims of industrial accidents, may become stakeholders due to the occurrence of a crisis 
(Shrivastava et al., 1988; Marcus and Goodman, 1991). Moreover, in some instances, crises 
may be caused by stakeholders, such as dissatisfied customers, activist groups, or regulators 
(Meyer, 1982; Milburn, Schuler, and Watman 1983). In other cases, the perception of stake-
holders may influence the spreading of crises to other organizations, changing the structure of 
an entire industry (Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 2008).  
Stakeholders also routinely evaluate the organization and its actions and base their decisions 
on that evaluation: members adjust their loyalty, investors allocate financial resources, and 
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other constituencies decide about whether to continue transactions with the organization (Car-
roll and Hannan, 2000; Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 2008). Depending on their position relative to 
the organization, stakeholders may refer to the media for this purpose (Pollock and Rindova, 
2003; Pfarrer et al., 2008). In addition to the increased general attention crises invite (James 
and Wooten, 2006), they threaten the positive evaluation of the affected organization by caus-
ing a loss of shared values and commonly held beliefs, putting the organization and its leader-
ship under close scrutiny (Turner, 1976; Pearson and Clair, 1998; Ginzel, Kramer, and Sutton, 
1993). In a related vein, actors in organizational fields rely on social codes to reduce uncer-
tainty. Stakeholders may regard crises as violations of such codes, where the organization 
breaks the default set of rules associated with its actions (Milburn, Schuler, and Watman, 
1983; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 2008). Possible punitive reactions 
by the stakeholders include the reduction or termination of transactions, such as the purchase 
of products, employment relationships or financial investments (Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 
2008). 
A useful concept for framing these aspects of organizational crises is that of organizational 
legitimacy (e.g., Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; Suchman, 1995). An organization is deemed legitimate if its actions are “desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). This well-established definition corresponds well to the 
aspects of organizational crises outlined above: Crises suddenly threaten organizational le-
gitimacy because they are perceived by stakeholders as a breach of social codes, i.e. norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions. In other words, organizational crises are characterized by an 
unexpected loss of legitimacy. Moreover, I argue from a legitimation perspective that a nega-
tive evaluation by stakeholders lies at the core of organizational crises. Other issues, such as 
financial hardship, are mostly consequences of negative evaluations, not elements of crises 
themselves. Exceptions to this rule are loss of life or of assets occurring in events triggering 
organizational crises, e.g. accidents, although the assessment of such losses may differ in the 
perception of stakeholders (Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman, 1980). 
Note that descriptions of organizational crises tend to focus on situations or events happening 
to the organization, while Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy comprises actions by the 
organization. This leaves two possible sources of effects on legitimacy: the environment and 
the organization itself. Indeed, there has been some debate over the degree of discretion an 
organization has when trying to manage its legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Some scholars tend 
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to view the single organization as relatively weak and passive compared to the dynamics 
shaping its industry or economic sector (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Zucker, 1987; Oliver, 1991; Dacin, 1997). Others emphasize a wide variety of activities 
an organization can employ to actively influence its environment and, consequently, the way 
it is perceived and attributed legitimacy (e.g., Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Like Suchman (1995), I take a middle road 
between those two approaches, conceptualizing the organization as faced with external pres-
sures and equipped with a repertory of strategies for influencing its stakeholders. Institutional 
environments do shape the course of an organization’s evolution and create boundaries of 
action for the organization, but not independently of it. Conversely, stakeholders are suscepti-
ble to organizational legitimation activities to some extent, albeit a limited one. 
The literature on organizational legitimation offers several typologies of legitimation strate-
gies. For instance, Suchman (1995) differentiated between strategies aimed at pragmatic, 
moral, or cognitive legitimacy. Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) provided a typology of how 
organizations may affect change in their environment to varying degrees by conformance, 
selection, manipulation, or creation. A third variant focuses on the purpose of legitimation 
pursued by the organization (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). If the organization 
is attempting to become established, possibly in a newly emerging industry, its goal is to ex-
tend or gain legitimacy by building knowledge and setting precedents in the social order (see 
also Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Once it has overcome the “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 
1965; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, 1983), the organization directs its efforts at maintaining 
legitimacy through role performance and monitoring. In the case of organizational legitimacy 
being threatened, repairing or defending it and re-establishing credibility and stakeholder re-
lations become the purpose of legitimation activities. Reviewing the literature on legitimation 
strategies, Suchman (1995) pointed out that “legitimacy acquisition strategies outnumber le-
gitimacy maintenance and legitimacy repair strategies, combined. This pattern both reflects 
the biases of the existing legitimacy literature and indicates the need for future research” (p. 
599). However, very few studies have provided additional insight into how organizations re-
act to problematic stakeholder evaluation. Exceptions include the works of Sutton and Calla-
han (1987), Dutton and Dukerich (1991), Elsbach (1994) as well as Hoffman and Ocasio 
(2001). 
Addressing both this shortage and the explanation of organizational crises outlined above, the 
focus of this paper, concerning legitimation strategies, is put on the latter category of regain-
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ing legitimacy. Such strategies are generally reactive, since the circumstances causing the 
necessity to repair legitimacy are unforeseen by the organization. Responses triggered by le-
gitimacy-threatening events tend to be intense, reflexive, and often rigid (Staw, Sandelands, 
and Dutton, 1981; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). They may take a variety of forms in terms of 
accommodating the expectations and demands uttered by stakeholders. At the defensive end 
of the spectrum, management may choose to deny or conceal any connection to an event, or 
attempt to withdraw from the scene. At the accommodative end, it may offer apologies and 
restitution to those negatively affected, or restructure in order to avoid future crises (e.g., 
Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi and Melburg, 1984; Sutton and Callahan, 1987; Elsbach, 1994; 
Arndt and Bigelow, 2000; Elsbach, 2003). Moreover, responses to losses in legitimacy differ 
in their degree of symbolism vs. substance. Some organizations may react by substantively 
changing their structure or processes, e.g. by replacing management, creating monitors or 
watchdogs, or by disassociating themselves from problematic entities. Others may symboli-
cally offer the appearance of conformity through ceremonial action, such as certification or 
bureaucratization, or by giving verbal accounts, like explanations and justifications (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Elsbach, 2001; 
see Westphal and Zajac, 1998, for a related example). 
However, reactive legitimation activities may not always lead to the intended outcomes. Ash-
forth and Gibbs (1990) suggested that stakeholders discount legitimation practices depending 
on the organization’s current legitimacy, resulting in what they refer to as the ‘self-promoter’s 
paradox’: the more problematic the organization’s legitimacy, the more difficult the acquisi-
tion of additional legitimacy. This principle creates boundaries on the organization’s discre-
tion in legitimation activities, since it limits the acceptable deviation from stakeholder expec-
tations. Intense and rigid reactions to a surprising event may therefore be perceived as inap-
propriate, validating stakeholder skepticism and further decreasing perceived legitimacy. 
Suchman (1995) elaborated that such ‘legitimacy crises’ may escalate through self-reinforcing 
feedback loops, driving down organizational legitimacy. To the extent that stakeholders pro-
vide resources to the organization (Frooman, 1999), a reduction of support may disrupt criti-
cal resource flows. In extreme cases, former allies may even engage in active sniping and os-
tracism. The concepts of feedback processes and malign dynamics in organizational legitima-
tion are intriguing, yet have not received significant attention thus far. They therefore lend 
themselves to further investigation. 
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A MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY CRISES 
Research Approach 
In order to explore and extend theory on organizational crises from a legitimation perspective, 
I developed a computer simulation model (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007; Harrison et 
al., 2007). Choosing simulation as a research approach was based on the possibilities it offers 
for theory development. Since simulation results may be analyzed like longitudinal empirical 
data, but follow inevitably from a set of assumptions, it combines the strengths of the classical 
methods of induction and deduction and has been recognized as a ‘third way of doing science’ 
(Pool, 1992; Axelrod, 1997; Hulin and Ilgen, 2000; Harrison et al., 2007). Simulation can also 
offset some of the shortcomings associated with theory building and testing, such as data 
availability, mathematical tractability, and logical rigor. Furthermore, transforming an appar-
ently well-understood theory into a formalized simulation model requires discipline and great 
precision in the specification of constructs and assumptions, increasing internal validity (Sut-
ton and Staw, 1995; Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007). The transformation process may 
also reveal gaps in the understanding of the theory and permit a more thorough or parsimoni-
ous explanation of the focal phenomenon (Hanneman, Collins, and Mordt, 1995; Harrison et 
al., 2007). Analyzing the data generated by the model may provide additional insights into 
“implied dynamics” (Hanneman, Collins, and Mordt, 1995: 7) undetectable without the use of 
simulation. The latter benefit is further enhanced since simulation provides a virtual labora-
tory for conducting experiments in order to answer questions as to “what is, what might be, 
and what should be” (Burton, 2003: 93) as well as for testing alternate hypotheses when em-
pirical data are available (Bronson and Jacobsen, 1986).  
Following the roadmap for simulation-based research developed by Davis, Eisenhardt, and 
Bingham (2007), my goal was to hit the ‘sweet spot’ between inductive or formal theory 
building, and statistical theory testing, where simulation can contribute most effectively to 
theory. Starting with the research problem, i.e. how organization-stakeholder interaction in-
fluences crisis development, I identified and selected extant theory addressing aspects of the 
problem, which will be discussed in detail in conjunction with the simulation model. As simu-
lation approach, I chose to employ system dynamics (Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000). System 
dynamics is essentially “a method to enhance learning in complex systems” (Sterman, 2000: 
4). It is a suitable tool for exploring theory and its implications due to several of its character-
istics. First, system dynamics takes a feedback perspective, viewing systems as an intricate 
network of cause and effect. Thus, it explicitly accounts for the complexity of social systems, 
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constituted by circular causal relationships. These relationships feed back through the system, 
forming causal loops (Richardson, 1991). This approach has advanced our understanding of a 
variety of phenomena, such as organizational failure (Hall, 1976), vicious circles (Masuch, 
1985), adaptive learning (Lomi, Larsen, and Ginsberg, 1997), punctuated organizational 
change (Sastry, 1997), quality management (Sterman, Repenning, and Kofman, 1997), deci-
sion making (Perlow, Okhuysen, and Repenning, 2002), process improvement (Repenning, 
2002), disasters (Rudolph and Repenning, 2002), and new technology implementation (Black, 
Carlile, and Repenning, 2004).  
Second, system dynamics offers both a qualitative and quantitative method of analyzing 
causal relationships. The phenomenon at hand may be studied qualitatively by creating a 
‘causal loop diagram’ consisting of variables as well as the causal links between them, which 
may have a positive or negative polarity. Based on a qualitative causal loop diagram, a quanti-
tative simulation model may be built. This enables the researcher to observe the system’s be-
havior over time and in much greater detail by subjecting the model to a variety of tests, and, 
if available, by integrating empirical data into the analysis (Sterman, 2000). Third, system 
dynamics simulation models include different types of variables, representing states (‘levels’ 
or ‘stocks’) as well as rates (‘flows’), making them “particularly useful for looking at strategic 
issues within organizations” (Robinson, 2004: 25). Thus, a model not only captures the state 
of a system at any point in time. It also mirrors the rates changing the state, for instance, the 
occurrence and resolution of interruptions in an organization (Rudolph and Repenning, 2002). 
This is in consonance with McKelvey’s (1997) suggestion of modeling rates rather than 
states. In fact, system dynamics appears to be the only simulation approach offering this abil-
ity (Dooley, 2002). 
The process of developing a system dynamics model consists of several steps, most of which 
are congruent to those generally followed in simulation modeling (e.g., Banks, 1998; Mus-
selman, 1998; Robinson, 2004; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Typically, the initial task is to 
select the boundaries of the model, i.e., articulate clearly the research problem and the key 
concepts to be included and excluded. At this stage, it is crucial not to attempt modeling the 
entire ‘system’, e.g. an organization in all its details, but to focus on a specific problem. Oth-
erwise, the model may become too broad to handle in terms of model construction, data gath-
ering, and model testing (Sterman, 2000). Once the scope of the model as well as the underly-
ing concepts have been established, they are mapped in the form of a causal diagram. Model-
ing theoretical constructs – as opposed to a simply observable real system like, say, an oil 
  8 
SCHUMPETER DISCUSSION PAPERS 2008-005
refinery – is accomplished by combining the causal relationships extracted from the relevant 
literature. As explained above, the result is a visual representation of the feedback loops hy-
pothesized to cause the focal phenomenon. Note that a causal diagram describes a structure, 
not a pattern of behavior (Randers, 1980). The behavior of the system becomes visible once 
the simulation model is run.  
Causal Model 
Drawing mainly on literature focusing on legitimacy as well as organizational crises, I devel-
oped a system dynamics model, the causal diagram of which is shown in Figure 1. In deter-
mining the scope of the model, I chose to keep it as simple as possible. Not only are large 
models difficult to construct, their comprehensibility also rapidly decreases with growing size, 
making them difficult to test and evaluate (Barlas, 2007). My goal was to capture “the central 
logic while stripping away the nonessential” (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007: 491), 
which is why I concentrated on building a model that is parsimonious and enhances readers’ 
intuition and confidence in the simulation results.  
One critical step in developing a simulation model is the determination of the model bounda-
ries, i.e. what to build into the model and what to leave out. Consistent with keeping the 
model simple, I included only concepts related to the interactive legitimation between an or-
ganization and its stakeholders following a crisis. More specifically, since legitimacy is a per-
ception based on individual evaluation and social construction (Suchman, 1995), its formation 
takes place largely in the minds of stakeholders. Therefore, most of the concepts comprised 
by the model are a representation of this ‘internal’ evaluation process. Only the upper part of 
the model depiction in Figure 1, namely the variable organizational reaction strength corre-
sponds to the actions of the organization. Significantly, there is no variable in the model di-
rectly representing the crises itself. The crisis is a process triggered by an event which origi-
nates beyond the boundaries of the model. The model excludes factors contributing to the 
formation of a crisis (e.g., Turner, 1976; Vaughan, 1990, 1999; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). 
Its boundaries delineate the line of visibility for the organization’s stakeholders. Hence, the 
crisis becomes visible only due to the triggering event (Shrivastava et al., 1988; Roux-Dufort, 
2007a).  
The central concept – and thus, variable – of the model is the organization’s level of legiti-
macy. If there is a decline in legitimacy, the organization reacts by engaging in activities to 
regain legitimacy. Reactions, however, occur with a certain delay due to information 
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Figure 1. Causal model. 
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processing restrictions associated with the inherently surprising character of crises. Generally, 
organizations require some time for information gathering and processing as well as planning 
a reaction (Smart and Vertinsky, 1984; Sastry, 2001). Moreover, crises are unanticipated by 
organizational actors because there is no routine or “program” for dealing with crisis readily 
available. The mere possibility of such an event is seldom recognized. When a crisis does 
happen, communication channels used to process information are reduced (Hermann, 1963; 
Ginzel, Kramer, and Sutton, 1993). In terms of the content of communication, the increased 
likelihood of misunderstanding and failures may contribute to the problems in handling in-
formation about the incident (Turner, 1976). Although other pathologies underlying flawed 
decision making in the wake of a crisis have been identified (e.g., Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; 
Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman, 1980; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981; Pearson and 
Clair, 1988), these issues are condensed to a delay in reaction within my model for the sake of 
simplicity. 
Organizational reactions to a threatening event may take a variety of forms, differing in their 
extent of accommodation of stakeholder demands as well as their degree of symbolism. My 
model reduces these attributes to a single dimension, representing the intensity of legitimation 
efforts, which can be regarded as reflecting both accommodativeness and symbolism. Ac-
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commodative behavior not only entails psychological ‘costs’ such as admitting guilt, taking 
blame and offering apologies. It is also typically associated with higher financial strains for 
the organization, especially when involving restitution or monetary fines. Similarly, almost by 
definition, substantive reactions require greater efforts than purely symbolic ones. For in-
stance, concealment or simply refraining from any action bears very little direct costs, while 
replacing personnel or restructuring the organization may create significant expenditures. 
Current legitimacy also has an effect on stakeholders’ perception of the organization’s at-
tempts at regaining legitimacy. The perceived violation of social code renders stakeholders 
uncertain towards organizational actions (Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 2008). More specifically, a 
loss in legitimacy reduces the organization’s credibility among stakeholders. They skeptically 
discount legitimation efforts as potentially self-serving or even manipulative. As Ashforth and 
Gibbs pointed out: “the lower the perceived legitimacy, the more skeptical will constituents 
be of legitimation attempts” (1990: 186). The degree of skepticism exhibited by stakeholders 
has an adverse impact on the effectiveness of legitimation attempts. 
Beyond discounting legitimation efforts, stakeholders assess the appropriateness of the or-
ganization’s response in terms of their expectations, norms and values. An otherwise legiti-
mate organization is granted a certain leeway in its reaction to threatening event. Conversely, 
the more problematic the organization’s legitimacy, the narrower the spectrum of activities 
accepted by stakeholders. With respect to the intensity of legitimation efforts, extremely weak 
activities, such as concealment or remaining silent, are judged inappropriate because they 
suggest that the organization places little value on the severity of the situation. Weak reactions 
may also create the impression of lack of control, which runs contrary to stakeholder expecta-
tions. Moreover, since organizations are subject to norms of rationality and professionalism, 
purely symbolic activities may also be frowned upon (Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990). Very strong reactions to crises, on the other hand, may be perceived as in-
dications that something is amiss. They may appear to stakeholders as clumsiness, nervous-
ness, overacting, or even panic, and may thus be destructive to the remaining level of organ-
izational legitimacy (Hermann, 1963; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). Attempts 
which fall outside the interval deemed appropriate inadvertently undermine legitimacy instead 
of repairing it. The concept of inappropriate reactions differs from that of stakeholders dis-
counting organizational actions, as outlined above, in that the latter moderates the effects of 
legitimation activities whereas the former directly reduces legitimacy. 
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From causal model to simulation model 
With the theoretical basis and the adequate simulation approach in place, the next steps in 
simulation research are to create the computational representation of the causal model, includ-
ing operationalization of theoretical constructs and specification of assumptions, and to verify 
it in light of the underlying theory (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007). The computa-
tional model was built and analyzed using the VenSim software. With regard to operationali-
zation and specification, I defined all variables as single-dimensional measures, with values 
ranging from 0 (e.g., no legitimacy) to 1 (e.g., full legitimacy). For the duration over which to 
run the simulation model, I chose 100 time periods, since this provides a sufficient, yet man-
ageable time span for observing and analyzing model behavior.  
Verification, which partly coincided with experimentation, revealed a shortcoming in terms of 
the representation of the theoretical basis of the model. More specifically, it required me to 
make one significant change to the model, concerning the effect of legitimacy on the organi-
zation’s reaction. The model is designed to represent crises in terms of organizational legiti-
mation, i.e. losses in the level of current legitimacy. Hence, the greater the acute decline in 
legitimacy due to a threatening event, the stronger the reaction aimed at regaining legitimacy. 
However, the extent to which organizational actors perceive crises also depends on the value 
of possible loss associated with the threatening event (Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman, 
1980). Therefore, organizations with a low level of legitimacy, which are already facing their 
possible demise, exhibit stronger reactions than otherwise legitimate organizations (Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990). Consequently, I divided the effect of legitimacy on organizational reaction 
into two distinct effects for the level of legitimacy, and changes in the level, respectively. The 
level effect determines legitimation activity based on the current legitimacy level. The loss 
effect causes an additional reaction by the organization whenever the level of legitimacy de-
clines compared to the previous time period. 
DYNAMICS OF LEGITIMATION FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONAL CRISES 
The essence of using simulation techniques for building theory lies in experimentation (Davis, 
Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007). I therefore employed the ‘what-if’-capabilities of computer 
simulation by running the model through a series of experiments. The model is a representa-
tion of causal relationships between an organization and its stakeholders – a system, from a 
system dynamics perspective. The experiments were designed to expose the system to organ-
izational crises under a range of different conditions. In order to gain a comprehensive under-
  12 
SCHUMPETER DISCUSSION PAPERS 2008-005
  13 
standing of the system’s behavior, I varied characteristics of both the crises (severity) and the 
organization (reaction delay). As is typical when employing simulation methods, experimen-
tation consisted of many runs, and only those highly relevant for the research problem are 
presented here. 
As explained in the model description, within this paper, crises are treated as exogenous 
events. The system consists of the organization and its stakeholders, and only as far as legiti-
mation is concerned. Although crises may have causes internal to the organization, they are 
external to the mechanism by which organizational legitimacy is interactively determined. 
Thus, a crisis is represented by a sudden decline in legitimacy. Since organizational legiti-
macy is not problematic prior to the event, i.e. legitimation interaction between organization 
and stakeholders is weak, the crisis may be considered a jolt away from equilibrium (Meyer, 
1982; Milburn, Schuler, and Watman, 1983). Such jolts may be associated with anomalous 
events like accidents, scandals, products safety incidents, or bankruptcy (Marcus and Good-
man, 1991; Hudson, 2008). With regard to conditions at the start of the simulation runs, the 
organization was assumed to be very well established, with full legitimacy. Ancillary tests 
generally confirmed that relaxing this assumption does not significantly affect results.  
Exposing the organization to crises of increasing severity 
For the first experiment, I introduced threatening events of varying strength by conducting 
pulse tests, the results of which are shown in Figure 2. Since the organization is assumed to 
have an initial legitimacy level of 1, neither its stakeholders nor itself are induced to take any 
action. The system is in equilibrium. It is then exposed to a ‘pulse’ of decreasing legitimacy, 
i.e. of a sudden decline in the legitimacy level, lasting for one time period. Although this kind 
of test may be limited in its realism, it is very useful for analyzing how systems behave in 
disequilibrium situations (Sterman, 2000; Rudolph and Repenning, 2002). For this model, the 
pulses may represent the disclosure of an accident, scandal, or product safety incident, or sim-
ply unexpected negative media coverage. The experiment consisted of four scenarios, differ-
ing only in the severity of the threatening event. Figure 2a displays the simulation output for 
the first scenario.  
Initially, the system is in equilibrium, with organizational legitimacy remaining at a constant 
value of 1. In time period 10, a threatening event of mild strength occurs, diminishing legiti-
macy. This triggers the organization to react by engaging in some effort to regain full 
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Figure 2. Organizational legitimacy, reaction strength, and perceived inappropriateness with crises of increasing severity. 
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 legitimacy. Since the event only slightly reduces stakeholder perception of the organization’s 
credibility, its legitimation activities are successful and, after a few ‘weeks’, legitimacy is 
almost back at its original value. For the second scenario (Figure 2b), I doubled crisis sever-
ity. All other conditions remained unchanged; therefore the results for the first nine periods 
are exactly the same for all scenarios. Again, after a sharp decline in legitimacy, the organiza-
tion takes measures to repair its evaluation by stakeholders, and successfully so, albeit after a 
longer time interval. The same pattern holds true for a crisis three times the strength of the 
first run (Figure 2c). While the stronger reaction by the organization causes some perception 
of inappropriateness with stakeholders in periods 11 and 12, it is too faint to have any signifi-
cant effect on organizational legitimation activities. The time span required to regain legiti-
macy is further prolonged. The situation changes considerably in the face of an even more 
severe threat. In the fourth run for this experiment (Figure 2d), I increased the scale of the 
legitimacy crisis to fourfold the original strength. This leads to strikingly different results. 
Again, the first nine periods of the simulation run are identical to the scenarios described 
above, and the threatening event sharply reduces legitimacy. Yet, in contrast to the previous 
scenarios, the reaction induced by the incident is stronger and is considered inappropriate by 
stakeholders. Organizational legitimacy declines further until it reaches a value of zero. At-
tempts at defending legitimacy are maintained but have no effect other than evoking percep-
tions of overacting. 
The most striking result of this first experiment was the disproportionate effect of crisis sever-
ity on legitimacy, organizational reaction, and perceptions of inappropriateness. While dou-
bling and tripling crisis severity produced increasing amplitudes in all variables, the pattern of 
behavior remained the same. An additional rise in event strength, however, led to a very dif-
ferent outcome. Within two time periods, the organization loses all of its legitimacy, despite 
great efforts to recover, which are met only by disapproval. This pattern, known in system 
dynamics methodology as a tipping point, warranted further investigation. I therefore con-
ducted further tests in order to find the tipping point and analyze the system’s behavior in its 
vicinity. Specifically, I identified a crisis severity value of 0.77, i.e. a sudden 77 percent loss 
of legitimacy, as the tipping point. I then ran pulse tests close to the tipping point as well as 
farer away to clarify the nonlinear effects just described. The results are shown in Figure 3.  
Congruent with the first part of the experiment, legitimacy losses of 40 percent and 70 per-
cent, as mapped by the upper two lines, follow the same pattern. The threat is countered by 
actions to regain legitimacy, which lead to recovery after a number of periods; the more
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 Figure 3. Organizational legitimacy around the tipping point. 
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severe the threat, the longer the repair phase. When approaching the tipping point, however, 
two aspects of the system’s behavior change considerably: the result of the interaction imme-
diately after the event, and the relative time required to reestablish full legitimacy. First, the 
time span passing before full recovery increases disproportionately the closer threat severity 
gets to the tipping point. Raising threat severity from 70 percent to 76 percent produces ap-
proximately the same increase in required recovery time as the raise from 40 percent to 70 
percent. This is due to the double effect of reduced legitimacy on stakeholder perception. At a 
70 percent loss, compared to 40 percent, stakeholder skepticism climbs to a higher level, mak-
ing organizational legitimation activities less effective. Legitimation requires a longer time 
span since skepticism has to be gradually reduced. The relatively slight increase in threat se-
verity from 70 to 76 percent, though, introduces perceptions of inappropriateness as to the 
organization’s reaction. This effect, again, is twofold. As a direct result, an extra loss of le-
gitimacy adds to the ground the organization has to regain, prolonging recovery in addition to 
general skepticism. Indirectly, a further extension of repair time results from the fact that re-
sistance posed by stakeholder skepticism has now reached a new high due to the extra loss in 
legitimacy. 
Second, and more critically, when confronted with a threat just below the tipping point (76 
percent), the organization does not go into recovery right away. Although the legitimacy crisis 
only occurs for a single time period, legitimacy continues to decline through period 13 of the 
simulation run. The initial reaction on the part of the organization not only fails to stop legiti-
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 macy from falling, it exacerbates the situation. The organization’s already damaged legiti-
macy is further undermined by the strong response to the threatening event. In addition to 
rendering stakeholders very skeptical of legitimation attempts, the perceived inappropriate 
reaction causes them to lower their evaluation of the organization. Yet, in this scenario, man-
agement can sustain a basic level of support among stakeholders and rebuild full legitimacy. 
When crossing the tipping point, these two responses by stakeholders become dominant and 
determine the ensuing complete loss of legitimacy. Due to the initial event, increased stake-
holder skepticism already restricts the organization’s efficacy in defending itself. Then, stake-
holders ‘punish’ the organization by reducing their perception of legitimacy. This additional 
loss triggers management into an even stronger reaction to save the remaining level of sup-
port, leading to a further increase in stakeholder skepticism and an even lower evaluation. A 
vicious circle sets in, driving down legitimacy as members of the organization frantically try 
to rebuild it over the course of seven time periods. The end result is a complete loss of legiti-
macy in period 19 of the simulation run. 
Effects of varying reaction time to the crisis 
Organizations are generally incapable of reacting immediately after a threatening event be-
cause they need time to collect and process information. This ability may further deteriorate 
when communication channels are reduced due to the stress associated with crises. Organiza-
tions also often lack routines for coping with crises. Aside from this involuntary, ‘built-in’ 
feature, organizations may also actively choose not to react immediately when a crisis occurs. 
As part of the broad spectrum of available responses, they may opt to withdraw from public 
discussion of the incident or conceal their involvement in order to minimize the impending 
negative evaluation by stakeholders. Thus, there are two sources of reaction delay after a 
threatening event. Since, from the stakeholders’ perspective, these are indistinguishable, this 
opens another avenue for experimentation. 
For my second experiment, I investigated the effect of varying organizational reaction times 
after the crisis on legitimacy. More specifically, I focused on the loss effect incorporated in 
the model, representing the influence of changes in legitimacy on the intensity of the organi-
zation’s reaction. Varying the delay that is part of the loss effect allows analyzing how stake-
holders perceive the timing of organizational reaction, be it involuntary or purposeful. The 
results of the experiment are displayed in Figure 4. 
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 Figure 4. Organizational legitimacy with increasing delay of reaction. 
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As in the experiment reported above, I ran four scenarios, differing only in the reaction delay. 
Crisis severity was 71 percent for all runs, reflecting a severe yet manageable threat to the 
organization. The first run, containing no additional delay, is therefore congruent with the 
now familiar pattern. After a short episode of overacting and the consequent punishment by 
stakeholders, the organization regains control of the situation and recovers from the crisis. 
Increasing the reaction delay by one, two, and three time periods, respectively, reveals system 
behavior noteworthy in several aspects. First, similar to increasing crisis severity, raising reac-
tion delay has a disproportionate effect on organizational legitimacy. While adding one time 
period only slightly prolongs the time span needed to recover, two extra periods produce a 
much more significant lag. For instance, in period 21, the one-extra-period organization has 
regained 71 percent of legitimacy, while its two-extra-period counterpart is still at a much 
lower 28 percent. Increasing reaction delay to three additional periods results in the organiza-
tion reacting too late to achieve successful repair, and a complete loss of legitimacy. Second, 
the deterioration of organizational legitimacy is also disproportionate to reaction delay. 
Within the three time periods constituting the increasing delay, the additional legitimacy 
losses are four, nine, and thirteen percent, respectively. During the time stakeholders wait for 
the organization to react, the situation becomes increasingly worse. In more mathematical 
terms: the level of legitimacy accelerates towards zero. 
These two phenomena have their causes in the same mechanisms. Stakeholders expect or-
ganizations to keep their reaction within a certain interval of intensity. Reacting extremely 
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 strong is perceived as overzealous, while too faint a reaction raises suspicions as to whether 
something is amiss. A greater delay in the organization’s reaction is perceived by stakeholders 
as inappropriate. Stakeholders therefore reduce their perception of legitimacy. If the organiza-
tion now chooses to react, regaining support has become more difficult and requires more 
time, but only slightly more than before. If a reaction fails to appear, stakeholders lower their 
evaluation by an even larger portion. The already problematic level of legitimacy has ren-
dered them more critical of the intensity of legitimation attempts, making them open only to 
very moderate reactions. By the end of the third period of waiting, organizational legitimacy 
has deteriorated to the point where activities aimed at repairing it fall on deaf ears. This last 
aspect, as well as the disproportionate positive relation between reaction delay and recovery 
time is also due to stakeholder skepticism. As lower legitimacy contributes to skepticism, at-
tempts at regaining legitimacy are discounted more and more, making them less effective. 
Thus, during a waiting period, legitimacy is not only reduced on grounds of inappropriate-
ness, but the organization is also less capable of stopping the downward trend because stake-
holders are more skeptical towards its actions. In the case of the three-extra-period organiza-
tion in Figure 4, by the time the organization reacts to the threatening event, legitimacy has 
eroded and skepticism has risen to a degree where legitimation activities are futile. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the experiments reported above contain several potential additions to theory on 
organizational crises which are discussed in this section. According to Davis, Eisenhardt, and 
Bingham (2007), the final step of simulation modeling lies in validating results with empirical 
data in order to strengthen external validity of the underlying concepts. They describe two 
possible approaches to validation, depending on data availability: employing the simulation 
model to predict the results of existing large-scale statistical data, or comparing simulation 
output to case studies for “granular validation” (p. 494). I chose to follow the latter approach. 
Crises, by their very definition, are rare events, making it difficult to collect large-scale statis-
tical data. Therefore, most empirical research on organizational crises is qualitative in nature 
and focuses on case studies. Although there have been efforts to analyze large numbers of 
cases (e.g., Lin et al., 2006), the vast majority of studies report on one or a few cases (e.g., 
Vaughan, 1990; Weick, 1990, 1993; Shivastava, 1992). Moreover, my simulation model op-
erates at a relatively high level of abstraction. As Siggelkow (2007) proposed, case studies 
can illustrate conceptual arguments by clarifying how they relate to real-world phenomena. I 
selected several cases of crises from the extant literature and extracted the details relevant to 
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 organizational legitimacy. They are interwoven with the general discussion of simulation re-
sults. 
The purpose of this paper was to explore theory on organization legitimation and crises in 
order to gain insights into why some organizations successfully regain trust among stake-
holders while others are unable to do so. To this end, I constructed a system dynamics model 
mapping the causal relationships behind the interaction between an organization and its stake-
holders in the context of a crisis. For the sake of parsimony and comprehensibility, I kept the 
model as simple as possible and as complex as necessary. The model was then run through 
two series of experiments. The first involved exposing the system to crises of increasing se-
verity. It revealed a disproportionate effect of crisis severity on legitimacy, organizational 
reaction, and perceptions of inappropriateness, resulting in a tipping point in the system’s be-
havior. Just below this point recovery time rises considerably. Above, a vicious circle of reac-
tion, skepticism and perceived inappropriateness sets in, driving legitimacy down to zero. The 
second experiment focused on the delay in organizational reaction to crises. Similar to the 
first, it showed that recovery time increases disproportionately high with reaction delay. 
Moreover, the longer the organization fails to react, the more problematic its legitimacy, at a 
growing rate. 
The idea of vicious circles in social systems has been discussed for many years now (e.g., 
Forrester, 1971; Masuch, 1985). With regards to organizational legitimation, it has been sug-
gested that overacting on the part of the organization may trigger such circles (Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). However, there have been little efforts directed towards valida-
tion. The results generated by my model support the notion of vicious circles of de-
legitimation in the wake of organizational crises. More specifically, results indicate that there 
is a tipping point in the evaluation of organizational actions by stakeholders beyond which 
feedback loops of increasing skepticism, inappropriate response, and deteriorating legitimacy 
dominate to completely destroy stakeholder trust in the affected organization (Roux-Dufort 
2007b; see also Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). As described in the introduction of this paper, 
the withholding of information about its flight lost over Lockerbie has been found to have 
further damaged the already problematic image of PanAm, which ultimately diappeared from 
the market (Sipika and Smith, 1993). 
Even if the system does not cross the tipping point, intense skepticism and strong perceptions 
of inappropriateness may still have negative effects on the organization in that they may sig-
nificantly prolong the time span required to regain full acceptance. For instance, in the wake 
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 of the Valdez oil spill in 1989, Exxon reacted by attempting to shift the blame not only to the 
ship’s captain, but also to the State of Alaska. In addition, Exxon tried to minimize the effects 
of the catastrophe by understating estimates of measurements of the damage, such as the 
number of animals killed or miles of beaches affected. The public, already suspicious due to 
the extensive media coverage of the incident, perceived these reactions as highly incompetent 
and insufficient in terms of compensating for the corporation’s guilt. The company fell from 
sixth place to number 110 in Fortune magazine’s admiration ranking, and became a favorite 
object of ridicule on entertainment television. Other stakeholders responding negatively to 
Exxon’s activities included customers, several thousand of which returned their credit cards in 
protest, and stockholders, who subjected its chairman to intense questioning on the company’s 
handling of the situation (Benoit, 1995; Pearson and Clair, 1998; McLane, Bratic, and Bersin, 
1999; Pfarrer et al., 2008). Similarly, Firestone, when confronted with serious product safety 
issues associated with 271 deaths in 2000, attempted to shift the blame to Ford, despite an 
over 100-year-old business relationship. This, alongside the ineffective denials that a problem 
existed in the first place, resulted in unfavorable public opinion about the company well after 
its initial reactions (Blaney, Benoit, and Brazeal, 2002). Sears Roebuck also suffered from a 
tarnished reputation after mishandling the controversy surrounding accusations of fraudu-
lently charging customers for unnecessary repairs on their cars. Criticism was directed par-
ticularly at Sears’ claims that the state’s accusations were politically motivated, which were 
viewed as an inability or unwillingness to take full responsibility for its actions (McLane, 
Bratic, and Bersin, 1999; Elsbach, 2001). 
Other organizations have proven more able to recognize the effects of initially inappropriate 
reactions and change their strategies, gradually moving back towards full legitimacy. For in-
stance, Dow Corning suffered considerably regarding its public image during the breast im-
plant crisis after attacking the FDA and incurring punitive damages from a lost lawsuit over 
defective implants. In addition, there were allegations about internal documents suggesting 
that Corning knew about the potential hazardousness of its products. These actions and their 
perception by stakeholders illustrate the escalating nature of legitimacy crisis proposed by the 
results of my model. Interestingly, Dow Corning was able to turn the controversy around by 
releasing the internal documents, replacing the two most senior executives as well as commu-
nicating that it would help implant recipients (Brinson and Benoit, 1996; see also Ginzel, 
Kramer, and Sutton, 1993). In a similar fashion, Toshiba redeemed itself in the eyes of US 
consumers after dramatic losses in legitimacy, following the illegal sale of submarine propel-
ler technology to the Soviet Union. Struggling to fend off an impending import ban on To-
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 shiba products, the company switched from symbolic acts, including the resignation of its 
chairman and president, to explaining to the American public the ultimate substantive conse-
quences of the planned parliamentary action, i.e. the loss of many jobs in Toshiba’s US facto-
ries (Hobbs, 1995). Drastically changing the nature of its reactions also helped AT&T over-
come the crisis triggered by an interruption of its long distance service in the New York area 
in 1991. After trying to place the blame on its workers, AT&T dealt with the threat success-
fully by engaging in mortification and corrective action, thereby bolstering its image (Benoit 
and Brinson, 1994). 
The racism crisis involving Texaco provides a good example of how appropriate reactions can 
lead to a thorough resolution of a problematic situation. In 1996, secret tape recordings sur-
faced, containing a conversation between several Texaco executives. Analysis of the conver-
sation revealed intolerant remarks as well as plans to destroy evidence that might help a pend-
ing lawsuit against the company by six African-American employees. The publicity generated 
by the discovery induced calls for boycott and demonstrations in front of Texaco gas stations, 
clearly threatening its legitimacy as a business organization. However, unlike Exxon or Fire-
stone, Texaco reacted by admitting the inadequate behavior of the executives, seeking outside 
assistance in corrective action, and agreeing to a multi-million dollar court settlement. The 
settlement, along with efforts to increase minority promotions within the company as well as 
contracts with minority-owned businesses, was widely welcomed as a commendable reaction 
and relieved Texaco of public pressure. Responding to a threat in an accommodative and sub-
stantive manner proved successful in overcoming the crisis (Brinson and Benoit, 1999; 
McLane, Bratic, and Bersin, 1999; Coombs and Schmidt, 2000; Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
The results generated by my model also suggest that the delay in organizational reaction to a 
threatening event is critical in repairing legitimacy. The absence of a response is perceived by 
stakeholders as inappropriate because they expect the organization to both respect their opin-
ion and actively control its environment. Failing to react therefore reduces organizational le-
gitimacy. Furthermore, stakeholder skepticism increases, making eventual efforts to restore 
legitimacy less effective. Again, the cases of Exxon, Firestone, and Texaco allow for com-
parative illustration of these effects. After the Valdez oil spill, Exxon’s chairman waited a full 
week before commenting on the incident. A newspaper ad containing an apology – but no 
acceptance of responsibility – was run ten days after the ship went aground. This was re-
garded by the public as far too late a reaction to such a catastrophic event. Consequently, 
Exxon’s already weakened image was further damaged in the eyes of multiple stakeholder 
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 groups, as described above (Benoit, 1995; McLane, Bratic, and Bersin, 1999). Firestone ac-
knowledged problems associated with its tires only when reports on numerous fatalities were 
published. Yet, as was revealed, the company had concealed knowledge about the defects for 
3 years. In addition, negative evaluation by the American public was particularly strong be-
cause product recalls were initiated in the US after other countries, and were spread out over 
18 months (Blaney, Benoit, and Brazeal, 2002). Again, failure to address the problem imme-
diately exacerbated the crisis considerably for the affected organization. Texaco, by compari-
son, reacted much more effectively. The company’s chairman listened to the evidentiary tape 
recordings personally and swiftly issued a personal public apology. This strategy led to media 
coverage of the scandal subsiding after just a few weeks and public boycotts being called off. 
In fact, the crisis had no significant effect on sales (Brinson and Benoit, 1999; McLane, 
Bratic, and Bersin, 1999; Coombs and Schmidt, 2000). 
Although I argue that the results of my study improve our understanding of organizational 
reactions to crisis, there are some limitations to consider. Most generally, my model has a 
fairly reduced scope, i.e. narrow boundaries, and is relatively simple. It focuses on the interac-
tion between organization and stakeholders concerning legitimacy after a crisis. More specifi-
cally, I do not distinguish between different legitimation activities, but use their intensity as a 
single-dimension measurement. Literature on legitimacy management, however, proposes a 
variety of strategies, ranging from defensive to accommodative, and from symbolic to sub-
stantial (e.g. Sutton and Callahan, 1987; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach, 2003). The 
model also includes only one generic group of stakeholders, although real organizations typi-
cally are confronted with multiple stakeholders, often expressing different expectations and 
demands (Ginzel, Kramer, and Sutton, 1993). I thereby abstracted the model from the setting 
of the crisis, which in reality has some influence on the development of the interaction and 
has been suggested to be included in organization studies (Rousseau and Fried, 2001). My 
model also treats crises as events external to the organization, whereas some causes of crises 
often lie in the structure and processes embedded within it (e.g. Perrow, 1984; Vaughan, 
1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Sipika and Smith, 1993). However, the goal of my ap-
proach was to capture the core causal processes behind legitimation dynamics, involving the 
organization and its stakeholder, both of which are often surprised by the occurrence of 
threatening events (Hermann, 1963; Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman, 1980; Meyer, 1982). 
This necessitated trading off some degree of realism in favor of comprehensibility and test-
ability (Barlas, 2007). 
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 Despite these limitations, I argue that my study contributes to the literature on organizational 
crises and legitimation in several respects. First, it points to the importance of incorporating 
the construct of legitimacy into research on organizational crises. As my results, as well as 
some of the cases discussed above suggest, organizations can considerably accelerate recov-
ery from a crisis by managing their stakeholders’ evaluation because crises are partly con-
structed in the perception of these stakeholders. Although some studies in the field of man-
agement and organization theory have incorporated this aspect (e.g., Elsbach, 1994; Sutton 
and Callahan, 1987), it has been in the context of crises caused by problematic behavior of the 
organization. I propose that, even after an obviously external event, such as an industrial acci-
dent, the negative impact on the organization involved depends largely on perceptions of its 
reaction. Second, and more specifically, my model analyzes crises over time and my results 
suggest nonlinearity of the effects of both the nature and timing of organizational responses to 
crises on the ensuing legitimation dynamics. It is the interplay between general skepticism 
related to the current level of legitimacy as well as perceptions of inappropriateness caused by 
organizational reactions that shape the path of regaining legitimacy. When approaching the 
tipping point in defending legitimacy, this interplay extends the time span required to recover. 
In terms of reaction timing, failing to address stakeholder expectations – be it purposefully or 
not – may have the same adverse effect, and may erode legitimacy further. 
Avenues for future research on the role played by legitimation in organizational crises pertain 
to the scope of the model, and to empirical studies of past and ongoing crises. The model 
could be extended by abandoning some of the more restrictive assumptions. For instance, one 
could introduce a two-dimensional measure of reactive legitimation, or, correspondingly, a 
more complex assessment of appropriateness by stakeholders. Multiple stakeholder groups 
could be incorporated, reacting differently to legitimation attempts. As a more significant ex-
tension, the notion of resources as an influence on crisis coping could be introduced. As sev-
eral authors have suggested, resources play an important part in overcoming crises, as the 
organization can employ ‘slack’ to fund defensive activities and compensate for diminished 
income (e.g., Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; Audia and 
Greve, 2006). With more general respect to research on organizational crises, more studies 
could focus on the path of crises in terms of the interaction between organization and stake-
holders, and on the effects of the organization’s actions on this path. As crises, though rare for 
individual organizations, occur more and more frequently in a world of increasing complex-
ity, many opportunities for analyzing and understanding them more deeply present them-
selves. 
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ABSTRACT 
Research on organizational crises has typically focused on case studies or measures for crisis 
prevention, while the social dimension of crises has remained largely unexplored. In some rare 
exceptions, differences in the efficacy of reactive strategies depending on the type of crisis have 
been reported. However, the mechanisms behind these differences remain unclear. This paper 
aims to fill this gap by arguing that organizational crises and effective reactions are linked by 
different dimensions of legitimacy perceived by stakeholders. To this end, after elaborating on 
the role of legitimacy in organizational crises, typologies of crises as well as reactive strategies 
are presented, accompanied by propositions about possible links. 
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INTRODUCTION
Studies of organizational crises have been a fruitful stream of research for several decades 
(e.g. Hermann, 1963; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miglani, 1988; 
Turner, 1976; Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008), from which two main foci can be identified. First, 
there is a rich body of literature presenting case studies of crises and analyzing with great 
precision the development of catastrophic events. Examples are the Tenerife air disaster (Weick, 
1990), the loss of the space shuttle Challenger (Vaughan, 1990), the industrial accident at Bhopal 
(Shrivastava, 1992), or the Mann Gulch fire (Weick, 1993). These studies typically discuss 
organizational sensemaking (Weick, 1988, 1993), intraorganizational regulatory relationships and 
social control (Vaughan, 1990), and information processing (Rudolph and Repenning, 2002) as 
factors contributing to crises. Second, the causes thus identified have prompted other authors to 
provide prescriptions for organizational design in order to prevent crises or minimize their effects 
(e.g., Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck, 1976; Turner, 1976; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). 
Only more recently has research on organizational crises directed its attention to the role of 
stakeholders, and the social environment within which crises unfold and upon which the 
organization depends for survival (Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Pfarrer, 
Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Yu et al., 2008). More specifically, the interaction between 
organization and stakeholders as well as the organization’s influence on stakeholder perception 
has been recognized as a field worthy of inquiry. In their study of organizational signalling 
during crises, Marcus and Goodman (1991) drew upon the literature on organizational impression 
management (e.g. Benoit, 1995; Elsbach, 2003; Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981). They showed 
that two types of signals – accommodative vs. defensive – sent in communicating with investors 
differed in successfully evoking positive responses, depending on the kind of crisis. This implies 
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that organizations may actively influence stakeholder perception of reactions to crises, possible 
easing recovery through improved stakeholder support. Similarly, Elsbach (2001) suggested that 
organizations adjust their reactions depending on how foreseeable the threatening event was. 
Although these valuable findings point to the importance of the topic and provide a starting 
point, the social dimension of organizational crises remains understudied. For instance, theory on 
impression management provides a suitable background for framing organizational reactions and 
the study by Marcus and Goodman (1991) employs it effectively by pointing out differences in 
efficacy between reaction types. However, it remains unclear why some reactions are useful in 
overcoming a certain type of crisis while others are not. Filling this gap by identifying the 
mechanism behind stakeholder perception of crises and organizational reactions may deepen our 
understanding of the crisis phenomenon. It may also provide a basis for improved 
recommendations for effective crisis management. 
Therefore the aim of this paper is to present “missing links” between organizational crises and 
corresponding effective reactions. To this end, I argue that the construct central to stakeholder 
perceptions of crises is that of organizational legitimacy (e.g. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995), in that crises are characterized by a sudden loss of 
legitimacy. More specifically, I suggest that different dimensions of legitimacy are affected by 
different types of crises and by different organizational reactions. Crisis management strategies 
are effective if the reaction on the part of the organization matches the dimension of legitimacy 
affected by the crisis. In order to develop my argument, I proceed by explaining the suitability of 
legitimacy as the central construct in organizational crises and by identifying four dimensions of 
legitimacy from the literature. I then turn to developing a typology of organizational crises and 
presenting a set of propositions linking these types to dimensions of legitimacy. In the following 
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section, I present a second set of propositions on links between legitimacy and reactions, based 
on a typology of the latter. The paper closes with a brief discussion and conclusion. 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY AS THE CENTRAL CONSTRUCT IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL CRISES 
Like all change in and around organizations, the evolution of crises is embedded in a social 
system constituted by various groups of stakeholders (e.g. Freeman, 1984). Such groups may 
comprise employees, customers, suppliers, or stockholders. With regard to events such as 
accidents and product safety issues, a new group of stakeholders – victims – may be created 
(Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Shrivastava et al., 1988). Furthermore, stakeholders have 
considerable influence on the cause of crises (Milburn, Schuler, & Watson, 1983), and their 
spreading across organizations (Yu et al., 2008). 
More generally, organizations depend on positive evaluation by stakeholders because such 
evaluations have significant influence on decisions concerning membership, market transaction, 
and financing (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). Crises threaten positive stakeholder evaluation in that 
they cause a loss of shared values and commonly held beliefs (Pearson & Clair, 1998) and may 
be regarded as a violation of uncertainty-reducing social codes (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Milburn 
et al., 1983). Stakeholders may punish such transgressions by terminating transactions, 
boycotting sales activities, quitting jobs, or withdrawing funds (Yu et al., 2008). 
These aspects are usefully framed through the construct of organizational legitimacy (e.g. 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Suchman, 1995). 
According to Suchman (1995: 574), an organization is deemed legitimate if its actions are 
“desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions”. Because crises are perceived by stakeholders as a breach of social codes, 
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i.e. norms, values, beliefs, and definitions, they may be characterized as an unexpected loss of 
legitimacy. In reaction to the problematic event, stakeholders challenge organizational 
performance or values (Hirsch & Andrews, 1984). From this perspective, other issues, such as 
financial hardship, are mostly consequences of reduced legitimacy, while the latter lies at the core 
of organizational crises. Exceptions to this rule are loss of life or of assets occurring in events 
triggering organizational crises, e.g. accidents, although the assessment of such losses may differ 
in the perception of stakeholders (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980). 
Dimensions of Organizational Legitimacy 
The literature on organizational legitimacy contains several classifications, differing in 
breadth, depth, and delineations. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) distinguished between cognitive
legitimacy, which reflects the degree to which knowledge about an organization has spread, and 
sociopolitical legitimacy, which focuses on the acceptance of the organization “as appropriate 
and right, given existing norms and laws” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994: 648). In its highest form, 
cognitive legitimacy implies acceptance of an organization as part of the sociocultural landscape 
to the point of being ‘taken for granted’. Aldrich and Ruef (2006) refined sociopolitical 
legitimacy by subdividing it into two components. Moral acceptance results from conformance 
with cultural values and norms, while regulatory acceptance requires conformance with 
governmental rules and regulations. 
A similar concept was proposed by Scott (1995) based on the seminal work by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), comprising three types of legitimacy corresponding to three pillars of institutions: 
regulative, normative, and cognitive. Regulative legitimacy is awarded based on accordance with 
legal or quasi-legal requirements, where possible sanctions coerce organizations into adherence 
to rules. By comparison, normative legitimacy tends to have a deeper, moral base, and thus 
  5 
SCHUMPETER DISCUSSION PAPERS 2009-005
conformance to it is likely to stem from intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivation. It mirrors 
perceived appropriateness in terms of values and norms, which govern what is important, and 
how things should be done, respectively. Normative legitimacy is achieved through social 
obligation. Attributions of cognitive legitimacy are governed by shared definitions and frames of 
reference. They reflect the extent to which an organization and its activities are culturally 
supported and conceptually correct, i.e. taken for granted. Elements of cognitive evaluation 
specify the meaning of structural and procedural features of organizations – basic characteristics 
of social systems (Ruef & Scott, 1998). The similarity of the typologies developed by Aldrich 
and colleagues (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Hunt & Aldrich, 1996), and Scott 
(1995) have caused some researchers to equate their respective dimensions of regulative, 
normative, and cognitive character (e.g. Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
The most fine-grained typology has been provided by Suchman (1995), who distinguished 
twelve types of organizational legitimacy by combining three dimensions (pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive) with two temporal textures (episodic vs. continual) and two foci (actions vs. essence). 
Accordingly, pragmatic legitimacy comprises exchange, influence, and dispositional legitimacy. 
It is based on stakeholders’ self-interest calculations with respect to expected value provided by 
the organization, responsiveness and commitment to their larger interests, or – in an 
anthropomorphic fashion – the interests and character of the organization. Moral legitimacy 
comprises consequential, procedural, structural, and personal legitimacy. It reflects a normative 
evaluation of what the organization accomplishes, which technologies and procedures it employs 
in doing so, its structure and capacity for producing results, and the charisma of individual 
organizational leaders. Cognitive legitimacy comprises comprehensibility and taken-for-
grantedness. It stems from the extent to which organizational activities are predictable and 
plausible, and are perceived to be permanent and inevitable. In addition to the various flavors of 
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legitimacy outlined above, some authors have proposed legitimacy types related to their specific 
research context, such as industry-derived legitimacy (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), or corporate 
environmental legitimacy (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). 
The dimensions of these models of organizational legitimacy are broadly similar, yet they 
exhibit some differences in their emphasis and delineation. Suchman’s (1995) pragmatic type of 
legitimacy is treated by Aldrich and Ruef (2006) as an aspect of organizational learning and 
therefore excluded from their typology. These authors, in turn, consider moral and regulatory 
acceptance to be sub-dimensions of sociopolitical legitimacy, which, according to Scott (1995), 
are two separate types. Thus, Scott (1995) places relatively strong emphasis on legal aspects of 
legitimacy, while these are only implicitly incorporated in Suchman’s (1995) approach. 
Moreover, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) noted that there is some confusion concerning the 
meaning of the term normative legitimacy, since some authors tend to restrict normative aspects 
to those associated with particular ethics of formal professions, as opposed to norms ubiquitous in 
social systems. In consonance with the proposition put forward by Deephouse and Suchman 
(2008), the term is used in the more general sociological sense within the context of this paper. 
Although conceptually distinct, interrelations and (non-)correlations between dimensions of 
legitimacy may exist. Suchman (1995) explained that both moral and cognitive legitimacy require 
cultural frameworks, while pragmatic legitimacy rests on individual utility calculations. 
Therefore, offering tangible rewards to stakeholders may be effective in gaining pragmatic 
legitimacy, but may be regarded unacceptable in moral and cognitive terms. Similarly, the 
discursive nature of both pragmatic and moral legitimacy stands in contrast to cognitive 
legitimacy, whose implicit taken-for-granted base may be threatened by public discussion. 
Furthermore, Scott (1995) pointed out that assessing the legitimacy of a certain organization on 
different dimensions may lead to varying conclusions. For instance, normative standards may 
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require an organization to break regulative prescriptions. Also, the borderline between legitimate 
and illegitimate is fuzzy in cases such as street gangs or organized crime, which are culturally 
constituted yet illegal, or pornography, which is often legal but morally tainted (Solari, 2007). 
Organizations suffering from ‘core-stigma’ due to their very nature fall into this category 
(Hudson, 2008). However, the focus of this paper lies on organizations which are free from core-
stigma, but are exposed to ‘event-stigma’ resulting from a crisis. 
It should be noted that there has been some debate as to how much influence an organization 
has on its own legitimacy. While some authors propose that a single organization is relatively 
weak and passive compared to the dynamics shaping its industry or economic sector (e.g. Dacin, 
1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Zucker, 1987), others 
emphasize a wide variety of activities an organization can employ to actively influence its 
environment and, consequently, the way it is perceived and attributed legitimacy (e.g. Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). Like Suchman 
(1995), I take a middle road between those two approaches, conceptualizing the organization as 
faced with external pressures and equipped with a repertory of strategies for influencing its 
stakeholders. Institutional environments do shape the course of an organization’s evolution and 
create boundaries of action for the organization, but not independently of it. Conversely, 
stakeholders are susceptible to organizational legitimation activities to some extent, albeit a 
limited one. 
As described in the preceding portion of this paper, the respective literature suggests that 
organizational crises are closely tied to a loss in reputation, built on shared values and beliefs 
(Pearson & Clair, 1998), and a violation of social codes (Milburn et al., 1983; Yu et al., 2008). 
Although the constructs of reputation and legitimacy may by considered distinct (Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005), I follow Aldrich and Fiol (1994) in subsuming reputation under the antecedents of 
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organizational legitimacy, the definition of which comprises the aspects just noted. According to 
various authors, organizational legitimacy consists of three dimensions (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 
1995), although some scholars diverge slightly from that division (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). 
Treating moral (Suchman, 1995) and normative (Scott, 1995) legitimacy as equivalent, I employ 
a concept of organizational legitimacy consisting of the four major dimensions identified in this 
section, namely pragmatic, moral, cognitive, and regulative legitimacy. The remainder of this 
paper is dedicated to providing a summary of the possible relationships between crisis types, 
dimensions of legitimacy, and organizational reactions, and to creating a series of propositions on 
those relationships. 
CRISES TYPES AND DIMENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY 
Types of Organizational Crises 
Organizational crises are high-impact, low-probability events (Hermann, 1963). They prevent 
the organization from reaching its goals and may threaten its very survival (Milburn et al., 1983; 
Pearson & Clair, 1998). Thus, they are associated with the possibility of great loss (Billings et al., 
1980), while being ambiguous with respect to their causes, effects, and means of resolution 
(Hermann, 1963; Pearson & Clair, 1998). Crises restrict organizational capabilities of 
information processing and decision making by inducing individual stress, resulting in 
misunderstandings and failures (Hermann, 1963; Smart & Vertinsky, 1984; Turner, 1976). 
This rather broad characterization of crises allows the inclusion of a wide variety of events. 
Consequently, the literature on organizational crises offers extensive lists of incidents related to 
crises (e.g. Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Clair, 1998), while few scholars have attempted 
to develop consistent typologies. Exceptions include Marcus and Goodman (1991), Milburn et al. 
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(1983), Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), and Shrivastava et al. (1988). Interestingly, these typologies 
are diverse in scope, dimensionality, delineation, and detail. 
Milburn et al. (1983) presented a typology consisting of three dichotomous dimensions: the 
degree of control the organization has over its external environment (high vs. low), the general 
perceived character of the crisis (positive vs. negative), and the degree of organizational 
susceptibility (high vs. low). This results in eight different types of crises, although the authors 
did not specify these types or provide examples. Rather than a framework for describing or 
analyzing past or future events, the model is intended as an instrument for deducing the 
likelihood of an organization facing a severe crisis, given its characteristics as positioned in the 
model space. It is also used to form hypotheses about antecedent aspects of organizations and 
crises.
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) took a very different approach by inductively developing a two-
dimensional concept of crises. Based on a survey of corporate managers, they identified six 
clusters of crises, namely ‘external economic attacks’ (e.g. extortion), ‘external information 
attacks’ (e.g. counterfeiting), ‘breaks’ (e.g. product defects), ‘occupational health diseases’, 
‘psycho’ (e.g. copycats), and ‘megadamage’ (e.g. environmental accidents). These groups are 
positioned on two dimensions denoted ‘technical/economic’ vs. ‘human/social’, and ‘normal’ vs. 
‘severe’. The former specifies the underlying cause of a crisis, although the authors point out that 
technical defects and social problems may be intertwined. The latter describes the extent to which 
the “underlying cause can be explained more easily in terms of everyday or ‘normal’ human 
behavior” (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992: 29). Accordingly, analyzing crises types at the ‘severe’ end 
of the spectrum, such as the ‘psycho’ cluster, requires “a great deal of psychological 
sophistication” (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992: 29). 
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Shrivastava et al. (1988) focused on events associated with industrial production. They 
differentiated between production-related and consumption-related harm. Production-side harm 
includes risks linked to the production system (personal or transportation accidents, system 
failures), the production environment (e.g. occupational diseases), and post-production effects 
(e.g. chronic pollution). Consumption-side harm includes risks linked to product use (misuse, 
sabotage, defects), and side-effects of consumption (e.g. diseases such as smoking-related 
cancer). These authors stressed that the events noted in their typology are merely the triggers of 
the actual crises, which may consist of large-scale damage to human life and the environment as 
well as large economic and social costs. Furthermore, they identified two sets of causes. First, 
human, organizational, and technological factors, such as operator errors or sabotage, policy 
failures, or faulty design, respectively, lead to the triggering event. Second, due to the interaction 
of these causes with regulatory, infrastructural, and preparedness failures, triggering events 
escalate into crises. 
The classification presented by Marcus and Goodman (1991) adopts a shareholder perspective 
by distinguishing between three crises types (accidents, product safety and health incidents, and 
scandals) in terms of their deniability, and the ease of identification of victims. Thus, accidents 
have an easily identifiable group of victims and are plausibly deniable, because they occur 
unexpectedly. Conversely, scandals have a diffuse group of victims and are difficult to deny since 
their causes are misdeeds within the organization. Product safety and health incidents lie between 
the other two types on both dimensions. 
In sum, the literature on organizational crises offers relatively few and very different attempts 
at categorizing threatening events. While Milburn et al. (1983) deductively assess the general 
exposure of an organization to crises – without regard to the character of the event – the other 
typologies outlined above identify common traits according to which crises may be classified. 
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Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) cover a wide range of crises and group them into several clusters. 
However, the consistence of this approach appears to be questionable. For instance, it remains 
unclear why rumors are both highly technical and highly human in nature, and why they are 
crises at all. Moreover, it appears implausible why events such as sabotage or tampering are 
psychological in nature and particularly difficult to analyze, while boycotts are primarily 
economic. By contrast, Shrivastava et al. (1988) offer a very stringently organized catalogue of 
triggering events, in combination with suggestions on the causal structure of crises resulting from 
such events. Unfortunately, their typology is restricted to industrial crises, ignoring problems 
such as corruption and other illegal arrangements. Marcus and Goodman (1991) incorporate these 
types, resulting in a comprehensive – albeit more coarse-grained – classification, which is able to 
accommodate the types described by Shrivastava et al. (1988) in addition to covering non-
industrial crises. Their approach is also unique in that it takes a stakeholder perspective, 
accounting for the social and psychological aspects of organizational crises. 
Within the context of this paper, I employ a classification combining elements of those 
summarized above. It is visualized in Figure 1. Like Marcus and Goodman (1991), I divide crises 
into three broadly delineated types: scandals, product safety and health incidents, and accidents. 
Adapting one criterion used by Milburn et al. (1983), I classify them in terms of the degree of 
control the organization has over the triggering event, in principle, reflecting stakeholder 
expectations of organizational control (Salancik & Meindl, 1984). Furthermore, I follow 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) in distinguishing between two primary causes: human/social, and 
technical.
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FIGURE 1 
Classification of crises 
Degree
of
control
high 
low 
Primary 
cause
human/social technical
Scandals
Product safety and 
health incidents 
Accidents
Scandals comprise crises triggered by, e.g. bribery, insider trading, price-fixing, or sexual 
harassment. They allow a relatively high degree of control since their roots often lie within the 
organization, among its members. It is therefore generally feasible to identify the perpetrators and 
possibly even prevent the crisis. Scandals have primarily human and social causes, since they are 
based on member interaction and are influenced by social processes (e.g. Ashforth & Anand, 
2003; Finney & Lesieur, 1982). Accidents comprise events categorized by Shrivastava et al. 
(1988) as related to the production system, such as explosions, airplane crashes, or the sinking of 
ships. By contrast, they are much more difficult to control, since they are often caused by the 
complexity of tightly coupled systems (Perrow, 1984a). While failures of such systems are 
relatively rare, even when compared with other crises, they do occur, are difficult to prevent, and 
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are often devastating in their effects. Due to these reasons, accidents are also primarily technical 
in nature, although flawed human perception and decision making may contribute to their 
development. Finally, product safety and health incidents comprise post-production effects and 
consumption-side harms (Shrivastava et al., 1988), like sabotage, product defects and associated 
recalls, and production-related pollution. Since these are not as rare and causally ambiguous as 
accidents, but feature a combination of internal (production systems) and external (e.g. 
consumers) influences, they are in the mid range in terms of controllability. The same is true for 
the second criterion, due to their inherent mixture of technical and human causes.  
Proposed Links 
A few authors have pointed to a connection between crises and reputation, shared values and 
beliefs, and social codes (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Milburn et al., 1983; Yu et al., 2008), which
may be subsumed under organizational legitimacy. Yet, in general, little is known about the exact 
nature of this relationship. Hudson (2008), in contrasting persistent lack (core stigma) against 
temporary loss of legitimacy (event stigma), proposed that core stigma is primarily related to 
sociopolitical (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) or moral, rather than pragmatic or cognitive (Suchman, 
1995) legitimacy. Indeed, as Hudson (2008) elaborated, an organization may be pragmatically 
and cognitively legitimate, yet core-stigmatized. While this description contributes to the 
understanding of ‘spoiled image’ (Sutton & Callahan, 1987) of organizations, it remains unclear 
how dimensions of legitimacy relate to event-stigma associated with crises. I therefore turn to 
discussing possible links. 
Scandals, such as those involving bribery, corruption or insider trading, are almost invariably 
connected to ‘white-collar crime’ (e.g. Fisse & Braithwaite, 1983). The discovery of such deeds 
is typically followed by criminal investigation, since they violate rules and regulation governing 
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bidding procedures or securities trading. Furthermore, scandals often evoke public outcry since 
they point to greed among leading personnel in the ranks of the organization. They also put into 
question the ability of the organization’s structures and processes to adequately police its 
employees’ decisions (Marcus & Goodman, 1991). Since those responsible for the scandal often 
draw significant financial benefit from their actions, they also appear as primarily focused on 
their own well-being instead of their stakeholders’. Note that the problematic behaviors 
associated with scandals are relatively unrelated to specific products, services, or industries. 
Product safety and health incidents, such as product defects or sabotage, have a weaker legal 
connotation than scandals, although they may violate standards of quality or consumer protection 
laws. Moreover, they may create legal action from victims of faulty or tampered products. 
However, they primarily call into question the organization’s status as an exchange partner, i.e. 
provider of economic benefit. They also challenge previous perceptions of the organization’s 
trustworthy, honest and reliable character. In a related vein, product safety and health incidents 
cast doubt on organizational predictability and the capacity to deliver goods or services at a 
constant level of quality. 
Accidents, such as explosions or oil spills, are typically complete surprises to all parties 
involved. They occur in tightly coupled systems and have their causes in the inherent complexity 
of modern production or transportation technology. Therefore, accidents tend to be relatively free 
from perceptions of moral injustice or deliberate wrongdoing, although there may be inquiries 
into the efficacy of procedures for accident prevention. Neither do they cast serious doubt on the 
organization’s disposition as a ‘good’ exchange partner. They do, however, evoke questions 
concerning predictability and permanence, especially since accidents can be devastating enough 
to jeopardize the organization’s existence (e.g. Sipika & Smith, 1993). Thus, 
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Proposition 1. Scandals affect regulative, normative (Scott, 1995) and 
moral (Suchman, 1995) legitimacy more than pragmatic and cognitive 
legitimacy.
Proposition 2. Product safety and health incidents affect pragmatic 
legitimacy more than moral/normative, regulative, and cognitive 
legitimacy.
Proposition 3. Accidents affect cognitive legitimacy more than 
moral/normative, pragmatic, and regulative legitimacy. 
CLASSES OF REACTIONS AND DIMENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY 
A Typology of Reactions to Crises 
Organizations react to crises in a variety of ways, which are all aimed at influencing 
stakeholder perceptions of the organization’s role within the context of the crisis. One stream of 
research which has contributed to the understanding of such tactics is impression management 
theory (e.g. Elsbach, 2003; Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981). Impression management can be 
defined as “the conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or 
imagined social interactions” (Schlenker, 1980: 6). Grounded in social psychology, the concept 
originally focused on individual and intraorganizational behavior (e.g. Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 
1989, 1991) and has since been applied to organizations in a variety of studies (e.g. Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Elsbach, 2003; Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992; Ginzel, Kramer, & Sutton, 1993; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). 
The literature on impression management provides numerous typologies of activities directed 
at influencing stakeholder perception (e.g. Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Elsbach, 1994, 2003; Ginzel 
et al., 1993; Schlenker, 1980; Suchman, 1995; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Tedeschi & Melburg, 
1984), varying in terms of their scale. For example, while Scott and Lyman (1968), and Tedeschi 
(1981) distinguish between two strategies – excuses and justifications –, Schlenker (1980) 
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identifies no less than seven different activities. Moreover, the typologies differ in their scope, i.e. 
the kinds of behavior they cover. Some authors focus on verbal accounts, such as denials or 
excuses (e.g. Elsbach, 2003), whereas others include withdrawing from communication (Sutton 
& Callahan, 1987) or restructuring (Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995). What’s more, there is no 
consistent distinction between different impression management activities. Note how Suchman 
(1995) named explanations as one kind of technique besides excuses and justifications. 
According to Elsbach (2003), however, the latter two are subtypes of explanations. Similarly, 
Elsbach (1994) described denials as accounts negating either the involvement in an event or the 
occurrence of the event itself. However, theses two variants may alternatively be considered two 
distinct tactics (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). 
Several authors used a rather general classification by distinguishing between defensive and 
accommodative behaviors, where defensive means avoiding association with a threatening event, 
while accommodative means accepting responsibility for it (Elsbach, 1994, 2003; Marcus & 
Goodman, 1991; see also Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Although this is a useful distinction, it does 
not account for the various different types of reactions listed in the typologies noted above. More 
specifically, there may be more than one step between an organization denying all possible 
connections with a problematic incident, and the organization assuming full responsibility and 
offering compensation for the damage inflicted on victims. 
In order to obtain a more fine-grained overview of organizational reactions to crises, I 
developed a new typology, drawing upon the measure used by Marcus and Goodman (1991) in 
their study of the conflict between shareholders and victims during crises. These authors 
operationalized accommodative tactics as “those in which managers accepted responsibility, 
admitted to the existence of problems, and attempted to take actions to remedy a situation” 
(Marcus & Goodman, 1991: 291). Based on this definition, I propose four classes of strategies, 
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defined by three dichotomous criteria. First, in its communication with stakeholders, the 
organization may or may not agree that a problem, i.e. a crisis, exists to begin with. Second, if 
there is a problem, the organization may or may not assume responsibility for the crisis. Finally, 
if responsibility for the problem is accepted, the organization may or may not actively attempt to 
solve it. The three criteria and the four resulting classes of reactions are shown in Table 1, along 
with the individual reaction types within the classes, which are described below. Within each 
class, individual strategies are ordered according to the same general logic, i.e. from resistant to 
conforming (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). 
Evasive strategies. The first class of reactions is employed if the organization seeks to avoid any 
connection to the threatening event and the related stakeholder disapproval (Schlenker, 1980). It 
may therefore attempt to retreat from the scene, conceal the problematic event, or simply deny 
that it occurred. The most comprehensive form, retreat – or withdrawal (Sutton & Callahan, 
1987) – entails not commenting on the unfolding crisis at all in order to “hide away until the 
storm passes” (Schlenker, 1980: 134). This strategy offers the general advantage of providing the 
organization with some time needed to gather information and resources, and to form a more 
elaborate response. However, since stakeholders may be aware of the organization deliberately 
refraining from communication, this may be effective only over short time spans. Extending 
retreat over a longer period of time can be counterproductive, as will be discussed for several 
reaction types later in this section of the paper.  
Concealment is aimed at avoiding the necessity to cope with the confrontation following a 
negative event. It may take passive forms aimed at leaving stakeholders in their ignorance, such 
as avoiding situations in which the crisis must be revealed. Concealment may also be applied 
more actively by providing deceptive information (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). For instance, the 
vast majority of organizations studied by Arndt and Bigelow (2000) strived not to draw attention 
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TABLE 1 
Reactions to organizational crises 
Organization 
acknowledges 
problem 
accepts
responsibility 
actively seeks 
resolution 
Strategies 
Evasive no no no Retreat 
Concealment 
Denial
Defensive yes no no Disassociation
Excuses 
Defining 
Appreciative yes yes no Explanation 
Justification 
Apologies 
Accommodative yes yes yes Restitution 
Divorce
Restructuring 
to the fact that they were restructuring, and, even when describing their new structure, kept quiet
about its novelty to the industry. If successful, concealing a crisis may allow the organization to 
circumvent negative evaluation by stakeholders. Since this is rather unlikely, it may at least serve 
as temporary measure, similarly to the tactic of retreat.  
If stakeholders do suspect that a threatening event has occurred, the organization may choose 
to deny the event (Suchman, 1995). The strategy of denial is a borderline case in that it may be 
used in two different versions, asserting that the even did not occur, or that the organization had 
nothing to do with (Schlenker, 1980; Elsbach, 1994, 2003).
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Defensive strategies. The second class of reactions is employed if the organization does not 
question whether a crisis is occurring, but refuses to accept responsibility for the event and its 
consequences. To this end, the organization may disassociate itself from the crisis, make excuses 
for its actions, or attempt to define the situation in more favorable terms. In the case of 
disassociation, the goal is not to keep stakeholders from discovering the threatening event, but 
from drawing a connection between the event and the organization (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984; 
see also Cialdini, 1989). This may be attempted by shifting the blame to other problematic 
entities, such as business partners or an identifiable group of employees (e.g. Benoit & Brinson, 
1994). Disassociation may therefore be considered one form of defense of noncausation 
(Schlenker, 1980) or pleading lack of control over the situation (Benoit, 1995).
Excuses are aimed at downplaying the organization’s responsibility for the negative 
consequences of an event (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984). Tedeschi and 
Riess (1981) offered a typology of excuses. Accordingly, the actors may claim they did not 
intend to cause the negative effects and were mistaken, uninformed, or deceived about the 
potential results of their actions. They may also claim that the action causing the harm done was 
beyond their control. Finally, excuses may take the form of claiming not to be the true 
perpetrator, including the use of alibis and witnesses. For instance, the environment may be 
blamed as a reaction to negative evaluation (Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983).  
Alternatively, the organization may avoid the necessity to admit any wrongdoing through the 
strategy of defining the situation as apparently discrediting, but really harmless (Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987). This may be done by claiming that there is a general misunderstanding of the 
crisis, i.e. that the situation is not as normatively objectionable as it seems to be. Bankruptcy, for 
example, has been found to be defined by affected companies as an every-day phenomenon 
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independent of misconduct. Another type of defining involves the organization describing its 
individual case as unique, implying that the violated norm does not apply. 
Appreciative strategies. The third class of reactions requires that the organization accepts the 
existence as well as its responsibility for a crisis, but does not offer any remedial action. Instead, 
it reverts to explaining, justifying, or apologizing for its involvement. Explanations may be used 
if responsibility for the event cannot be successfully avoided. A general fit with stakeholders’ 
norms and expectations may be preserved by constructing an account conveying that the 
unfolding situation is at least understandable. For instance, Perrow (1984b) described how 
accidents are labeled as ‘discrete’ in order to make them appear unfortunate but unavoidable in an 
imperfect world, a tactic which provides the image of some conformance while avoiding the 
necessity to redesign the system as a whole. 
Justifications go one step further by providing “over-riding or compensating positive 
consequences as outweighing the harm done” (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984: 35). They signal 
acceptance of the responsibility for an event – at least to some extent – but not for its implications 
(Schlenker, 1980; Scott & Lyman, 1968). This is done by downplaying the negative connotations 
of the event in an attempt to realign the organization’s image with stakeholder beliefs (Elsbach, 
2003; Suchman, 1995). Justifications may take many forms, such as appeals to organizational 
rules or missions, economic doctrines, or standards of equality (Tedeschi & Riess, 1981).
Apologies offer a confession of responsibility for the incident. Unlike justifications, they 
include regret, the acceptance of punishable wrongdoing and possible restitution (Elsbach, 2003; 
Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984). The purpose of apologies is to suggest that the organization is ill-
represented by the negativity of the crisis. They serve to redress the past, combined with a 
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promise of more appropriate behavior in the future (Schlenker, 1980). Due to their 
comprehensive nature, apologies are the most conforming type of appreciative strategies. 
Accommodative strategies. Finally, the fourth class of reactions involves the organization 
taking full responsibility for the crisis and responding by offering restitution, divorcing from 
problematic entities, or modifying its structure or processes. Restitution may be offered to 
persons, groups, or organizations negatively affected by the crises as a form of prosocial behavior 
(Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984). As a swift response to the perceived violation associated with 
crises, this may provide some compensation, although this kind of relief may be mandated as a 
result of legal action (James & Wooten, 2006; Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Shrivastava et al., 
1988). Charitable giving may also be considered one type of restitution after a threatening event 
(Pfarrer et al., 2008).  
While offering restitution to affected stakeholders may effectively provide temporary remedy 
after a crisis, the strategy of divorce is more fundamental. The most common form of divorce is 
executive replacement, which, in some cultures, has become institutionalized to the point of 
taken-for-grantedness (Marcus & Goodman, 1991). Other subjects of divorce may be 
organizational units or geographic locales, whereby the organization attempts to increase the 
perceived – or actual – distance between itself and the problematic entity (Suchman, 1995).  
Instead of actively trying to get rid of reminders of inappropriate situations of the past, the 
threatened organization may also restructure by changing organizational processes or creating 
monitors (Milburn et al., 1983; Suchman, 1995). These approaches signal some degree of 
commitment to the future since they are aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of crises through 
optimized structures and processes. Even in the event of another threatening situation, units such 
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as monitors or watchdogs suggest a more effective handling of the ensuing challenges (Pfarrer et 
al., 2008; Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995). 
Symbolism and associated risks in reactions to crises 
An aspect related to the strategies outlined above which has received some attention is the 
role of symbolism in and around organizations (e.g. Pfeffer, 1981; Pondy, Frost, Morgan, & 
Dandridge, 1983; Russ, 1991). Organizational attempts to influence their evaluation by 
stakeholders vary in their degree of symbolism, i.e. their degree of association with attitudes, 
values, and perceptions vs. physical referents (Pfeffer, 1981). If stated as a dichotomy (Ashforth 
& Gibbs, 1990), substantive management involves real change in goals, structures, and processes, 
while symbolic management seeks to appear consistent with social values and expectations. Note 
that most of the reaction types described above would be classified as symbolic activities, since 
they focus primarily on stakeholder perception of the crisis and the organization’s involvement. 
In fact, the accommodative class of reactions is the only one associated with actual change. 
Moreover, symbolic and substantive actions may be combined in what is known as the practice of 
decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; e.g. Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998). By 
separating symbolic reactions from substantive ones, organizations can create a buffer against 
external pressures on its structures and processes (Sutton & Galunic, 1996). Aside from the 
greater effort required for substantive change, organizations often resort to symbolic action 
because their actual influence is limited. Due to their dependence on external resource providers, 
focusing on the perception of conformance is much more effective than attempting real 
accommodation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981). 
Due to their partially symbolic nature, some of the possible reactions to threatening events 
carry inherent risks which may severely curtail the intended effects of crisis management. 
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Specifically, these risks are associated with stakeholder trust, perceptions of control, and 
conflicting demands and expectations. First, trust is essential to stakeholder relations and 
organizational survival (e.g. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). However, the evasive strategies outlined 
above, namely retreat, denial, and concealment, are ‘double-edged’ in this respect (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990). Although they may serve the organization well in buying some time, stakeholder 
demands have to be confronted eventually. A significant loss of trust – if not withdrawal from the 
relationship – may ensue once stakeholders discover that the initial reaction was merely tactical 
and misrepresentative in nature (Ginzel et al., 1993; Schlenker, 1980; Turner, 1976).
Second, organizations are expected to exert control over their environment. Some defensive 
strategies, particularly disassociation and excuses, imply a lack of control on part of the 
organization, although retaining an image of control, even in an effectively uncontrollable 
environment, may buffer against negative evaluation by stakeholders (Salancik & Meindl, 1984; 
Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Finally, organizations typically interact with diverse groups of 
stakeholders, voicing different, sometimes conflicting demands and expectations. For instance, 
some audiences may be generally more sympathetic, while others may be more antagonistic. 
Depending on their respective power over and relationship with the organization, this may create 
a dilemma in deciding whose interests should be addressed primarily (Ginzel et al., 1993; Marcus 
& Goodman, 1991). 
Proposed Links 
Although a few scholars have investigated strategies of influence within the context of 
problematic legitimacy (e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach, 1994, 2001; Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992; Suchman, 1995), most of these works treat legitimacy as a one-dimensional construct. In a 
rare exception, Suchman (1995) proposed that certain types of strategies for repairing legitimacy 
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may apply to specific dimensions of it. Accordingly, and in terms of my classification presented 
above, denial and the creation of monitors address pragmatic legitimacy, excuses, justifications, 
and restructuring can be employed to rebuild moral legitimacy, and explanation are useful in 
defending cognitive legitimacy. Note that denial is an evasive reaction, whereas creating 
monitors is rather accommodative. Similarly, excuses are defensive, justifications are 
appreciative, and restructuring is accommodative. Thus, while there may be differences in the 
compatibility of specific strategies with dimensions of legitimacy, there is no tendency as to what 
class of behaviors may be suitable to restore a given aspect of legitimacy. However, Suchman 
(1995) does not further explain the assignment of strategies to legitimacy dimensions as just 
summarized, and his review does not comprise all legitimation strategies described in the 
literature. Therefore, I turn to a discussion which covers all four dimensions of legitimacy as well 
as the strategies classified above. 
Evasive reactions to threatening events, such as retreat, concealment, and denial, are aimed at 
avoiding confrontation with negative evaluation by stakeholders. This is attempted by refraining 
from providing information, dissemination deceptive information, or repudiating any connection 
to the event. In other words, while retreat may also be useful in buying time, evasive tactics are 
employed in order to avoid any public discussion of the problematic incident. If such discussion 
cannot be prevented, the goal is to restrict information, so as to keep stakeholder re-evaluation at 
a shallow level, as opposed to in-depth investigation of the organization’s core values and raison-
d’être. Moreover, these reactions aid in upholding the impression that the organization is acting 
in congruence with current rules (Scott, 1995). In consonance with Suchman (1995), I therefore 
suggest that denial, as well as the two other evasive strategies – retreat and concealment – are 
primarily linked to pragmatic, as well as regulative, legitimacy. It should be noted, however, that 
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evasive strategies carry the risk of backfiring if perceived as misrepresentations (Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
Defensive reactions, such as disassociation, excuses, and defining, generally seek to distance 
the organization from the threatening events, if the latter cannot be ignored or denied. In contrast 
to evasive reactions, however, defensive strategies are more diverse in their specific goals. 
Disassociation may be used to avoid stakeholder perceptions of there being anything problematic 
about the organization – similar to denying connections to the crises. In addition, they are to 
prevent ‘contagion’ of negativity from the event to the organization. Thus, disassociation may be 
pragmatic, moral, and regulative in effect. Excuses are used to downplay this negativity by 
appealing to a lack of intention or control. They are, as Suchman (1995) suggested, aimed at 
moral legitimacy. The third defensive tactic, defining, is applied if the organization wants to 
affect the connection between stakeholders’ understanding and evaluation of the situation, 
making it appear more positive. It may therefore influence moral and cognitive legitimacy. 
Appreciative reactions, such as explanations, justifications, and apologies, require the 
acceptance of at least some responsibility of the crises. In this vein, explanations are an attempt to 
make the organization’s conduct at least understandable, i.e. cognitively compatible (Suchman, 
1995), by delivering a plausible account of what happened. Justifications have a more normative  
flavor in that they stress positive connotations of the event, trying to outweigh any perceived 
inappropriateness. Even more conformant, apologies signal full recognition of unacceptability 
and regret of past actions, combined with an indication of possible remedial activities. Thus, they 
are mostly aimed at reestablishing the organization’s moral integrity and rightness. 
Accommodative reactions, such as restitution, divorce, and restructuring, go beyond the 
acceptance of responsibility by comprising active responses to the crises, directing attention away 
from the inglorious past to a more promising future. Restitution affects both moral and pragmatic 
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legitimacy, since it provides compensation for the damage done, while also conveying the image 
of an organization striving to ‘make things right again’. Divorce, usually through the replacement 
of personnel, signals the parting from old, ‘bad’, illegal influences, and reorientation towards 
more morally appropriate, and regular, behavior (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 1995). Finally, changing 
procedures and practices, and creating monitors, is aimed at demonstrating that the organization 
posseses the capacity to perform its tasks in a morally acceptable and rule-conforming manner 
and therefore should be considered a predictable exchange partner worthy of support. Thus,
Proposition 4. Pragmatic legitimacy is primarily influenced by evasive 
and some accommodative reactions.
Evasive tactics keep stakeholder attention away from more fundamental reassessment and 
thereby preserve taken-for-grantedness, while carrying the risk of undermining legitimacy. 
Accommodative activities, particularly restitution and the creation of monitors, direct attention 
back to a transactional level when general acceptability has been restored. 
Proposition 5. Moral legitimacy is primarily influenced by the more 
resistant defensive reactions, the more conformant appreciative reactions, 
and by accommodative reactions.  
Defensively, disassociation aims at reducing perceived negativity, while appreciatively, 
justifications and apologies try to emphasize positive connotations of the event. Restitution, 
divorce, and the reconfiguration of procedures suggest a favorable outlook. 
Proposition 6. Cognitive legitimacy is primarily influenced by the least 
resistant and the least conformant, i.e. the most neutral, reactions.  
Defining and explanations seek to increase the understandability of the situation, preserving 
compatibility to mental frames of reference and avoiding normative reevaluation. To some 
extent, restructuring may additionally suggest increased future predictability and permanence. 
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Proposition 7. Regulative legitimacy is primarily influenced by evasive, 
the most resistant defensive, and the most conformant reactions.  
Retreat, concealment, denial, and disassociation maintain the perception that the 
organizations’ actions adhere to established rules. Divorce and restructuring signal the departure 
from illegal entities and reorientation towards conformance. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The two preceding sections of this paper posit the existence of links between types of 
organizational crises and dimensions of legitimacy on one hand, and links between dimensions of 
legitimacy and reactions to crises on the other. From this, it follows that certain ways of reacting 
to crises may be particularly effective for certain types of crises, connected by the respective 
dimensions of legitimacy they affect. Although the literature on both organizational crises and 
perception management is extensive, there are few sources combining the two subjects. What’s 
more, none of them explicitly incorporate organizational legitimacy as a framework. Therefore, I 
shall provide a brief discussion of how my argument matches extant findings for a link between 
crisis types and classes of reactions, along with the combinations inferred from the above 
explanations.
Scandals affect regulative legitimacy, since they are often a result of corporate crime. They 
also influence normative legitimacy due to the morally reprehensible behaviors associated with 
them. This suggests that scandals may be addressed by a wide variety of strategies: evasive and 
accommodative reactions for regulative legitimation, and defensive, appreciative, and 
accommodative reactions for moral legitimation. This is congruent with empirical evidence to 
some extent. Marcus and Goodman (1991) found that “accommodative” (i.e. appreciative and 
accommodative in my classification of reactions) signals evoked significantly more positive 
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responses by investors than “defensive” signals. Moreover, Elsbach (2001) proposed that 
expressing consideration of stakeholders’ views may be more effective when facing relatively 
foreseeable controversies. A possible implication is that evasive strategies should only be 
employed if the violation of rules has not already become obvious.  
Product safety and health incidents primarily affect pragmatic legitimacy in that they threaten 
the organization’s image as a reliable exchange partner. Thus, they may be resolved by choosing 
evasive or accommodative reactions. Similarly, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) suggested that when 
goal performance is challenged, the focal organization typically resorts to denial, concealment, 
and coercive isomorphism (i.e. adopting established practices). This combination may constitute 
decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), which may be difficult to uphold under increased scrutiny 
by stakeholders. Marcus and Goodman (1991) reported that none of the two classes of signals 
they studied (accommodative vs. defensive) was significantly more effective than the other. 
Accidents primarily affect cognitive legitimacy since their surprising occurrence and causal 
ambiguity challenge perceived comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness. It follows that the 
most neutral types of reaction – at the boundary between defensive and appreciative – may be the 
optimal choice in countering them. There is limited congruence of this notion with the evidence 
provided by Marcus and Goodman (1991), who found no evidence of efficacy for defensive 
signals following accidents. Elsbach (2001) posited that unforeseeable controversies should best 
be countered by communicating rationality. This seems to be broadly congruent with the 
strategies of defining and explaining, although Elsbach described denial as most effective. 
Finally, when abstracting away from individual crisis types, accommodative behaviors appear to 
be the most promising because they address moral, regulative, and pragmatic legitimacy. This 
does not come as a complete surprise, however, since it involves conforming unreservedly to 
stakeholder expectations (e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach, 1994). 
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Organizational crises have only recently received attention by researchers from a social 
interaction perspective. And while there have been successful attempts at incorporating image 
restoration strategies in order to explain effective crisis management, the mechanisms behind the 
social dimension of crises remained unclear. Therefore, in this paper, I introduce organizational 
legitimacy as the missing construct linking crises types and organizational reactions. I provide 
overviews of the literature on dimensions of legitimacy, types of crises, and types of reactions to 
crises, respectively. For crisis types and organizational reactions, I also develop new typologies, 
taking account of and refining extant approaches. Based thereon, I present two sets of 
propositions. The first posits links between scandals and regulative and moral legitimacy, product 
safety and health incidents and pragmatic legitimacy, and accidents and cognitive legitimacy. The 
second suggests connections between these four dimensions of legitimacy and a variety of 
reactive crisis management strategies. These proposed connections tie well into the extant 
evidence and provide an explanation of why certain reactive strategies are more appropriate in 
restoring normalcy after a threatening event. 
While I argue that the ideas put forward in this paper refine and extend our knowledge about 
organizational crises, some caution is in order. Aside from the caveats of attempting to defend 
organizational legitimacy noted above, i.e. potential loss of trust and image of control, another 
source of failure lies among the groups of stakeholders the organization has to face. Since these 
groups may be highly diverse, so may be their demands and expectations. This may not only 
considerably complicate information processing and decision making (Ginzel et al., 1993). In 
some cases, the affected organization may have to choose which group of stakeholders to favor 
over others (Marcus & Goodman, 1991). Moreover, the diversity of members of any one group 
may also require employing a complex mixture of signals in order to regain legitimacy (Elsbach, 
2003), rendering the already challenging task of crisis management even more daunting. 
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Abstract 
Organizational crises can be conceptualized as interactions between organizations and stake-
holders around the breach and reestablishment of common norms and social codes, i.e. per-
ceptions of legitimacy. This paper contributes to the understanding of organizational crises by 
exploring the roles of dimensions of legitimacy in organizational crises as well as the role of 
different reactions in the resolution of crises. Results of two qualitative multiple-case studies 
based on analyses of media reports are presented. They suggest that crises are indeed charac-
terized by a loss in legitimacy, the specific dimensions depending on the type of crisis. More-
over, results support the notion that the type as well as the timing of organizational reactions 
to crises is relevant to the effective handling of threatening events. 
Introduction 
Case studies of organizational crises have contributed greatly to advances in management re-
search in the last decades. Examples are the Tenerife air disaster (Weick 1990), the loss of the 
space shuttle Challenger (Vaughan 1990), the industrial accident at Bhopal (Shrivastava 
1992), or the Mann Gulch fire (Weick 1993). Specifically, these works extended our under-
standing of organizational sensemaking (Weick 1988, 1993), intraorganizational regulatory 
relationships and social control (Vaughan 1990) as well as information processing (Ru-
dolph/Repenning 2002) as factors contributing to crises. An aspect which has been underrep-
resented in research on organizational crises is the social system within which crises unfold. 
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Only recently have scholars begun to conceptualize crises as interactions between organiza-
tions and stakeholders, through which these parties reestablish a sense of normalcy and nego-
tiate a path back to a stable mode of operation (Pfarrer et al. 2008; Yu et al. 2008). This is im-
portant since organizations are dependent on stakeholders in order to survive (Carroll/Hannan 
2000). Crises threaten shared values and commonly held beliefs in stakeholders and may be 
regarded as violations of uncertainty-reducing social codes (Carroll/Hannan 2000; Milburn et 
al. 1983; Pearson/Clair 1998). 
The influence of social aspects on organizational crises may be framed through the construct 
of organizational legitimacy (e.g. Dowling/Pfeffer 1975; Suchman 1995), which features 
prominently in current organization theory (Deephouse/Suchman 2008). According to Such-
man (1995: 574), an organization is deemed legitimate if its actions are “desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and defini-
tions”. Because crises are perceived by stakeholders as a breach of social codes, i.e. norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions, they may be characterized as an unexpected loss of legiti-
macy. The literature on organizational legitimacy offers several conceptualizations, consisting 
of two to four dimensions (Aldrich/Fiol 1994; Aldrich/Ruef 2006; Scott 1995; Suchman 
1995). Comparing these has revealed a considerable overlap between these concepts, allowing 
for the identification of four dimensions in total, namely moral, cognitive, regulative, and 
pragmatic legitimacy (Breitsohl 2009). Moral legitimacy is concerned with normative evalua-
tions, cognitive legitimacy comprises comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness, regulative 
legitimacy is awarded based on accordance with rules, and pragmatic legitimacy reflects 
whether the organization is perceived to be a valuable exchange partner. 
As for crises themselves, numerous authors have proposed different definitions and classifica-
tions, varying greatly in terms of scope, dimensionality, delineation, and detail (e.g. Mar-
cus/Goodman 1991; Milburn et al. 1983; Pauchant/Mitroff 1992; Shrivastava et al. 1988). 
When combining those typologies while maintaining a stakeholder perspective (Breitsohl 
2009), three broad types of crises can be identified. Scandals comprise crises triggered by, 
e.g. bribery, insider trading, price-fixing, or sexual harassment. Their roots often lie within the 
organization, among its members, so it is generally feasible to identify the perpetrators and 
possibly even prevent the crisis. Accidents comprise events categorized by Shrivastava et al. 
(1988) as related to the production system, such as explosions, airplane crashes, or the sinking 
of ships. By contrast, they are much more difficult to control, since they are often caused by 
the complexity of tightly coupled systems (Perrow 1984). While failures of such systems are 
relatively rare, even when compared with other crises, they do occur, are difficult to prevent, 
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and are often devastating in their effects. Product safety and health incidents comprise post-
production effects and consumption-side harms (Shrivastava et al. 1988), like sabotage, prod-
uct defects and associated recalls, and production-related pollution. These are not as rare and 
causally ambiguous as accidents, but feature a combination of internal (production systems) 
and external (e.g. consumers) influences. For crisis in general, while some authors have noted 
a potential connection between crises and reputation, shared values and beliefs, and social 
codes (Milburn et al. 1983; Pearson/Clair 1998; Yu et al. 2008), little is known about the ex-
act nature of this relationship. 
With respect to the management of organizational crises, research has hitherto focused con-
trolling contributing factors by establishing systems for crisis prevention (e.g. Hedberg et al. 
1976; Smart/Vertinsky 1977; Turner 1976). Little attention has been directed at possibilities 
of handling threatening events after they have occurred. The literature on impression man-
agement (e.g. Elsbach 2003; Schlenker 1980; Tedeschi 1981) offers extensive knowledge on 
how organizations attempt to control perceptions in social interactions. It is therefore very 
useful in studying crises from a stakeholder perspective. In an attempt to consolidate the mul-
titude of available conceptualizations of impression management techniques, Breitsohl (2009) 
has developed a typology featuring four classes of organizational reactions to crises, each 
comprising three types. Accordingly, evasion seeks to avoid any connection to a problematic 
event through retreat, concealment or denial. Defense involves acknowledging the existence 
of a problem without taking responsibility by disassociation, offering excuses, or defining the 
situation. Appreciation is chosen when responsibility is accepted in the form of explanation, 
justification or apology, but no further action is taken. Finally, accommodation is associated 
with actively seeking resolution through restitution, divorce, or restructuring. Regarding ef-
fects of such reactions, a few scholars have investigated strategies of influence within the con-
text of problematic legitimacy (e.g. Ashforth/Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach 1994, 2001; Els-
bach/Sutton 1992; Suchman, 1995). Yet, with the exception of Suchman (1995), most of these 
works treat legitimacy as a one-dimensional construct. Moreover, specific crisis management 
strategies have not been studied empirically from a legitimacy perspective. 
It is therefore the goal of this paper to shed light on organizational crises by adopting a legiti-
macy perspective. More specifically, the roles of dimensions of legitimacy in organizational 
crises as well as the role of different reactions in the resolution of crises are to be examined. 
To this end, two multiple-case studies of nine and six real-world crises, respectively, were 
conducted. Study 1 examined the extent to which four dimensions of legitimacy were affected 
in different types of organizational crises. Study 2 compared crises in terms of the reactions 
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exhibited by the organizations involved. The remainder of the paper consists of reports on the 
methodology, samples, and results of both studies. It concludes with a discussion of implica-
tion of those results. 
Study 1: Effects of Crises on Organizational Legitimacy 
In order to identify testable relationships between critical events and organizational legiti-
macy, an exploratory study was conducted. As noted above, crises are rare events and, there-
fore, large-sample investigations are exceedingly difficult to undertake, although there are ex-
ceptions (Lin et al. 2006). Research on organizational crises typically consists of studies com-
prising one or few cases, which allow accounting for the complexity of such events. Since the 
goal was to identify candidate causal relationships, the first task was to strike a balance be-
tween creating an empirical base solid enough to support testable propositions, and keeping 
data collection and analysis manageable. In other words, the goal was not to inductively es-
tablish a theoretical model by testing hypotheses, but to explore whether a connection be-
tween organizational crises and legitimacy may exist and what its character may be. This in-
dicated the need for employing case studies (Eisenhardt/Graebner 2007). More specifically, I 
chose a comparative multiple-case approach, following the “most different systems” principle 
(Przeworski/Teune 1970). Accordingly, if the variable to be explained, i.e. affected dimen-
sions of organizational legitimacy, is the same for different cases, i.e. organizations, then the 
factors distinguishing those cases are irrelevant for the explanation. Thus, the goal was to gain 
robust propositions about relationships between organizational crises and legitimacy by se-
lecting a diverse sample of cases. 
Adopting the three crisis types identified by Marcus and Goodman (1991), I selected three 
cases for each crises type, which will be outlined briefly below. This sample size allowed for 
a broad range of scandals, accidents, and product safety and health incidents, while keeping 
the necessary efforts for data collection and analysis within reasonable limits. The foremost 
criterion for selecting different cases within one crisis type was the focal organization’s indus-
try. For instance, the cases for scandals cover an automobile manufacturer, a retailing chain, 
and an armored transportation provider. If more than three cases were candidates for investi-
gation, selection was based on data availability. 
Another important step in the research approach was to determine the method of data analysis. 
As noted, small-sample studies allow for rich descriptions and exploration. Furthermore, or-
ganizational legitimacy is inherently difficult to measure (Terreberry 1968), although some 
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authors have successfully used survey methods (e.g. Elsbach 1994). Other quantitative meas-
ures, such as performance indicators, were deemed inappropriate due to theoretical irrele-
vance or possible distortion (Emondson/McNamus 2007). By contrast, media reports are im-
portant indicators for organizational legitimacy (Deephouse/Suchman 2008). More specifi-
cally, corporate audiences draw on media reports when constructing assessments of reputation 
and legitimacy on which investment decision, career decisions, and product choices are based 
(Fombrun/Shanley 1990; Pollock/Rindova 2003). Researchers have therefore used media re-
ports as measures for organizational legitimacy (e.g. Deephouse 1996; Hybels et al. 1994). 
Since the goal of this study was to identify possible relationships within the perception of cri-
ses by stakeholders in terms of legitimacy, a qualitative analysis (Miles/Huberman 1994) of 
media reports on crisis events appeared to be the optimal choice. The media included in the 
analysis were 86 articles from 12 major German newspapers and business magazines as well 
as their respective online versions. Employing a similar procedure as Marcus and Goodman 
(1991), articles from these sources reporting on the nine crises were analyzed with a focus on 
how the events were described in terms of legitimacy. Although the construct was not men-
tioned directly by the journalists, the reporting did contain judgments of whether the organiza-
tions adhered to rules (regulative), displayed immoral behavior (moral), or if the events en-
dangered the organization’s quality as an exchange partner (pragmatic) or its taken-for-
grantedness (cognitive). The qualitative differences in reporting were classified as positive, 
neutral, or negative in tone. The goal was then to determine whether differences in affected 
dimensions of legitimacy could be observed between crisis types. 
Summaries of cases 
As noted above, the nine cases were selected to represent a broad range of crises within the 
respective types in order to gain a relatively robust empirical foundation – given the study’s 
qualitative nature. The cases therefore feature organizations from different industries, as will 
be outlined below. In addition, where possible, the cases also reflect different subtypes of cri-
ses, resulting in a portfolio of cases covering many of the types from the established typolo-
gies by Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), Pearson and Clair (1998), and Shrivastava et al. (1988). 
Table 1 lists the represented subtypes. For instance, the three scandals were constituted by 
bribery, spying, and misappropriation, respectively. I now turn to a brief summary of the 
events triggering each of the nine crises. 
The first accident involves the crash of a passenger train operated by Deutsche Bahn, the 
state-owned national railway company in Germany. On June 3, 1998, the high-speed train,
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Table 1: Overview of case types analyzed 
Accidents Product safety & health incidents Scandals 
Passenger train crash Lead-poisoned toys Spying on employees  
Explosion at fireworks plant Baby food Misappropriation of funds 
Oil spill Defective drug Bribing of union representatives 
 
travelling at approximately 200 kilometers per hour, derailed and crashed into the foundations 
of an overpass. 101 people were killed and more than the same number were injured. Investi-
gations concluded that the main cause was a defective wheel rim. The second accident fea-
tures an explosion at S.E. Fireworks, a large fireworks manufacturing plant in Enschede, the 
Netherlands. The accident occurred on May 13, 2000, killing 22 people and injuring hun-
dreds. Furthermore, due to the plant’s location within a residential area, almost 400 houses 
were destroyed and about 1000 more were damaged. The cause for the explosion has not been 
clarified completely. The third accident under study is an oil spill off the coast of Spain. The 
Prestige, a large 26 year-old single-hull tanker registered to a Liberian shipping company 
went aground on November 13, 2002, broke into two pieces and sank within six days, spilling 
several thousand tons of crude oil into the Atlantic Ocean. The resulting oil film polluted hun-
dreds of kilometers of Spanish coastline, killing large numbers of wildlife and tarring beaches.  
The first scandal involves the systematic practice of spying on employees at Lidl, a large 
German retail chain. Supposedly in order to prevent theft at over 200 of the company’s stores, 
detective agencies were hired to collect information on personnel without notice, which was 
discovered in March 2008. For about half of the employees subject to this practice, the detec-
tives’ actions were illegal. The second scandal is linked to the bankruptcy of Heros, the then-
leading provider of armored transport services in Germany. For several years prior, the foun-
der as well as some top executives had been illegally withdrawing hundreds of millions of 
dollars from the company. This was accomplished by setting up a sophisticated scheme in 
which money taken from recent transports was replaced by taking on loans as well as money 
from new transports, driving up the company’s financial debt. Bankruptcy was declared on 
February 20, 2006, within days after the illegal practices were discovered. The third scandal 
developed around several counts of bribery at Volkswagen, the largest automobile manufac-
turer in Europe. As was revealed in mid-2005, top executives had bribed union representatives 
on more than one occasion. This included inviting them on “business trips” where they would 
employ the services of prostitutes. Payments for such travels totaled in the millions of dollars 
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and were camouflaged as regular travel expenses or special bonuses, as investigations by an 
external auditor showed.  
The first product safety and health incident involves the recall of close to one million prod-
ucts by Mattel in August and September 2007. These poisonous toys had been found to con-
tain high levels of lead because the Chinese subcontractor performing the actual production 
had failed to adhere to the contract with the brand company. Unlike that case, the second inci-
dent did not pass without human victims, since it claimed the lives of two infants in the fall of 
2003. These had been fed with defective baby food produced by Humana, a large German 
producer of dairy products, containing only one tenth of the amount of vitamin B1 reported on 
the packaging label. In addition to these two deaths, 13 children had to be treated due to the 
malnourishment. The third incident – and final case to be summarized – had consequences for 
a much larger number of people, when Bayer had to admit in August 2001 that Lipobay, one 
its most successful drugs, was responsible for about 100 fatalities. For each of the nine crises, 
a qualitative analysis of media reports was conducted, the results of which will be presented 
in the following section of the paper. 
Results 
The analyses revealed different outcomes in terms of affected dimensions of legitimacy across 
crisis types. To a lesser extent, there was also some variation within crisis types, when com-
paring single cases. Overall, organizational legitimacy was affected negatively by the critical 
events. This is especially true for scandals and accidents, while the results for product safety 
and health incidents were more ambiguous. With respect to dimensions of legitimacy, moral 
legitimacy was most clearly jeopardized, followed by regulative and cognitive legitimacy. Re-
sults for pragmatic legitimacy were scarce and did not allow for a concise categorization. 
More specific findings for each type of crisis are presented below. 
Accidents 
In the three cases representing accidents, moral, cognitive, and regulative legitimacy were all 
negatively affected. Concerning moral legitimacy, stakeholders criticized the respective or-
ganizations for being overly oriented towards maximizing profits while neglecting standards 
of safety. Perceived violations of regulative standards were clear in only one of the cases. The 
same was found to be true with regards to cognitive legitimacy for a different case. Pragmatic 
legitimacy was not found to be reduced in any of the accidents studied. Examples of these 
findings are provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Affected dimensions of legitimacy for accidents by example 
 Moral Cognitive Regulative Pragmatic 
Train 
crash 
“time is money”; 
“wheel rims were 
used out of cost con-
siderations”; 
“afterwards, trains 
were running again 
like after some usual 
malfunction” 
“the day high-speed 
railway traffic lost its 
nimbus”; 
“the belief in suppos-
edly safe travel by 
train […] certainties 
that were shattered 
that day”; 
“there is a loss of im-
age, no doubt” 
  
Fireworks 
explosion 
“sloppiness and greed 
lead to the catastro-
phe”;  
“business was more 
important than the 
safety of the people 
around” 
 “factory was produc-
ing illegal fireworks”; 
“license did not per-
mit the processing of 
explosives”  
 
 
As for the individual cases, reports on the passenger train crash reflected negative impacts on 
moral and cognitive legitimacy. Morally focused criticism was directed primarily at the fact 
that Deutsche Bahn had foregone checking the wheels on its trains in order to reduce costs. 
Similarly, the particular type of wheel rims mounted on the derailed train as well as many 
others had been chosen for its lower price. This was regarded as an immoral decision, placing 
economic principles over passenger safety. From a cognitive perspective, the crash seriously 
damaged the reputation of railway travel as being extremely safe – and thereby the image of 
the quasi-monopolist provider. Interestingly, some passengers aboard the ill-fated train were 
so convinced of its safety that even wheel-parts piercing the floor just before the crash did not 
prompt them to pull the emergency brakes. Although the accident was perceived to be related 
to a breech of social norms, regulative legitimacy was not found to have suffered. Indeed, a 
later court trial found three responsible engineers not guilty of contributing to the crash. 
For the fireworks explosion, media coverage focused on moral and regulative aspects of le-
gitimacy, which were both affected negatively. As could be observed for the train crash, the 
public perceived organizational practices at S.E. Fireworks to be immorally focused on prof-
its. This judgment was based on the regulative assessment that the company had broken laws 
as well as industry standards when building the factory in the residential neighborhood. Fur-
thermore, the products had been illegally manufactured and traded, and their storage had vio-
lated environmental and fire protection regulation. Due to the severity of the accident, the as-
sociated loss of legitimacy appears to have spread to the town administration, which had been 
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lax in enforcing safety rules at the factory. Signs for a general discussion about safety at fire-
works factories were found for other countries as well. 
The third accident, the sinking of the oil tanker Prestige turned out to be an unusual case in 
terms of organizational legitimacy, making it difficult to compare. While there was extensive 
media coverage of the oil spill, the owner of the ship could not be easily identified. As it was 
finally revealed, the ship was owned by a Liberian organization, operated by a Greek shipping 
company, chartered by a Swiss corporation, while sailing under the flag of the Bahamas. This 
ambiguity rendered the case more difficult to compare in two respects. First, since there was 
no clear “perpetrator”, most reports focused on the accident itself, simply because there was 
nothing to report on the organization behind the accident. Second, although there were pro-
tests by environmental activists, they remained relatively scarce and directed at the govern-
ment, because they had no primary target. As Kostova and Zaheer (1999) have pointed out, 
attacking an unknown organization would have carried no benefits for the critics. From a 
more general perspective, the accident considerably damaged the already weak legitimacy of 
single-hull oil tankers. 
Scandals 
The three scandals under study were largely characterized by losses in moral as well as regu-
lative legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy was affected in only one of the cases. Similarly to the 
accidents described above, there were very few references to pragmatic legitimacy in the me-
dia reports on the scandals. Examples of these findings are provided in Table 3. 
With respect to the scandal surrounding the spying on employees at Lidl, media reports were 
dominated by moral and regulative aspects, while no evidence was found for effects on cogni-
tive and pragmatic legitimacy. Specifically, harsh criticism was directed at the company’s dis-
regard of its employees’ privacy needs. One especially problematic part was the recording of 
how often employees used the restrooms at their workplace. Additional dismay was caused by 
the revelation that the company had systematically attempted to prevent the formation of 
workers’ councils through means of intimidation. In terms of regulative legitimacy, reports 
also emphasized the illegality of the spying practices. The reason for secretly observing em-
ployees put forward by the organization, namely protecting against theft, was not accepted by 
the public, partly because this course of action would also be illegal, except in cases of rea-
sonable suspicion. Interestingly, it can be argued that, from a pragmatic perspective, theft pre-
vention could have been used as a sensitive explanation for observing employees. However, 
this argument could not be identified in the media reports. 
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Table 3: Affected dimensions of legitimacy for scandals by example 
 Moral Cognitive Regulative Pragmatic 
Spying on em-
ployees 
“spying of unbeliev-
able magnitude” 
“records intrude far 
into the privacy” 
“when and how of-
ten employees went 
to the restrooms” 
 “illegal observation 
by private detec-
tives” 
“the limits of legal-
ity were crossed” 
 
Misappropriation 
of funds 
“employees were in-
timidated in order to 
prevent the forma-
tion of workers’ 
councils” 
“acquisition could 
not have possibly 
been financed 
through usual busi-
ness” 
“up to the bank-
ruptcy, Heros had 
established a pyra-
mid scheme” 
“large sums of 
money went into 
their own pockets” 
“the court ruled that 
the mangers had 
misappropriated 
funds amounting to 
250 million” 
“customers termi-
nated cooperation 
directly after the 
revelations” 
 
The case of massive misappropriation of funds at armored transport services provider Heros 
showed similar results in that moral and regulative legitimacy were affected, with the addition 
of a loss in cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy was found to be mildly damaged. Spe-
cifically, investigation by journalists revealed that the success of the company, being the larg-
est provider on a national level, was based on an elaborate pyramid scheme. Customer funds 
were not, as stated officially, transferred to trust accounts, but were used to lower service 
charges. This allowed Heros to drive competitors out of business in order to subsequently ac-
quire them, securing market dominance. These insights, in conjunction with reports that other 
portions of customer funds were misused for personal enrichment of the founder and several 
top managers, called into question the success story and taken-for-grantedness of the company 
and thus severely undermined its cognitive legitimacy. Furthermore, both regulative and 
moral legitimacy suffered due the misappropriation as well as the fact that the company ex-
plicitly prohibited the formation of workers’ councils. Additional moral outrage was triggered 
by the finding that the company had often hired permanently unemployed persons since those 
were less likely to risk their jobs through whistle-blowing. Only one media report indicated a 
threat to pragmatic legitimacy, specifically the termination of business relationships by cus-
tomers. It should be noted, however, that the company filed for bankruptcy very soon after the 
illegal practices were discovered, preempting further loss of its customer base. Finally, as was 
observed for the accident at a fireworks factory, the entire armored transports industry suf-
fered from the scandal and reacted by introducing stricter standards of security. 
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The third scandal, involving the bribing of union representatives at Volkswagen, was found to 
be somewhat different in that media reports drew a clear distinction between the managers 
perpetrating bribery on one hand, and the company being damaged by those actions on the 
other. Problematic practices were not presented as typical for the organization, but as re-
stricted to a small identifiable group of persons. Moreover, by comparison, reports on the 
bribing practices were relatively moderate in tone, indicating no emphasis of moral, regulative 
or pragmatic aspects. As far as cognitive legitimacy is concerned, the extent to which both ex-
ternal as well as internal stakeholders were surprised by the revelations suggested a potential 
threat to predictability of the company’s actions. However, media reports downplayed the role 
of mistakes made on the part of Volkswagen. Overall, the company was described as having 
taken all necessary steps to prevent such problematic events. Therefore, organizational legiti-
macy was only weakly affected by the scandal. 
Product safety and health incidents 
For the third type of crisis, comprising events related to product safety and health, the dimen-
sions of organizational legitimacy primarily affected were cognitive and regulative. Reports 
touching moral and pragmatic legitimacy were less frequent and clear. Overall, assessments 
of the incidents varied to a much greater extent compared to accidents and scandals. This was 
true between as well as within the three cases. Examples of these findings are provided in Ta-
ble 4. 
In the case of lead-poisoned toys, media reports stressed the toxicity and dangerousness of the 
toys, questioning the taken-for-grantedness of safety of the otherwise well-established Mattel 
products. Thus, reports of the threat to child health embodied by the toys challenged the com-
pany’s cognitive legitimacy. Interestingly, related reports noting that other toy producers and 
retailers were suffering from similar problems as well as that 80 percent of all toys were pro-
duced in China – just like the products in question – did not mitigate the situation. A minority 
of stock analysts did interpret the product recalls as evidence for a functioning quality man-
agement system. This, however, did not affect the overall loss in cognitive legitimacy. The 
negative assessments of cognitive aspects were contrasted by positive regulative reporting 
with regard to the product recalls. Although, strictly speaking, the levels of lead found in the 
toys were illegal, the recalls were largely described as voluntary – and therefore commend-
able. 
Similarly mixed results, yet on different dimensions of legitimacy, were found for the baby 
food case. The incident clearly undermined Humana’s cognitive legitimacy. Having been 
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Table 4: Affected dimensions of legitimacy for product safety and health incidents by 
example 
 Moral Cognitive Regulative Pragmatic 
Lead-poisoned 
toys 
 “recalls have dam-
aged the company’s 
reputation” 
“toys were taken off 
the market due to 
hazardous parts” 
“Mattel was forced 
to recall contami-
nated toys” 
“toys merely 
crossed the very 
strict internal thresh-
olds for lead” 
“thresholds for the 
EU and the US were 
definitely complied 
with” 
 
Baby food “Humana takes re-
sponsibility” 
“Humana expresses 
dismay” 
“Humana admitted 
massive flaws in 
product develop-
ment” 
“mishaps in devel-
opment and quality 
management” 
“EU thresholds were 
vastly violated” 
“public prosecution 
has initiated investi-
gations” 
 
Defective drug  “patients were very 
uncertain” 
“the image was tar-
nished” 
“no effective drug is 
free from side ef-
fects” 
“Bayer had tested 
and launched Lipo-
bay according to 
regulations” 
“patients discontin-
ued treatment” 
“Statins demonstra-
bly reduce mortality 
and improve quality 
of life” 
 
recognized previously as an experienced provider of baby food, this taken-for-grantedness 
could not be sustained, despite management’s effort to present the incident as unique. From a 
regulative perspective, the death of two infants as a triggering event was, without doubt, a se-
rious threat to legitimacy. This is true even though no intent or gross neglect on the part of the 
company or its employees could be identified. Interestingly, as in the toy case, the organiza-
tion was applauded for its reaction to the product safety incident. Specifically, there were no 
reports on morally reprehensible conduct. Quite the contrary, the deliberate manner in which 
Humana handled the situation, including expressing sympathy, assuming responsibility, and 
proactively helping parents of affected children was presented in a positive light by the media. 
For last case under study, focusing on the defective drug Lipobay, effects for all dimensions 
of legitimacy can be reported, although results were scarce for moral, and diverse for prag-
matic legitimacy. Again, as for the other two product safety and health incidents, results were 
mixed and more ambiguous than for accidents and scandals. A definite assessment for cogni-
tive legitimacy was difficult. On one hand, taken-for-grantedness of the drug was reduced, 
such that some patients deliberately discontinued treatment without consulting their physi-
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cians. Moreover, consumers were more insecure with respect to the entire class of cholesterol-
lowering drugs. On the other hand, media reports pointed to the fact that some of the prob-
lems associated with the drug may have been preventable, had patients and doctors paid closer 
attention to the package leaflet, effectively exonerating the company. From a regulative per-
spective, Bayer appears to have come out of the incident without significant damage, mainly 
because no violations of the law could be proven. Although the actual legal status of a crises 
may differ from its perception by the public, as seen in the lead-poisoning case, this was not 
found for this particular instant. 
Conclusions from Study 1 
To sum up, results from the nine cases indicate that, while all crises were characterized by 
losses in organizational legitimacy, crisis types differed in their effects on dimensions of le-
gitimacy. Across crisis types, cognitive and regulative legitimacy were most frequently af-
fected, although not always in the same cases. Moral legitimacy was found to be threatened in 
more than half of the crises under study. There were very few media reports touching on 
pragmatic legitimacy. A possible explanation lies within the delineation of pragmatic legiti-
macy: its focus is on the perception of an organization as an exchange partner (Suchman 
1995). This may simply not be as relevant to the media as aspects more congruent with gen-
eral interests of a diverse readership: moral issues, the adherence to rules, and the role of an 
organization in everyday life. Still, the results support the notion that losses in legitimacy lie 
at the heart of organizational crises. 
With regards to the individual crisis types, accidents primarily affected moral legitimacy, with 
additional reductions in cognitive or regulative legitimacy. This is not entirely congruent with 
earlier propositions (Breitsohl 2009) suggesting that accidents primarily reduce cognitive le-
gitimacy. However, the core of this discrepancy may not be the type of crisis, but that the par-
ticular accidents analyzed here were perceived to be caused in part by the companies them-
selves, making them borderline cases between accidents and scandals. This point will be dis-
cussed in more detail below. In addition, due to the massive impact of these particular acci-
dents, they may have evoked more affective responses by the public than usual. Scandals 
were found to impair moral and regulative legitimacy, and, in one case, cognitive legitimacy. 
This supports the relationship proposed by Breitsohl (2009), as scandals are typically con-
nected to “white-collar crime” as well as morally reprehensible actions, such as neglect and 
deceit. Effects on cognitive legitimacy are plausible since in some cases, e.g. Heros or, most 
prominently, Enron, the core of the scandal lies in creating an illegal business separate from 
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the legitimate façade. Revealing this divide between symbolism and substance would clearly 
threaten perceptions of comprehensibility. Finally, for product safety and health incidents, 
cognitive legitimacy was most dominantly reduced. Although not in complete concordance 
with earlier suggestions (Breitsohl 2009), this is plausible because problems associated to 
product safety may challenge perceptions of comprehensibility. More support is offered by 
the finding that regulative legitimacy was reduced in two cases, since governments often es-
tablish regulation designed to protect consumers from faulty products. The results for product 
safety and health incidents were relatively diverse between cases. This may be interpreted as 
support for the positioning of such events between accidents and scandal in typologies of or-
ganizational crises (Breitsohl 2009; Marcus/Goodman 1991). 
The results from this study also point to a possible limitation of some typologies of organiza-
tional crises. Specifically, it remains unclear what exactly constitutes a scandal, i.e. what cri-
teria could be used to delineate scandals. While for some types of crises, such as spying on 
employees, it is relatively easy to denote them as scandals. For other cases, it is much more 
difficult because they contain a mixture of problematic actions. For instance, there was some 
indication that the fireworks factory explosion may have been caused in part by illegal manu-
facturing procedures. Does this turn the accident into a scandal? The same may be true for the 
train crash, had there been clearer evidence for a neglect of safety for the sake of lower costs. 
On a related note, accidents often occur within the context of complex technologies (Perrow 
1984), which are therefore highly regulated. Given that organizations are expected to exert 
control (Salancik/Meindl 1984), this may lower stakeholders’ threshold to regard an accident 
as “scandalous” if only the slightest mistake in handling a complex technology became appar-
ent. More generally, intention may be one criterion for delineating scandals. Another criterion 
may be the degree to which a group of perpetrators is separable from the organization as a 
whole. In the case of bribery of union representatives, the company suffered only small loses 
in legitimacy, because a small group of employees could be identified as responsible for the 
transgressions. For the armored transport case, the fact that one of the managers misappropri-
ating company funds was also the founder may have worsened the public’s perception of the 
company. By contrast, since it was very difficult to identify the organization behind the oil 
spill, there was no subject to condemn in terms of legitimacy.  
As noted above, some of the media reports on product safety and health incidents were posi-
tive in tone, a somewhat surprising result given the inherently problematic nature of crises. A 
closer inspection of those specific reports revealed that they did not address the crises per se, 
but organizational reactions, i.e. the handling of the situation. For example, Mattel was com-
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mended for voluntarily recalling defective products. Similarly, Humana’s proactive and ac-
commodative reaction to the baby food crisis was regarded as positive. A screening of the 
other nine cases yielded one more instance in which organizational reactions were evaluated 
instead of the crisis: Lidl unsuccessfully attempted to frame the practice of spying on employ-
ees as a theft-prevention program. These findings point to the importance of carefully separat-
ing between different effects, even within qualitative studies. More importantly, they support 
the notion that organizational reactions play an important part in the course of crisis and are 
worthy of further investigation, such the second study presented below. 
Study 2: Efficacy of organizational crisis reactions 
For the second study, focusing on the effect of organizational reactions to threatening events, 
I followed a different approach in selecting cases compared to Study 1. Since the focal aspect 
was crisis reactions by affected organizations, cases were chosen following the “most similar 
systems” (Przeworski/Teune 1970) principle. Accordingly, cases are selected to possess as 
many common traits as possible, so that important differences found in the comparison may 
be attributed to a small number of possible causes. In other words, “common systemic charac-
teristics are conceived of as ‘controlled for’, whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as 
explanatory variables” (Przeworski/Teune 1970: 37). This required finding organizational cri-
ses which ideally share as many initial properties as possible in order to reduce variation and 
exclude this entire set of explanations (Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover, selected cases were to 
exhibit large discrepancies in their outcomes, so that it could be assumed that such differences 
are due the way in which the respective organization handled the crisis. Therefore, I chose 
two cases for each type of organizational crisis, resembling each other in terms of geographic 
locale, industry, and the specific type of crisis. This matching approach, combined with the 
low general frequency of crises, severely limited the number of (pairs of) cases to choose 
from. I therefore reused one of the nine cases already analyzed. More specifically, the six 
cases represent two passenger airplane crashes in Indonesia, two scandals involving spying on 
employees in large German companies, and two product safety and health incidents involving 
Chinese producers of milk powder. Similarly to Study 1, a qualitative analysis of media re-
ports was conducted, using 155 articles from various online and print news outlets. If possi-
ble, news media from the countries in which the crisis took place were analyzed. In the cases 
of the Chinese producers of milk powder, international and German sources were drawn upon 
due to restrictions on independent reporting of Chinese media. All six cases will now be 
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summarized briefly, while the companies’ reactions will be described and compared in more 
detail in the following section. 
Summaries of cases 
Accidents 
On January 1, 2007, Adam Air Flight 574, en route from Java to Sulawesi, disappeared from 
radar in severe weather, after sending several emergency messages. The 17-year-old Boeing 
737 was carrying a total of 102 passengers and crew. At the time, Adam Air was an important 
provider of air travel within Indonesia, serving 25 routes with 19 airplanes. The company had 
previously been subject to public scrutiny due to safety issues. The search for Adam Air 574 
proved to be very difficult, despite large-scale support by the government, which deployed 
around 3,000 soldiers and volunteers, along with several ships and aircraft. It took ten days to 
discover the first parts of the wreck, and another six days to locate the flight recorder. How-
ever, the recovery of the flight recorder, the most crucial piece of evidence was delayed due to 
technical inadequacies. Adam Air assumed normal business activities, and the passengers and 
crew were declared dead. Meanwhile, another Adam Air Flight had to perform an emergency 
landing, prompting authorities to ground all of the airline’s planes. After successfully demon-
strating to investigators that safety at Adam Air was sufficient, an impending revocation of 
the company’s license could be held off temporarily. However, a third incident involving an 
Adam Air plane in March 2008, followed by the departure of a major investor, lead to the loss 
of Adam Air’s license. Investigations later revealed that the third accident was caused by 
technical defects in conjunction with errors by the crew. 
On September 5, 2005, Mandala Airlines Flight 091 crashed into a residential area in the city 
of Medan directly after take-off. 149 people were killed, many injured, and over 30 houses 
were completely destroyed. There were 14 survivors. The government-owned company had 
been involved in minor incidents in the past, but was growing steadily and was planning to 
search for private investors. Recovery proceeded relatively swiftly and the flight recorder was 
found two days later, while official investigations were already underway. On that same day, 
another Mandala plane had to return to its origin shortly after departure due to technical prob-
lems. During the following days, after clean-up efforts at the site of the crash had begun, a 
third Mandala flight was refused permission to take off on grounds of technical inadequacies. 
The following months saw the payment of restitution to the victims as well as the rebuilding 
of the houses destroyed in the crash. Mandala Airlines was subsequently acquired by two in-
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vestors and restructured comprehensively. It is now listed in the highest national safety class 
and has grown significantly. 
Scandals 
As noted above, one case from Study 1 was used again in Study 2 due to strict selection crite-
ria for case pairs. This case is the one involving spying in employees at Lidl, the second-
largest food retailer in Germany. For reasons of parsimony, a repetition of the details is omit-
ted here, and the focus is now directed at the other scandal. 
On May 24, 2008, Deutsche Telekom, Europe’s largest provider of telecommunication ser-
vices, announced that it had systematically monitored phone calls by managers, board mem-
bers, and journalists during the years 2005 and 2006. Specifically, Telekom recorded and used 
information regarding times and dates, participants, and length of those calls, on both mobile 
and land lines. Ten days earlier, the CEO had filed suit against the company with the public 
prosecution office. Following the public announcement, workers’ unions as well as the Ger-
man association of journalists demanded quick clarification of the matter. The Federal Com-
missioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information initiated official investigations. 
Meanwhile, Telekom’s board of directors explicitly supported the CEO’s handling of the 
situation, which later included the enlistment of two highly reputable experts for the devel-
opment of a new data security system for the entire corporation. During the following months, 
several additional reports on problems in information security were published, although none 
of them were equally serious. In response to the scandal, Telekom created a new job for a Di-
rector of Data Security, endowed with a right-to-veto on all decisions touching aspects of data 
security. In addition, an external council for data protection was to be appointed, and employ-
ees’ access to sensitive data was to be restricted. Although the corporation expected to incur a 
decrease in revenue for the first time in its history, the company report for the year 2008 
showed a doubling in profits. 
Product safety and health incidents 
On September 11, 2008, it was reported that Sanlu Group, China’s largest producer of milk 
powder, was involved in a major product safety and health incident. After consuming Sanlu’s 
products, over 430 children suffered from severe poisoning with melamine, a substance used 
in the production of plastics. One infant died subsequently. Sanlu recalled several thousand 
tons of its milk powder. Five days after the first reports, the body count had increased to two 
deaths and over 1,200 ill. The Chinese government reacted by placing all producers of con-
taminated milk powder – 22 companies, as investigations revealed – under official oversight. 
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As the number of affected children kept rising, reaching a final number of 300,000 victims, 
the prime minister assumed control over the investigations. Numerous managers and officials 
were fired and arrested. A whole network of illegal factories producing melamine was discov-
ered. Sanlu’s largest investor finally sold all its shares. This, combined with waves of law-
suits, resulted in the company’s bankruptcy in December 2008. Several managers were sen-
tenced to death or long terms in prison. 
In the course of the melamine crisis in China, another corporation under scrutiny was Meng-
niu, the country’s largest dairy producer. After tests showed that about ten percent of Meng-
niu products were contaminated, the company took all of its products off the shelves. Large 
customers, such as Starbucks and Disney, removed Mengniu products from their assortments. 
The collapse in exports caused losses in the hundreds of millions of US-Dollars. In early 
2009, the Chinese dairy industry established an aid fund for the victims of the crisis.  
Comparisons within crisis types 
Since the goal of this study was to gain an understanding of differences between successful 
and unsuccessful cases of crisis management, I compared the case pairs in terms of the pro-
gression of the respective crisis in general and organizational reactions in particular. In order 
to account for the temporal structure of the events, I divided the crises into four phases. These 
phases spanned the first two days (phase 1), the first week (phase 2), the first month (phase 3) 
after the triggering event, and the remaining time until the end of the crisis (phase 4). Organ-
izational reactions were classified according to the typology outlined above (Breitsohl 2009). 
Accidents 
Comparing the two accidents revealed some commonalities as well as recognizable differ-
ences with respect to how the two airlines reacted to the crises, which are visualized in Table 
5. Overall, neither of the two affected companies employed evasive tactics in their reactions. 
The two also displayed a similar total number of reactions over the course of their crises. 
However, their reactions differed in terms of both their distribution over the 12 types as well 
as their sequence and combination over time. A phase-wise comparison revealed the follow-
ing patterns.  
During the first few days (phase 1) after the crash of their plane, management at Adam Air 
merely confirmed that contact with an aircraft had been lost. When, despite rumors, no re-
mains of Flight 574 could be found, a vice president attempted to excuse the situation by as-
suring the public that the pilot had acted in accordance with regulations and that the plane had
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Table 5. Reactions to accidents over time by example. 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Evasive 
 
 
    
Defensive Adam: “We don’t 
have the exact data 
about the weather 
[…] but it was 
flight-worthy.” 
Mandala: “They 
were declared fit to 
fly.”; “It’s difficult. 
It’s supposed to be 
more organized.” 
 Adam: “I have never 
done any [..] cost 
cutting in our main-
tenance sector. 
Maintenance takes 
up to 40 percent of 
operational costs.” 
Adam: “The worst 
punishment ever 
imposed on a na-
tional airline”; 
“premature”. 
Appreciative   Adam: “I haven’t 
had the chance to 
give a public expla-
nation because I was 
in Makassar assist-
ing the search.”; fu-
neral service for the 
victims. 
 
Accommodative Mandala: Creation 
of crisis manage-
ment center; free 
flights and passen-
ger list. “We will 
pay compensation, 
but now our team is 
still calculating it.” 
Adam: Relatives of 
victims flown to 
Makassar. 
Mandala: “The 
evacuation is aimed 
at clearing [..] so 
that traffic returns to 
normal.” 
Adam: “We will pay 
the compensation 
[…] Our manage-
ment has informed 
the families about 
that.” 
Mandala: “We will 
use the criticism to 
improve”; “the 
compensation is for 
all victims, both 
passengers and resi-
dents”; “we were 
ordered to rebuild 
[…] all financed by 
Mandala”. 
Adam: Compensa-
tion affirmed again; 
salvage vessel hired. 
Mandala: Emphasis 
of swift restitution 
after seven weeks. 
“Mandala Airline’s 
responsibilities will 
be over once the 
cash payments are 
made.” 
 
been airworthy. Otherwise, no reactions by Adam Air were reported. By contrast, Mandala 
Airlines, besides also pointing to the good technical condition of their plane, immediately cre-
ated a crisis reaction center, published a list of the passengers aboard Flight 091, and supplied 
free flights to Medan for relatives of the victims. The company had to face some criticism for 
the publication of the passenger list when it was discovered that not all of the listed victims 
had actually been on the plane. Mandala reacted by admitting to mistakes, yet blaming insuf-
ficient security checks at the airport. In addition, restitution for all aggrieved parties was an-
nounced. When another Mandala flight had to return to its origin, this was explained as evi-
dence of the high priority the company placed on its passengers’ well-being. 
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Within the remainder of the first week (phase 2) after the crashes, both airlines reacted only 
scarcely to the progressing crises. Adam Air, in response to fruitless search efforts for the 
wreck, offered free flights for relatives to Sulawesi, the destination of Flight 574. The com-
pany did not comment on activist groups announcing lawsuits in case Adam Air would not as-
sume full responsibility. Mandala Airlines’ only noteworthy reaction within this time span 
was its handling and financing of the cleanup efforts on the site of the crash. 
After that first week, but within the first month (phase 3) of the crashes, Adam Air agreed to 
provide monetary compensation. This was confirmed later, i.e. over two weeks after the acci-
dent, in the first public statement by Adam Air’s president, who attempted to justify his tim-
ing by pointing to his involvement in the search efforts. He also emphasized that there had 
been no cost-cutting in security procedures and no orders for pilots to ignore weather fore-
casts. Mandala Airline’s restitution practices, although having been initiated more quickly, 
were criticized, prompting an extension to cover treatment costs for the survivors as well as 
rebuilding the destroyed houses. When a Mandala pilot was arrested for illegal drug use, his 
employer announced his termination and company-wide drug tests. Three-and-a-half week af-
ter the crash, reconstruction in Medan began. 
One month after Flight 574 disappeared (phase 4), Adam Air held a funeral service near the 
estimated site of the crash. Adam Air management agreed to build a memorial and repeatedly 
promised to pay restitution. When Adam Air planes were later grounded after another inci-
dent, the company attributed it to strong winds and expressed a lack of understanding for the 
punishment. Finally, almost eight months after the crash, Adam Air hired a ship to recover the 
missing black box. Mandala Airlines, on the other hand, started paying compensation about 
seven weeks after the accident involving Flight 091, along with the announcement that this 
would be considered the concluding step in the affair. 
When comparing the two cases across phases of the crises, two main differences in reactions 
stand out. First, Mandala Airline’s reactions occurred mostly in phases 1 and 2, while Adam 
Air’s activities were spread out more evenly over the duration of their crisis. The highest level 
of reactions for Mandala could be observed within days of the crash, whereas Adam Air took 
over a week to notably address the situation. Second, Mandala almost exclusively chose con-
formant tactics in response to the crisis. The only reactions falling outside the appreciative 
and accommodative categories occurred immediately after the crash. By contrast, Adam Air 
employed a combination of mainly defensive and accommodative strategies throughout the 
course of its crisis. In sum, Mandala reacted considerably more swiftly, decisively, and con-
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sistently than its competitor. As noted above, Mandala was much more successful in over-
coming the loss of Flight 091 as was Adam Air, which ultimately lost its license.  
Scandals 
Comparing the two scandals surrounding the practices of spying on employees at Lidl and 
Deutsche Telekom revealed more commonalities as was true for the two accidents. Again, 
both companies refrained from using evasive tactics in response to the accusations, acknowl-
edging the existence of problems. Lidl and Telekom also exhibited a similar total number of 
reactions, of which most were symbolic, i.e. non-accommodative. Still, there were different 
emphases in terms of the temporal structure and combination of crisis reactions, which will 
now be described phase-wise. Examples thereof are presented in Table 6. 
On the day that problematic practices at Lidl were reported by a news magazine (phase 1), a 
senior executive admitted to the existence of surveillance records, but attempted to excuse this 
by framing them as a theft prevention program. When a workers’ union publicly encouraged 
lawsuits against the company, Lidl referred to the spying activities as the work of a few over-
eager detectives acting without knowledge of the Lidl management. It was also announced 
that business relationships with those detectives had been terminated. In a letter to all employ-
ees, Lidl apologized for potentially breaching their privacy. Management further explained 
that there had been some intensive surveillance in the course of inventory taking. By contrast, 
the scandal involving Deutsche Telekom was publicized by the company itself, along with the 
assertion that all efforts to elucidate the affair would be supported. Telekom’s CEO also con-
ceded weaknesses in the company’s security procedures. After official investigations were 
initiated, the CEO reaffirmed that Telekom would be very active in the resolution of the mat-
ter. 
The remainder of the first week of the respective scandals (phase 2) passed relatively quietly 
in both cases. Lidl publicly apologized in a newspaper article, announcing closer cooperation 
with their workforce in the future. While detectives’ associations complained about being 
blamed for the irregularities and official investigation were underway, Lidl offered their em-
ployees access to data records containing information about them. With respect to the Tele-
kom case, a spokesperson defended the ten-day lapse between the self-report to the police and 
the public announcement as necessary for thorough internal investigations.  
Within the following three weeks (phase 3), Lidl reacted to warnings by consumer protection 
organizations not to use debit cards at Lidl stores by assuring customers that video surveil-
lance data was deleted daily. In addition, the company began removing all video cameras
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Table 6. Reactions to scandals over time by example. 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Evasive 
 
 
    
Defensive Lidl: “accusations 
have made us con-
cerned”; “single 
cases of overeager 
detectives”; “noth-
ing unusual in retail-
ing”. 
 Telekom: “There 
was no recording; it 
was merely neces-
sary to discover 
hacker code”. 
 
Appreciative Lidl: regret for the 
affair. 
Telekom: “We 
alerted public prose-
cution and will sup-
port all efforts for 
complete clarifica-
tion”; “discernible 
weaknesses” in se-
curity; “customer 
data are safe”. 
Lidl: “We are con-
cerned”; “we did not 
want this to hap-
pen.” 
Telekom: “Unhur-
ried investigations 
would have been 
impossible other-
wise”. 
Lidl: “We will con-
tinue to elucidate 
and openly inform”; 
“PIN might be re-
corded”; “video 
tapes are deleted 
daily”; “I have to 
blame myself for a 
lack of control”; ad 
campaign: “We trust 
Lidl – Trust Us”. 
Telekom: CEO 
meets Minister of 
the Interior; “data 
security of the high-
est priority”; “mis-
use is not a trivial 
offense” 
Telekom: “Apolo-
gize in the com-
pany’s name”; “for 
improper use of 
connection data”. 
Accommodative Lidl: “cooperation 
with the detectives 
was terminated, 
since their approach 
cannot be reconciled 
with our understand-
ing of treating em-
ployees fairly”. 
 Lidl: Cameras are 
removed; security 
systems “fundamen-
tally reformed”; 
“thank-you pay-
ment”; “proud of 
employees for 
standing by the 
company”. 
Telekom: “It’s now 
about preventing fu-
ture criminal mis-
use”. 
Lidl: “Special train-
ing for detectives”; 
“so that everybody 
knows what they’re 
dealing with”. 
Telekom: “First im-
portant piece” for 
ensuring better data 
security; creation of 
top executive and 
council for data se-
curity. 
 
from stores and developing an entirely new security system. When first signs of boycotts be-
came apparent, apologies and assurances of changes in treating employees were repeated. In 
addition, every employee staying with Lidl despite the scandal received a one-time bonus 
payment, followed by a media campaign asking customers to end the boycott. On behalf of 
Deutsche Telekom, the CEO met with the Minister of the Interior in order to provide informa-
tion on the spying incidents. He later announced that the company had enlisted well-known 
experts for the reorganization of corporate security. Rumors about a third of Telekom’s cus-
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tomer base wanting to change providers were countered by declaring that data security was of 
the highest priority. In response to new accusations of recording customer phone calls, Tele-
kom explained that there were no recordings, but that some attacks by computer hackers had 
to be detected. 
In the case of Lidl, the scandal had almost subsided after one month (phase 4). A large market 
research firm reported that Lidl’s losses in market share were smaller than estimated. Stores 
were equipped with new security cameras and detectives. However, it was emphasized that, 
under the new security rules, employees and customers would be informed about the surveil-
lance. In the end, Lidl was fined 1.5 million Euros. The last phase of the Telekom scandal saw 
an announcement by the CEO that he would apologize to all further persons concerned. He 
subsequently apologized to the workers’ council as well as the board of directors. A new top 
executive job for data security was created and access to sensitive data was restricted. 
Overall, the two scandals appear to be very similar, especially since both companies coped 
with them more or less successfully. There are, however, subtle differences: Lidl reacted more 
strongly right after its misconduct became public, while Telekom’s reactions were steadier 
and more evenly distributed over time. Lidl relied on defensive tactics to a greater extent than 
did Telekom, which in turn reacted almost exclusively by explaining and apologizing. This is 
particularly true for phase 1 of the scandals. On the other hand, Telekom did not move to sig-
nificant accommodative activities until very late in the progressing crisis. In other words, Lidl 
went from strong defense to quick acceptance of responsibility, while Telekom was more con-
formant from the beginning, but reacted more slowly. It may thus be concluded that temporal 
and qualitative aspects of the respective reactions balanced each other. This is in concordance 
with the outcomes of the crises. While it may be argued that Lidl suffered somewhat more due 
to customer boycotts, both companies remained largely unharmed. 
Product safety and health incidents 
Comparing the two incidents involving producers of powdered milk lead to a relatively clear 
picture of their differing reactions, be it in terms of temporal structure or combination of reac-
tion types. There were, however, a few commonalities. As was found in the other four cases 
none of the companies engaged in evasive behaviors. In addition, both organizations dis-
played the same total number of reactions, allowing for easier comparison. Again, these reac-
tions will now be described in more detail, while examples are listed in Table 7.  
One day after the media reported on over 400 children suffering from poisoned milk powder 
(phase 1), Sanlu Group publicly confirmed that their product was severely contaminated with
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Table 7. Reactions to product safety and health incidents over time by example. 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Evasive 
 
 
    
Defensive Sanlu: No an-
nouncement due to 
retailers refusing to 
remit products. 
Sanlu: Fraudulent 
suppliers are blamed 
for the problems. 
Mengniu: CFO 
claims that con-
taminated milk 
came from small 
suppliers. 
  
Appreciative Sanlu: admits to 
melamine in Sanlu 
products; “We fi-
nally imported for-
eign equipment in 
August [..] and 
found the milk pow-
der contained Mela-
mine”. 
Mengniu: “The 
situation is ex-
tremely distressing 
[…] important we 
get to the bottom of 
the problem […] 
we’re doing every-
thing […]. 
Sanlu: Vice Presi-
dent apologizes for 
the incident; con-
firmation of selling 
hazardous products 
for half a year; con-
fession to products 
still being on the 
market. 
 Mengniu: “we are 
very sorry to have 
caused harm […] 
offer sincere apolo-
gies and plea for 
forgiveness […] we 
welcome supervi-
sion from all walks 
of society.” 
Accommodative Sanlu: Recall of af-
fected products. 
Mengniu: An-
nouncement of pay-
ments twice the 
mandated amount; 
recall of all prod-
ucts; CEO offered to 
resign 
Sanlu: Director 
General fired. 
Mengniu: New test-
ing procedures an-
nounced; future fo-
cus on large suppli-
ers announced. 
Mengniu: Dairy in-
dustry established 
aid fund. 
 
melamine. Sanlu also initiated a large-scale recall in order to pull several hundred tons of milk 
powder from the value chain. When speculations arose whether Sanlu had already known 
about such problems since August – possibly March – of that year, a statement was issued ex-
plaining that there had been indications, but that Sanlu had not until recently gained access to 
more sophisticated foreign tests. However, it remained unclear if and when Sanlu had in-
formed authorities. According to Sanlu, they had refrained from a public warning because 
large retailers had refused to remit affected products. In the course of the melamine crisis, 
products of Mengniu Dairy Corporation were also found to be contaminated. On the same 
day, Mengniu issued a statement apologizing for the incident and announcing to pay twice the 
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state-mandated amount of compensation to victims of affected products. Mengniu then re-
called all of its products from retailers, and the CEO offered to resign his post. 
The following days (phase 2) saw Sanlu under intense criticism. The company refused to ex-
plain how the melamine could end up in the powdered milk and blamed fraudulent suppliers 
as the true perpetrators. Yet, Sanlu’s Vice President publicly apologized for the incident. 
When the number of victims continued to rise, Sanlu admitted to having been selling con-
taminated milk powder for at least half a year. The Director General of Sanlu was fired and 
arrested shortly after. The company then conceded that there were still hazardous products on 
retailer shelves. At Mengniu, the Chief Financial Officer apologized while emphasizing that 
only a small portion of the company’s product contained melamine. Regardless, the govern-
ment revoked its seal of quality for Mengniu milk powder. 
After the first week following the public uncovering of the health issues (phases 3 and 4), 
control over the situation had largely been taken out of Sanlu’s hands. The company was 
placed under oversight by the Chinese government and thus practically barred from issuing 
any more statements. Sanlu Group later filed for bankruptcy and was dissolved. Mengniu, be-
ing less affected by the strict government intervention, later announced the introduction of 
new testing procedures and techniques for dairy production. Finally, the remaining members 
of the Chinese dairy industry, including Mengniu, established an aid fund for the victims. 
Overall, reactions exhibited by Sanlu were more diverse than those by Mengniu. Sanlu em-
ployed more defensive and appreciative tactics, while Mengniu relied almost exclusively on 
accommodation. Moreover, Mengniu’s reactions were spread over several months, whereas 
Sanlu ceased communication with the public after one week. It should be noted, however, that 
this may have been due to government influence, which was much less strict for Mengniu. 
More generally, this case pair differs from the others in this study in that both organizations 
were part of the same crisis. On one hand, this serves as an additional “control” from a me-
thodical perspective, making the comparison more interesting. On the other hand, the crisis 
involved Sanlu from the very start and spread to other companies, including Mengniu, later. 
Mengniu therefore had more time to prepare in addition to not being portrayed as the primary 
perpetrator. 
Conclusions from Study 2 
In sum, there were considerable differences in reaction patterns within case pairs, particularly 
for accidents and products safety incidents. As for the classes of reactions, the distribution of 
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tactics followed the rule: the more conformant the more often. Accommodative reactions were 
most common, followed closely by the appreciative, and, at an interval, the defensive. Most 
strikingly, there was no evidence for evasive behavior in any of the cases. There are (at least) 
two possible explanations for this finding. First, the organizations involved may have re-
frained from retreat, concealment or denial because it was too late. Evasive reactions may be 
ineffective once the existence of a crisis has become obvious (Breitsohl 2009; Elsbach 2001). 
Second, since the analysis for Study 2 was based on media reports, it is possible that some of 
the organizations did use evasive tactics successfully in that the media simply did not notice 
the existing problems. This may be true, for example, in the Deutsche Telekom case. Before 
informing the public about the spying practices, the company had calmly conducted internal 
investigations.  
This may have been instrumental in overcoming the crisis without significant harm. It should 
be noted, however, that a comparison of the two scandals in terms of efficacy of reaction 
classes turned out to be difficult. Both Telekom and Lidl relied mostly on appreciative, some 
accommodative and a few defensive reactions. Yet, this does support earlier propositions that 
appreciative and accommodative tactics should be more effective in scandals (Breitsohl 
2009). With regards to the two product safety incidents, additional support for those proposi-
tions was found since the accommodative reactions exhibited by Mengniu proved more suc-
cessful than the defensive behavior by Sanlu. As noted before, however, Mengniu did have 
the benefit of being able to learn from Sanlu’s mistakes made in the very same crisis. On a 
more general level, “second-reactors” may often be in an advantageous position because the 
first company affected by an industry-wide crisis has to take a major part of the blame. For 
the two accidents, accommodative signals sent by Mandala Airlines were more effective than 
the defensive strategy pursued by Adam Air. While this does not provide support for 
Breitsohl’s (2009) suggestion of displaying rational, neutral reactions, it is congruent with re-
sults reported by Marcus and Goodman (1991).  
As for the four time phases into which the case histories were divided, two overall patterns in 
organizational crisis reactions emerged. Across reaction classes, phases 1 and 3 contained 
significantly higher activity than phases 2 and 4. It appears that, generally, an initial wave of 
reactions was followed by periods of waiting for public reactions before another wave of reac-
tions was issued. This would back up the conceptualization of organizational crises as dis-
courses consisting of organizational action and stakeholder feedback (Pfarrer et al. 2008). Be-
tween reaction classes, there was a clear shift from more resistant to more conformant tactics 
over time. More specifically, defensive reactions quickly subsided after a few days following 
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the threatening event and remained at a very low level. Appreciative and accommodative re-
actions exhibited the wave pattern described above. In terms of efficacy, reacting swiftly pro-
ved more successful for accidents and scandals, taking into account unreported evasive tactics 
by Deutsche Telekom. This supports earlier findings concerning the importance of timing in 
crisis management (Breitsohl 2008). 
Discussion 
The goal of the studies summarized in this paper was to gain insights into the course of organ-
izational crises in order to identify candidate relationships between crisis types, dimensions of 
legitimacy, and organizational reactions. To this end, two qualitative comparative case studies 
were conducted, for which large volumes of media reports on crises were analyzed. Most 
generally, support was found for the relevance of legitimacy in the context of organizational 
crises. As Study 1 showed, three out of four dimensions drawn from the literature on legiti-
macy were affected by threatening events, while the fourth may have been excluded due to 
methodological biases. Furthermore, deductively gained propositions by Breitsohl (2009) on 
relationships between crisis types and dimensions of legitimacy were largely supported by 
Study 1. This was particularly true for scandals, where moral and regulative legitimacy were 
primarily impacted. Partial support was found in that product safety and health incidents re-
duced regulative legitimacy. Lack of support in cases of accidents may be due to idiosyncra-
sies. Study 2 brought additional support for earlier work (Breitsohl 2008, 2009). Specifically, 
beyond reinforcing a stakeholder perspective on crises, results show that timing of crisis man-
agement measures played an important role in effectively handling both accidents and scan-
dals. In terms of reactions classes, scandals and products safety incidents followed the pattern 
posited by Breitsohl (2009). Specifically, conformant tactics proved successful in overcoming 
scandals. 
Despite these valuable insights, there are some limitations to consider, pertaining mainly to 
the use of media reports as data source as well as comparative qualitative case studies as a re-
search design. First, Study 1 comprised nine highly diverse cases, yet none of the reports on 
any of the cases provided a basis for assessing an effect on pragmatic legitimacy. This was 
explained above by a possible irrelevance of pragmatic evaluative aspects to journalists. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this explanation. Still, the scarcity of data on 
pragmatic legitimacy points to a limitation of media analysis as an indicator for public opin-
ion. Moreover, media reports not only reflect, but also shape the public opinion about an or-
ganization (Dowling/Pfeffer 1975). This is also true for reports on organizational crises. As 
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Nelkin (1988) pointed out, the media “serve as filters through which the public receives news 
and interpretations of accidents” (p. 341). In this process, norms and expectations of the jour-
nalists reporting the news play an important role. Thus, although very useful, media reports 
are not a perfect measure of organizational legitimacy. 
Second, by their very definition, organizational crises are rare events. This, in combination 
with the extant diversity of organizations, even within a particular industry, should render in-
dividual crises very dissimilar to each other, making comparative studies even more difficult. 
Indeed, the cases presented in Study 2, although purposely selected to be similar, exhibited 
numerous idiosyncrasies limiting comparison. For instance, prior to the spying scandal, Lidl 
had been suffering from reports on poor personnel management practices. Deutsche Telekom, 
on the other hand, has a notoriously poor image among the German population because, being 
a former state-owned monopolist, it faced great challenges in improving customer service. It 
remains unclear whether these individual histories affected the course of the scandals. Similar 
limitations can be found for Study 1. For example, the company operating the ill-fated pas-
senger train was largely owned by the state. This ownership structure may provide a different 
legitimacy basis compared to private companies. Moreover, industries employing high-risk 
technologies are often highly-regulated, making the organizations difficult to compare. In 
sum, while single-case studies of crises have provided great insights (e.g. Vaughan 1990; 
Weick 1990, 1993), this research design appears to exhibit more limitations for exploring re-
lationships from a stakeholder perspective. 
While the results presented in this paper point to the importance of studying organizational 
crises from a legitimacy perspective, as well as shedding light on the possible role of legiti-
macy in the resolution of crises, there is still room for further research. One goal could be to 
overcome the limitations of case studies outlined above in order to achieve higher levels of 
generalization. This may require researchers to abstract away from single real-world cases and 
focus on archetypes of crises, although those may be difficult to delineate. Furthermore, since 
measuring organizational legitimacy through media reports has considerable yet limited value, 
more direct approaches could contribute greatly to understanding perceptions of legitimacy. 
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